"If this were merely an objection of taste, I should be willing to allow that Grotius has indeed poured forth his learning with a profusion that sometimes rather encumbers than adorns his work, and which is not always necessary to the illustration of his subject. Yet, even in making that concession, I should rather yield to the taste of others than speak from my own feelings. I own that such richness and splendour of literature have a powerful charm for me. They fill my mind with an endless variety of delightful recollections and associations. They relieve the understanding in its progress through a vast science, by calling up the memory of great men, and of interesting events. By this means we see the truths of morality clothed with all the eloquence (not that could be produced by the powers of one man, but) that could be bestowed on them by the collective genius of the world. Even virtue and wisdom themselves acquire new majesty in my eyes, when I thus see all the great masters of thinking and writing called together, as it were, from all times and countries, to do them homage, and to appear in their train. But this is no place for discussions of taste, and I am very ready to own that mine may be corrupted. "The work of Grotius is liable to a more serious objection, though I do not recollect that it has ever been made. His method is inconvenient and unscientifick. He has inverted the natural order. That natural order undoubtedly dictates, that we should first search for the original principles of the science in human nature; then apply them to the regulation of the conduct of individuals; and lastly, employ them for the decision of those difficult and complicated questions that arise with respect to the intercourse of nations. But Grotius has chosen the reverse of this method. He begins with the consideration of the states of peace and war, and he examines original principles only occasionally and incidentally, as they grow out of the questions which he is called upon to decide. It is a necessary consequence of this disorderly method, which exhibits the elements of the science in the form of scattered digressions, that he seldom employs sufficient discussion on these fundamental truths, and never in the place where such a discussion would be most instructive to the reader. "This defect in the plan of Grotius was perceived and supplied by Puffendorf, who restored natural law to that superiority which belonged to it, and with great propriety treated the law of nations as only one main branch of the parent stock. Without the genius of his master, and with very inferiour learning, he has yet treated this subject with sound sense, with clear method, with extensive and accurate knowledge, and with a copiousness of detail, sometimes indeed tedious, but always instructive and satisfactory. His work will be always studied by those who spare no labour to acquire a deep knowledge of the subject, but it will in our times, I fear, be oftener found on the shelf than on the desk of the general student. "In the time of Mr. Locke it was considered as the manual of those who were intended for active life; but in the present age, I believe, it will be found that men of business are too much occupied, men of letters are too fastidious, and men of the world too indolent, for the study or even the perusal of such works. Far be it from me to derogate from the real and great merit of so useful a writer as Puffendorf. His treatise is a mine in which all his successors must dig. I only presume to suggest, that a book so prolix, and so utterly void of all the attractions of composition, is likely to repel many readers who are interested, and who might perhaps be disposed to acquire some knowledge of the principles of publick law."* PARTICULAR SYLLABUS. TITLE II. "Principles, causes, and elements being unknown, the science whereof they are, is altogether unknown."......FORTES. CH. VIII. THE ELEMENTARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE MUNICIPAL LAW OF ENGLAND: AND HEREIN, I. OF THE FEUDAL LAW. (Note 1.) | 1st. Robertson's State of Europe, introductory to his History of the emperor Charles V. 2d. The 1st. vol. of Hume's History of England, page 216. 298. 397. 467. 2d. vol. * Vide Mack. Intro. Disco. p. 15. (London, 1799.) page 1. 398. E. 3d. Gilbert Stuart's View of Civil Society. (Note 2.) 4th. Dalrymple on Feudal Property. (Note 3.) 6th. Lord chief baron Gilbert's Treatise of II. THE INSTITUTES OF THE MUNICIPAL LAW GE NERALLY. 1st. Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England. (Note 5.) 2d. Wooddeson's Systematical View of the Laws of England. (Note 6.) III. OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF THE COMMON LAW. E. 1st. Gilbert Stuart's Historical Dissertation concerning the Antiquity of the English Constitution.† 2d. De Lolme on the Constitution of England. (Note 7.) E. 3d. Plowden's Treatise on the Constitution of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. (Note 8.) * Vide note 2 on this Title. + Vide note 2 on the second Title. 4th. Eunomus, or Dialogues on the Law and Constitution of England. (Note 9.) 5th. Hale's History of the Common Law. 6th. Reeves' History of the English Law, from the time of the Saxons to the reign of Henry VII. (Note 10.) NOTES ON THE SECOND TITLE. (Note 1.) FEUDAL LAW, WHY THE STUDY OF IT SHOULD PRECEDE THAT OF THE COMMON LAW. The laws like the language of England, are of a very miscellaneous character: nearly every part of this vast system of jurisprudence is somewhat tinctured with feudalism; but the law affecting real property has its foundation deeply laid in the rules and principles of that extraordinary code. To acquire a comprehensive and philosophical view of the laws of England, it is very essential to examine the early history of that country and of Europe generally, and to explore the very sources and springs whence these laws originated; for ignoratis causis rerum, ut res ipsas ignoretis necesse est; and these are principally to be found in the repositories of the laws and customs of the dark and feudal ages. If, therefore, the student aspire to a knowledge of something more than mere "expository jurisprudence," which terminates in ascertaining the ita lex scripta est; if he desire to contemplate law "censorially," and thereby investigate its spirit and philosophy, in order to determine its justness or what it |