direction of affairs earlier; had he obtained the intervention, his reign would still have been transitory. Toreno is not the man of a revolution; he is sceptical and not ambitious. Without that firm conviction which produces civil virtues, he does not heartily embrace public principles, nor seriously embark in the public cause. Toreno, I repeat, is not ambitious. He does not aspire to power. He loves it not. Now ambition is a necessary virtue for a statesman; it is almost indispensable in any high social position; it is ambition which makes a great minister; it is ambition which triumphs over difficulties; it is by means of this passion that a name is imprinted on he rock of ages, and that the world is shaken; without ambition there are no durat ble conceptions, no firm devotion to any cause, no great designs, no powerful execu tion! But here, be it understood, I speak not of that vulgar ambition that destroyed the temple of Ephesus. The love of notoriety is but an inferior appetite. Ambition is another thing! It is Julius Cæsar who pursues one only object for fifteen years; and then in the field of Pharsalia breaks the Roman patriciate; it is Richelieu who sees the end he proposes to himself, and marches steadily on to it; he dies, but with him expires the French aristocracy; he leaves the people and the throne; it is Napoleon who places the people on the throne, and inoculates Europe with plebian royalty. Such is ambition! and it is a ray of this ardent flame of life that I would wish to see in Toreno. I would, that the regeneration of Spain should be his constant idea; that he should devote himself to it, that he should resolve to accomplish it at any price. But he is not anxious to acquire fame by performing a glorious work. Besides he does not love Spain sufficiently. Accustomed, during his long exile, to European customs, his country seems to him barbarous, and so much behind all others, that he despairs of it. Such are the faults of Toreno." Here our space compels us to close our translations from this valuable little work. We refer those of our readers who may wish to know more of it, to the original, which we doubt not can be readily procured. SONNET THE DISTANT LAND. Ask him, if in that land beyond the sea Ask him, if in that land of melody He pines to tread these quiet vales with me! He seeks the shadow of some silent grove, MEXICO AND TEXAS.* ARTICLE SECOND.-MANIFESTO OF GENERAL SANTA ANNA. In our former article upon the Campaign in Texas, in 1836, we drew largely upon "The Diary" of General Urrea, a publication marked by all the blunt honesty of the soldier, and bearing upon it the impress of manliness and truth. We now enter upon the examination of a document, the characteristics of which are the very reverse of all that we felt called upon to commend in the former publication. The "Manifesto" of General Santa Anna has more the air of a piece of special pleading, painfully and cautiously elaborated in the closet, than the strait-forward story of a soldier, penned in haste upon the drum-head, and amidst the tumult of the tented field. At every page, we are reminded of the wary policy of one who is studious to make the best of a bad cause, and compelled to mask the poverty of his reasoning under a profusion of rhetorical phrase, and periods rounded for effect. In a word, his composition smells more of the lamp, than of honest gunpowder. For instance, he talks of "la fortuna, y ella sola, cortò las álas à la victoria que nos venia á alcanzar," (fortune, and she alone, clipped the wings of that victory which was just alighting upon us ;) the very plain and simple fact that Thompsontown was too important a post to leave in the hands of the enemy, figures thus: "En Tompson estuba aun la urna del destino, y quise apoderarme de sus decretos," (in Thompson stood the urn of destiny, and I wished to possess myself of its decrees;) but ere we reach the close of the sentence the trope is changed, and we have "me fué imposible asir esa ancora de salvacion," (it was impossible for me to grasp * Diario Militar del General Jose Urrea, durante la Primera Campana de Tejas.— Victoria de Durango, 1836. (Military Diary of General Jos. Urrea, during the first Texas Campaign.) Manifesto que de sus Operaciones en la Campana de Tejas, y en su Cautiverio dirige a sus conciudadanos, el General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.-Vera Cruz, 1837. (Manifesto of operations in the Campaign in Texas, and of his captivity, addressed to his fellow-citizens by General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.) Eposician de los operaciones en la Campana de Tejas, del General D. Vicente Filisola.-Mejico, 1837. (Exposition of operations in the Campaign of Texas, by General D. Vincent Filisola.) this anchor of salvation.) The battle of San Jacinto is characterized as "los mismos escombros donde se quiere sepultar mi gloria," (the very ruins under which it was sought to entomb my glory.) He describes himself as "mas dcsdichado que Manlio, acusado ante el pueblo Romano, las heridas recibidas por la patria, lejos de procurarme una absolucion injusta de un crimen cierto, son ellas mismas al recibirlas y al curarlas, los delitos de que tengo que vindicarme," (more unhappy than Manlius, accused before the Roman people,-the wounds received for my country, far from procuring an unjust absolution for a crime that was certain, are themselves, at the very moment I was receiving and dressing them, the delinquencies from which I have to vindicate myself.) Certain scribes in the Mexican newspapers had taken it into their heads to compare Santa Anna to Napoleon, and he takes cares to let us know the fact: "Algun periodista soñò comparar mis campañas á las de Napoleon, y mis enemigos esperaban que la de Tejas me seriatan funesta, como al héroe Corso la de Rusia," (some periodical writer bethought himself of comparing my campaigns to those of Napoleon, and my enemies hoped that that of Texas would prove as fatal to me, as that of Russia to the Corsican hero;) all this is curious, but the effect which he gravely describes these evil wishes of his enemies as producing on his mind, is still more so; era para mi una inagotable fuente de reflecsiones desconsolatorias," (it was to me an inexhaustible source of desolating reflection.) Speaking of his imprisonment in Texas, he has the following flourish: "Yo me proponia, cuando escuchaba el crugido de los grillos que me aherrojaban, en llegando à romperlos presentar las señales que en mi dejaron, en ofrenda á mi patria!" (I proposed to myself, while listening to the clanking of the chains by which I was held captive, that should I succeed in bursting them, I would present the marks they had left upon me as an offering to my country!) From this we may gather, that at least Santa Anna has no mean opinion of himself; but whether his country would feel flattered by such an oblation, and deem it of such paramount value, is another question. We might continue to amuse our readers with a hundred other specimens of the same tone-the true 'Ercles' vein'-but these are sufficient for our purpose. They will tend to throw more light upon the character of the man, and afford more certain data for estimating the calibre of his mind, than any portrait we could presume to attempt. We now proceed to the pamphlet itself. 66 In our former article, we traced the progress of the Texan campaign till towards the middle of April, 1836, up to which time every thing had succeeded favorably to the Mexicans. We now come to the memorable day on which the tide turned in favor of the young Republic; the battle of San Jacinto took place on the 21st April, and the capture of Santa Anna on the day following We will allow this grand actor in this extraordinary scene to tell his own story, or rather to draw up his own apology for his errors on that eventful day; and sorry we are that it comes in the shape of an apology; a round unvarnished tale, in the manner of Urrea, would have satisfied us far better. After Santa Anna has, in his usual vein, edified us with a most complaisant commentary on his skill in taking up a commanding position, and arranging his plan of attack, he surprises the reader with this question: But, if all things were thus favorable to us, and the military arrangements so good, whence comes it that the day of San Jacinto proved so fatal to us? It is to be ascribed to the disproportion of recruits in the five hundred men commanded by General Cos, who, as is well known, are not only unavailable in action, but cause the greatest disorder, especially in irregular movements, and in case of a surprise. It was also owing to the sending on of a convoy which I had prohibited, and which, for its safe conveyance, deprived me of one hundred, out of five hundred men I had sent for. It is also in part attributable to the interception of a letter, and of the officer bearing the same, which, contrary to my express orders, was sent from Thompson. It was no less due to excessive fatigue, and want of provisions for the five hundred men of General Cos, and for my escort; being pressed by imperious necessity, I had allowed them to use the rations of the former. It was likewise owing to the contempt, well founded enough up to the present time, though carried to excess, with which our troops had taught themselves to look upon the ever-flying foe. It also arose from the sinuous nature of the ground occupied by us, which enabled the enemy to occupy a wood to the right, and of which, through a relaxation of the vigilance recommended by me, they at last, by a desperate effort, possessed themselves. None of these causes depended directly or indirectly on myself; all I can be considered responsible for is physical debility, or after having marched the whole of the previous day, and spending the night in watching, and the morning on horseback, I yielded to repose, which I was unfortunately induced to prolong in consequence of the delay of General Cos' troops. As General-in-Chief, I had fulfilled my duty, by disposing every thing on the field, and issuing the necessary orders; as a man, I yielded to the insurmountable necessity of nature, which cannot, I think, with justice be charged as a crime against any general, or me, much less when it took place at mid-day, underneath a tree, and in the camp itself; a proof that I did not abandon myself immoderately to that which, after all, is but a comfort a balm, or gentle tribute to human nature, with which the greatest men have been unable to dispense, not excepting HIM, the great military exemplar of our age; and yet for this they were not accused of rashness and want of foresight, and due caution. We were conquered at San Jacinto, and, on the twenty-second of April, 1 was brought into the presence of the Texan leader, Houston." The reader will not fail to remark, that while the hero of Tampico enters into so elaborate an apology for taking a nap in the middle of the day, he adroitly glides over, in two short lines, the very delicate scene of his capture by a single Texan soldier, on the twenty-second, and the curious minutia by which that capture was attended. Another important fact is also covered with the decent veil of silence, but which is notorious to all Santa Anna's countrymen, and that is, the motive by which he was induced to undertake this march in advance of his main body, with a mere handful of his forces. It is known to have originated in a feeling altogether un worthy of one aspiring to the character of a patriot, a feeling which should have been merged in the greatness of the object he had in view, in which were involved interests so vital to his country. It was a mean feeling of cupidity. He had received information that Galveston Bay was the great point of meeting for those who waited, with all their valuables around them, the issue of the campaign; and it was the strong desire of securing something more solid than etherial glory, that led him, by forced marches, in that direction. He continues: "In my new position, as a prisoner, I was doomed to numberless sufferings of every kind, which, had they terminated my existence, would have sheltered me from all those accusations on the part of my fellow-citizens, to which I have listened with so much sorrow. In their opinion, the tomb was the destiny to which honor pointed me, accusing me of rashness and imprudence in the first instance, and in the second, of pusilanimity and treason. As no other victories were expected at my hands, death, instead of a disgrace, would have formed my apotheosis, &c. The first thing which I did in my prison, was to claim the treatment and consideration of a prisoner of war. The word relaliation, which met my ears at Houston, brought me into a discussion, which was in every way dangerous, considering my position, drawing as I did, a parallel between Mexico and the Texas, in which the justice of the war, and the character of the two belligerant parties were freely discussed. The son of D. Lorenzo Zavala served me as an interpreter, and at last I became extremely offended at a proposition made to me, that nearly the whole of the army under my command, should lay down their arms. The idea thus advanced was in the highest degree offensive to the national honor, and so greatly was my indignation raised by the proposition, that Houston himself blushed at his having proposed it, and contented himself with simply demanding the retreat of the army. Let it not be supposed that I pretend to give myself more importance than my position as General-in-Chief is entitled to; I could well conceive that my troops would fall into dismay at the news of my being a prisoner, and that it would require no little tact to re-animate their drooping spirits. I tried to make the best I could of the present untoward state of things, which doubtless was to save the lives of my companions in misfortune, as well as my own, in the first moments of excitement and danger, and to gain time so that the troops composing the army might unite, and decide on what was best to be done. It appeared certain, that, in the first moments of disorder produced by a misfortune of such a character as that of San Jacinto, the operations of our troops ought to be suspended for a season, while the courage of the soldier was re-animated by the noble idea of avenging the recent outrage, under the conviction, that, as superiority and justice were on his side, he could and ought to attempt a new issue of things, by a new attack upon the enemy. Judging by the present aspect of things, and left as we were to the mercy and the interest of our enemies, it did not appear likely that our lives would be spared, though in the end it so turned out. The retreat *It may be well to compare this statement with an assertion of the General's, 、p. 27-8.) "Two days would have been sufficient for the single body of forces that had joined in Thompson, to have given a blow to the enemy that would readily have repaired the misfortune of the twenty-first. By the twenty-seventh, their whole forces ought to have been destroyed, and their provisions, &c., in our power. The general who succeeded me, ought to have made an attack; for I flatter myself, at the risk of appearing presumptuous, that if I had succeeded in reaching Thompson, as I projected, before three days, victory would have lighted on our ranks." In another place he speaks of the enemy's forces, “que podian facilmente pulverizar, p. 73," (which they could easily have pulverized.) |