closure of intelligence information which either the proposed Senate Intelligence Committee or the full Senate has determined should be kept secret pursuant to procedures recognized in Senate Resolution 400. Under our amendment, any unauthorized disclosure of information which the committee or the Senate had determined should be kept secret would have to be kept secret. It could not be publicly disclosed. Should there be a disclosure either by a member or by a staff aide, that person would be subject to sanctions. The authority to recommend sanctions would be placed in the Senate Select Committee on Standards and Conduct. In the case of an unauthorized disclosure, we would expect that the Select Committee would usually initiate an investigation of its own. In case it did not, however, either 5 members of the Intelligence Committee or 16 Members of the Senate could require such an investigation. The Committee on Standards and Conduct would, of course, be free to recommend a range of sanctions or even no sanctions-depending upon what its investigation indicated was appropriate. In order for sanctions to be imposed, they would have to be approved by the full Senate.

Senator ALLEN. Excuse me for interrupting. What do you mean by "sanctions"? Give me two or three examples as to a Senator and staff

member.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Sanctions, as to a Senator, could mean removing him from the committee, excluding access to certain information all the way to expulsion from the Senate.

Senator ALLEN. What about a staff member?

Senator HUDDLESTON. A staff member could be fired. He then, of course, would be subject to any other provision of the law that would apply to the situation.

Senator ALLEN. It could not go to the extent of a fine or imprison

ment?

Senator HUDDLESTON. I am not sure that the Senate has the authority to provide for that in a resolution unless it is under its contempt authority.

I believe that our amendment is important for several reasons. As a member of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, I have been extremely sensitive to the need to make more of our intelligence information available and yet at the same time to protect our sources, methods, means, other very sensitive data.

and

Certainly our jobs as legislators and policymakers in a number of areas would be easier if we had access to the tremendous amount of information which our intelligence agencies collect from a variety of sources about a wide scope of subjects. There is no doubt in my mind that more of the information-more of the material which informs. evaluates and assesses could be made available to Members of Congress and to the public. For that reason, I also recommended language which appears in section 4 (a) of Senate Resolution 400 and which requires periodic reports by the Intelligence Committee to the full Senate.

On the other hand, it seems to me obvious that it is not only counterproductive but irresponsible to release information which could endanger the lives of those who collect and assemble our intelligence information, which could alert unfriendly nations to our methods of

collecting information so that they could render those methods ineffective, which could reveal certain technological capabilities which we have, or which could seriously harm our security. To determine when such information would have these results is not an easy task. A cursory reading of material may not reveal the implications which one with expertise in the field could glean. The way material is presented or the perspective can often give hints as to where the information was obtained. The proposed committee will have to deal with this matter. Indeed, along with oversight, the distinguishing between what information should be released and what should be closely held, will certainly be one of its prime concerns.

Thus, if we in Congress are to prove that we are capable of handling this information in a responsible manner, if we are to demonstrate that we can release that which should be released and protect that which must be protected, we must have viable and effective processes. Our amendment seeks to provide such a process with regard to

sanctions.

In reading it, one must recall that it goes hand in hand with the other provisions of the bill. Those provisions provide for sharing of information among Senators under supervised situations, and I think that ought to be stressed, for sharing among appropriate committees, for reference to the full Senate for resolution those cases where a small minority of Members believe that information should be released. But, it seems of paramount importance to me that when the proposed intelligence committee or the full Senate determines that information is so sensitive that our Nation's security and public good demand it should be closely held, then to disregard this determination cannot

go unnoticed.

Unfortunately. many of our citizens see Congress as a sieve for headline-grabbing data which adversely affects our Nation's interest and security. Unfortunately, our intelligence agencies are often reluctant to cooperate with Congress because they do not believe we either understand that certain secret information must be just that— secret or that we are capable of containing it.

This is not to say that there is not an unnecessary degree of classification or to deny that there are instances of classification to protect mistakes and policy misjudgments. The whole matter of proper classification procedures is another issue that should be addressed by the Congress.

But our basic responsibility in this legislation is to balance the needs of legislators for information in order to perform their tasks and the needs of the people in a free and open society to know and understand the policies which their Government takes in their name against the need to protect that information upon which our Nation's security

depends.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the ability of the Senate to exercise proper and responsible oversight of the Nation's intelligence activities will depend to a large extent on the degree to which we can discipline ourselves in the handling of sensitive information. The sanctions provisions of Senate Resolution 400 will go a long way toward assuring that discipline.

Mr. Chairman, I have, as you are aware, addressed letters to you relating to the reporting requirements of this bill and the membership

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requirements for the proposed committee. I will, with your permission, submit those for the record at this time, rather than comment on them.

[The letters referred to above follow:]

Hon. HOWARD W. CANNON,

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, D.C., March 16, 1976.

Chairman, Committee on Rules and Administration,

U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This letter is in regard to section 6 of S. 2893 which, in slightly modified form, became section 4(a) of Senate Resolution 400.

This section requires the Committee on Intelligence Activities to make regular and periodic reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies and to call to the attention of the Senate or any appropriate committee or committees of the Senate any matters which might require their attention.

I am enclosing a copy of my testimony before the Government Operations Committee in which I explained my reasons for proposing the section. I believe reports such as those required by the section could not only contribute to an understanding of the role of intelligence activities but also, in doing so, help restore confidence in these agencies.

I would, however, like to call your committee's attention to a particular paragraph on page three of my testimony in which I discussed what I thought the guidelines or parameters of the report should be. That paragraph reads as follows:

"Secondly, I think it important to note that the provision does not envision a wholesale release of classified or sensitive information. The section itself directs that national security be protected. It does not contemplate the naming of agents, the revealing of specific details of on-going operations, which can only lead to undesirable results. Instead, it refers to reports on the 'nature and extent' of intelligence activities. Thus, it does contemplate the provision of general information on the total range of activities to all Senators. For those instances where classified materials might be involved, section 6 should be read in conjunction with section 11."

Should your committee decide to include section 4(a) in your version of the legislation, and I certainly hope you will, you might also want to consider inclusion of report language along the lines of the above paragraph, suggesting the parameters which are envisioned for the report.

Finally, I would like to refer to two statements in the Govenment Operations Committee report on this section (page 17 of Senate Report 94-675) which I believe are important. One indicates that the Government Operations Committee expects a minimum of one such report a year, with which I would certainly agree. The other notes that the section is to be read in conjunction with the sanctions provision, i.e., it is not to be read as a way of making disclosures which either should not be made or should be made in another manner. Furthermore, the report must be prepared and released in such a way as to protect national security.

Should you have any questions concerning the above, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

WALTER D. HUDDLESTON.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER D. HUDDLESTON BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FEBRUARY 6, 1976

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before the Committee on Government Operations this morning to testify on proposed legislation to establish a new Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities.

My service on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities has served only to reinforce my commitment to a strong and effective intelligence community, responsive to the needs of both national security and the Constitution. That service has, however, convinced me that the Congress must take upon its shoulders a larger responsibility for overseeing the activities of the various intelligence agencies. This, in turn, requires that the Senate be advised of the general nature and extent of intelligence matters. And, that in turn, requires that the Senate keep secrets and control itself internally.

Section 6 of the legislation introduced by certain members of the Select Committee provides that:

"The Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate, for the purposes of accountability to the Senate, shall make regular and periodic reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the intelligence activities of the various de partments and agencies of the United States. Such committee shall promptly call to the attention of the committees or to other appropriate committee or committees of the Senate any matters deemed by the Committee on Intelligence Activities to require the immediate attention of the Senate or such other committee or committees. In making such reports, the committee shall proceed in such manner as will protect national security."

Within the Select Committee, this section has sometimes been referred to as the Huddleston amendment. As a result, I would like to make a few comments concerning it.

First, it is important, I believe, to note that the section is modeled on similar language pertaining to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which deals with the very sensitive matter of development, use and control of atomic energy. Section 2252 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code established a Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. That section provides in pertinent part:

The [Atomic Energy Commission shall keep the Joint Committee fully and currently informed with respect to all of the commission's activities. The Department of Defense shall keep the Joint Committee fully and currently informed with respect to all matters within the Department of Defense relating to the development, utilization, or application of atomic energy. Any Government agency shall furnish any information requested by the Joint Committee with respect to the activities or responsibilities of that agency in the field of atomic energy."

That part of the Atomic Energy Act funnels the information to the Committee. Perhaps more important for our purposes, however, is a latter portion of that same section which provides that:

"The members of the Joint Committee who are Members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate...

Second, I think it important to note that the provision does not envision a wholesale release of classified or sensitive information. The section itself directs that national security be protected. It does not contemplate the naming of agents, the revealing of specific details of on-going operations, which can only lead to undesirable results. Instead, it refers to reports on the "nature and extent" of intelligence activities. Thus, it does contemplate the provision of general information on the total range of activities to all Senators. For those instances where classified materials might be involved, Section 6 should be read in conjunction with Section 11.

Perhaps the Angola situation best illustrates the need for Section 6. Some time ago, the Select Committee learned of the United States interest in Angola. We, of course, as we did throughout our investigation, kept this information in the strictest confidence, even to the point of not informing our fellow Senators. As the situation developed and information came from other sources, I saw conclusions being drawn on the basis of partial information and became increasingly aware of the real need of the Senate to know what was transpiring in Angola. Certainly, the U.S. Senate could have been provided more complete information on the situation-without naming contacts, sources of information, etc.

Third, I think it important to note that the reporting provision should not be read in a vacuum. Instead, Section 6 must be read in conjunction with Sections 7, 9 and 10, which involve the disclosure of information. Section 10, for example. seeks to create a process for the release of information, which the President and other specified members of the Executive Branch have objected to having disclosed. I believe your committee will want to examine this proposed process closely and perhaps strengthen it. And, for my own part, I would like to see it operate in conjunction with some type of sanctions for those who fail to honor and respect the responsibility which knowledge of sensitive matters of national security carries with it.

Certainly, it is reasonable to ask, “How will Congress act once it has received sensitive information?" I am deeply concerned about this issue. Indeed, it shares equally in importance with my desire to have the Senate fully informed so that it may intelligently decide questions of grave national importance. As one commentator so aptly put it recently, if Congress is to be taken seriously in exercising its oversight function, then it will have to devise ways for securing information

and for the orderly declassification and disclosure of information. I firmly be lieve that the task of dignifying and solemnizing this process falls squarely upon the shoulders of the Senate and that it must not flinch from this responsibility. Recently, I have at times had the feeling that we were all riding a "runaway horse" with information galloping forth and no one able to pull in the reins. That must be eliminated and replaced with understanding and acceptance of the fact that some secrets have to be just that-secret.

That is why I urge that the Senate consider the Section 6 reporting provision in conjunction with its consideration of provisions dealing with disclosure. Such provisions are designed not only to accord more sanctity to the process of disclosure but also to delineate a method for dealing with this complex issue. I personally believe that once individual Senators become exposed to the problems of intelligence that the full burden of responsibility will be felt and appreciated. But, that cannot be left to chance or hope or wishful thinking. Consequently, I believe it is incumbent upon the Senate to develop the internal sanctions it deems appropriate for unauthorized disclosure by its Members. Whether these should be fines, denial of access to classified materials, automatic expulsion from an intelligence committee should the person be a member, censure or even expulsion are matters of such grave import that they should receive the most studied and thoughtful consideration by the Senate. But, whatever the specifics decided upon, I believe it is imperative that the Senate adopt some standard which it believes in and will enforce with wisdom.

During most of the Select Committee's deliberations on proposed legislation, the draft contained the following provision regarding sanctions for Members who fail to comply with secrecy requirements:

"No Member of the Senate and no member of the staff of the Senate shall disclose outside the Senate any information conveyed to the Senate in closed session or otherwise made available to Members of the Senate in confidence by the Committee on Intelligence Activities, unless authorized by the Senate.

"The Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate shall refer to the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct of the Senate for investigation and other action (1) any disclosure outside the Committee on Intelligence Activities of the Senate, not authorized by such committee, of any information in the possession of or obtained by such committee relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the United States engaged in intelligence activities, or otherwise held in confidence by such committee; and (2) any disclosure outside the Senate, not authorized by the Senate, of any information conveyed to the Senate in closed session or otherwise made available to Members of the Senate in confidence by the Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Select Committee on Standards and Conduct shall investigate any breach of confidentiality referred to it pursuant to this subsection and shall recommend appropriate action, such as censure, or removal from office." I regret that this language was dropped from S. 2893 as introduced, and I am recommending comparable language be included in any bill reported to the full Senate. With the Committee's permission, I will in the next few days offer some specific suggestions regarding the original language as well as some recommendations on my own, which will include a broader range of sanctions. If comparable language is not added within committee, it is my intention at this time to offer such language as an amendment when the bill reaches the floor. If we are serious about being responsible, we will impose on ourselves sanctions sufficient to guarantee that responsibility.

In addition, it is my intention to offer separate legislation which will provide criminal penalties for ex-employees of the intelligence agencies and the proposed intelligence committee who reveal classified information subsequent to their employment by the agency or committee. As you know, ex-employees of intelligence agencies are now sworn to secrecy through an employment contract. I do not believe this contractural arrangement is sufficient, as evidenced by the unhappy episodes of late in which ex-employees have revealed the names of present C.I.A. undercover agents. I would like to strengthen the bond of secrecy by providing criminal penalties for such unauthorized revelations of national security information.

The experiences of recent years have taught us that our institutions are strong and worthy of the confidence of the people. During this period, conflicts on policy issues have often taken the form of attacks on individual institutions. Many have been unmercifully buffeted. Yet, they have borne well the brunt of each sally. What is desperately needed now is a method of conciliation and mediation which