If a Senator is going to know, any way, should he not have the right to go to the source and back up, whether he will or will not vote, in secret session, to disclose this information? I think there may have been room there, too, to work this provision over. I have listened to the doubts around this circle, and my feeling is, as a result of these hearings, and the doubts that you have raised, that you are going to get a better resolution out of this.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, you have done a real fine job of studying this, and I certainly feel that the resolution was arrived at after consideration of all possible alternatives. I certainly want to commend you for fine dedication and hard work. You personally have done a fine job, and the committee itself has done a fine job in this area.

Senator RIBICOFF. Thank you very much. And thank you, Senator Allen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I do appreciate your testimony. You have been very, very helpful to the committee, and I thank you, Senator.

I just started to read one thing here from the "Constitution of the United States of America, Annotated," that I would like for you to hear before you go. I know that in your approach here you have not been attempting to assert the congressional authority over the conduct of foreign relations, but I was just starting to read something with relation to the authority of the Executive in that regard. Jefferson wrote in 1790, "The transactions of business with foreign nations is executive altogether. It belongs, then, to the head of that department. except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted to the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly."

Reading further here elaborating on the necessity of judicial abstinence in the conduct of foreign relations, Justice Jackson declared for the Court, and I quote:

The President, both as Commander in Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive confidences. But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution on the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate. complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or injuiry.

Senator RIBICOFF. May I make available for the record two briefs, one submitted for the CIA, by Mr. Rogovin, and another that was commissioned by the intelligence community on the question of legal responsibility for both the CIA and FBI. You will find this fascinating. There is a responsibility that we have in the Congress in this field. Thank you for calling that to my attention. I will submit those briefs for the record.

[The briefs referred to, subsequently received by the committee, may be found as exhibits 1 and 2, respectively, in the appendix of these hearings.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Senator Nunn.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cannon.

I know you have a series of witnesses, and I am going to cut my testimony as short as possible.

I participated in the Government Operations Committee markup of this legislation. I voted for the legislation, although I had some doubts about it then. We were, however, under a severe time restraint. I think Senator Ribicoff did an excellent job in leading our committee through deliberations, particularly with the time restraint he had.

I do, however, think there is a requirement for the Rules Committee to take another look at Senate Resolution 400 and see if it can be strengthened and improved on.

I believe that almost everyone would agree that, since the National Security Act of 1947 Congress has failed to provide effective oversight of intelligence activities. Many corrective proposals have been advanced during that time frame, but none has received final approval by Congress.

The jurisdiction of the proposed committee encompasses budgets for the intelligence activities of not only the CIA, but the State Department and Defense Department. I, among others, have raised the following question: Can the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meaningfully oversee our relations with nations throughout the world, consider treaties and agreements with nations, approve aid programs for nations, and at the same time permit another committee to determine the scope and character of our intelligence activities in these nations and monitor them for the Senate?

I am not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, but I suspect that the division of responsibility could jeopardize prospects for coherent congressional contribution to the formulation of our foreign policy. In other words, I think the Foreign Relations Committee has a strong interest in intelligence activities.

I am a member of the Armed Services Committee, and I am confident that the Armed Services Committee cannot authorize procurement, research and development, tactical air, personnel, and other matters, and let another committee have authority to call its shots of so-called national intelligence.

I do not believe this will work. I believe that certainly the chairman is more familiar with that than I am because of his long service on the Armed Services Committee. Intelligence activities directly relate to the overall budgetary decision that we make, and without intelligence input, we would have a difficult time making decisions. Now, I know that Senate Resolution 400 does not prevent us from getting substantive intelligence information. My view, however, is if another committee has total authority over the budget of the intelligence community and total authority over the legislative affairs of that community it would be difficult for Armed Services to have the kind of meaningful interchange with the intelligence community that we must have to insure that community has the resources and wherewithal to produce the type of information that is essential for us to make decisions on the overall military budget.

One of the difficult distinctions Senate Resolution 400 attempts to draw is between tactical intelligence and international or strategic intelligence. This is reflected on page 3 of the Government Operations Committee report. Those who deal in this area obviously know that this is virtually an impossible distinction to make.

For example, many of the ships we build are equipped with sensors. These electronic detection devices produce valuable intelligence information, some of it tactical and some of it strategic. It would be very difficult under Senate Resolution 400 to determine which of these hundreds of overlaps we have.

Then there is the question of who is to decide how much of the Department of State or Defense budget is to be spent on intelligence, as against sums authorized or appropriated for other foreign policy— or defense programs; and how much is to be spent on intelligence overall, as against all other Government expenditures.

Clearly, here the Appropriations Committee also has a stake in the intelligence budget.

Boiling it all down, the Senate's constitutional responsibilities in the area of foreign policy are exercised primarily by the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees. No new Senate intelligence oversight mechanism can function idependently of these committees, in my view, nor can these committees be divorced from the oversight function.

We must recognize this reality while at the same time avoiding needless proliferation and duplication of responsibilities.

So the question is, can we recognize this reality and can we come up with an answer that has that as an assumption without having a proliferation of committees.

With these reflections in mind, I would like to give you some of my preliminary thinking that I hope would be of some assistance to your committee's deliberations.

I would suggest that a new oversight panel should include members from the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Appropriations Committees.

For instance, for an 11-member committee, three members each could be drawn from Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Appropriations. It could have two at-large members. I think we could also consider whether the majority and minority leaders might be ex officio members of this committee. Although I personally do not think they would have time to participate on a day-to-day basis, fellow Senators could ask the majority-minority leaders to pursue a matter for them. With that kind of structure being set up, I believe we could get a broad-based committee representing the entire Senate, and yet concentrating in the area where we have indispensable, constitutional duties in this field; that is, Appropriations, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services.

Another factor that this would help alleviate is the 6-year limitation on the terms of members of this committee. I understand the reasoning behind the limitation, both on the staff and the members. Yet when you take all of the glory away from an investigation, then my grave concern-with the 6-year limitation-is, I wonder who is going to want to serve. While the interest still is up, perhaps we would have a lot of volunteers. Over a period of time, however, I wonder if we will

not get two kinds of people: One kind would be interested in preserving the status quo, and the other kind would be interested in making tremendous changes for the sake of change.

In other words, what kind of Senators are going to want to be on this committee? I think that is all-important.

The composite panel which I am suggesting would be requiredor this would be a question for the committee to determine to make timely recommendations to the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees before those committees act on the overall authorization and appropriation for State, Defense, and CIA. They would be the oversight committee; they would keep up with activities of the intelligence community, and they would recommend to the Armed Services Committee what the authorization would be. But you would not have the impossible situation of having a separate kind of intelligence committee that was authorized independently which would virtually preclude any kind of secrecy regarding budget, no matter what protective mechanisms are set up.

A new oversight committee group, constructed along these lines, could assume a role in consideration of legislation, and nominations related to the intelligence community. It could be done, but it would be focused primarily on oversight, and it would be required to review, and to make recommendations annually on the scope of intelligence programs.

For these reasons that I have outlined, I think this would be a better procedure than the ones outlined now under Senate Resolution 400. One immediate advantage would be, and I have already said, the annual authorization for intelligence would remain secret, until Congress, by law, or by joint resolution, decides to make the information public. Senate Resolution 400, involving only the Senate, apparently would make information public annually, and in some detail. The intelligence community opposes that and I certainly think that this matter should be carefully considered.

One final note-I have not, in my proposal, mentioned the FBI, or included the Judiciary Committee, among those represented on the new composite panel.

Certainly, if the panel is, or the committee is going to have jurisdiction over the FBI, I think the Judiciary Committee should have certain representation. On the other hand, I would think it would be better to assume that the Judiciary is going to be making sure the FBI is only in areas intended under the original act of 1947. For that reason I tilt toward leaving the FBI oversight under the Judiciary Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I know you have a tight schedule, and I have tried to cut this short. I will be glad to answer any questions, and I would ask that my full statement be submitted for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will be made a part of the record, and I thank you for your very fine presentation.

You certainly raise some very serious points that this committee has been concerned with.

In line with your suggestion that one of the suggestions that has been made that perhaps this ought to be in the nature of a select committee made up of members of either the three or four committees that you referred to, and possibly some members at large.

69-450 O 76 - 12

It may be made up from the four committees, and if we exclude the FBI, then this should be made up of members of the three committees, and we eliminate the 6-year limitation, both on staff and on membership and service, and we provide only an oversight function, not a legislative function, which would mean that the authorization function would still remain with the committees that are in need of that information in carrying out their programs.

Your suggestion is quite close to this quite close to some suggestions that have been under discussion during these hearings.

I thank you very much. Your recommendations certainly have been very helpful.

[The written statement of Senator Nunn follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA

COMPOSITE OVERSIGHT PANEL

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present my views on S. Res. 400-a resolution to establish a Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities.

The issue of Congressional oversight for intelligence operations is vitally important to our national security. It is my strong impression that Congress, representing a view widely held by the public, wants a better, more aggressive system.

Further, I know that leaders from the intelligence community, Mr. Colby and others, feel there is a crying need for effective oversight and support the idea of a new blueprint for Congressional action.

In that spirit I listened to testimony before the Government Operations Committee. Given the strong sentiment for action, and given the tight reporting deadline imposed upon that Committee, I voted to send S. Res. 400 to the floor for Senate action.

In the weeks that have followed, I have continued to give the matter serious consideration. It is clear that since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the Congress has failed to fulfill its responsibility to provide effective oversight for intelligence activities. Proposals have been advanced; they have been debated; but actual progress has always eluded us.

These precedents make it imperative that the charges in Congressional oversight should be able to stand the test of time. Frankly, I have some misgivings. The jurisdiction of the proposed Committee encompasses budgets for the intelligence activities of not only the CIA, but also the State and Defense Departments.

Can the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meaningfully oversee our relations with Nation X, consider treaties and agreements with Nation X, approve aid programs for Nation X, and at the same time permit another committee to determine the scope and character of our intelligence activities in Nation X and monitor them for the Senate? I am not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, but I suspect that this division of responsibility could jeopardize prospects for coherent Congressional contribution to the foreign policy.

I am a member of the Armed Services Committee, however. I am confident that the Armed Services Committee cannot authorize procurement, research and development, and personnel strengths and let another committee call the shots of so-called "national" intelligence. I am quite sure that will not work.

Part of the problem arises from the fact that S. Res. 400 seeks to draw a distinction between "tactical" intelligence and "national" intelligence. (This is reflected on page 13 of our Government Operations Committee report.) Those of us who are privileged to serve on the Armed Services Committee know that this fine distinction cannot be maintained.

For example, many of the ships we build are equipped with certain sensors. These electronic detection devices produce valuable intelligence information, some of it tactical and some of it strategic, or "national" intelligence. Under S. Res. 400, how would you determine which was which?