There are many, many overlaps of this sort. Even the highly classified reconnaissance satellites which are keystones of our capacity to monitor compliance with strategic arms limitation agreements, also provide essential tactical intelli, gence information.

Then there is the further question of who is to decide how much of the Department of State or Defense budget is to be spent on intelligence, as against sums authorized or appropriated for other foreign policy-or defense-programs; and how much is to be spent on intelligence overall, as against all other government expenditures. Clearly, the Appropriations Committee has a stake in the intelligence budget, too.

With these reflections on S. Res. 400 in mind, I have reached some tentative conclusions on how a better oversight panel might be designed. May I suggest to you that:

A new oversight panel should include members from the Armed Services Committee, Foreign Relations Committee, and Appropriations Committee. For an eleven member committee, three members each might be drawn from Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees leaving two "at large" members. If members were selected by the majority and minority leaders, I believe a broadly-based membership could be guaranteed without resorting to the six-year membership assignments proposed in S. Res. 400. The six-year limitation amounts to a death sentence for staff as well as for committee members.

Such a composite panel should be required to make timely budget recommendations to the Foreign Relations, Armed Services and Appropriations Committees before those Committees act on the overall authorizations and appropriations for State, Defense and CIA.

Such a panel should be given broad power to consider, hold hearings, and report on all matters relating to intelligence—including allegations of illegal or improper conduct by or in the intelligence agencies.

This new oversight group constructed along the lines I have suggested could assume a role in the consideration of legislation and nominations related to the intelligence community. But it would be focused on oversight. It would be required to review and make recommendations annually on the scope of intelligence programs, and it would have authority to inquire into any irregularities. For the reasons I have outlined, I think this would be a better procedure than the one outlined in S. Res. 400. One immediate advantage would be that annual authorizations for intelligence would remain secret until Congress, by law or by Joint Resolution, decided to make information public. S. Res. 400, a resolution involving only the Senate, apparently would make information public annually and in some detail. The intelligence community opposes that, and certainly the matter should be carefully considered.

One final clarifying note: I have not, in my proposal, mentioned the FBI or included the Judiciary Committee among those which would be represented on the new panel. I should explain that I hope the FBI will, in the future, confine itself to counter intelligence activities as was envisioned in 1947. I think budget authorization for the FBI should continue to be a part of the responsibility of the Judiciary Committee. If there were indications of wrongdoing in the FBI or the IRS or any agency with collateral intelligence responsibilitiesI believe the oversight group, under my blueprint, would have power to investigate and report to the Senate.

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present these views. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will now adjourn until 10 o'clock, Monday morning for the continuation of this hearing.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Monday, April 5, 1976.]

The committee met in room 301, Russell Senate Office Building, at 10:07 a.m., Hon. Howard W. Cannon (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Cannon, Allen, Hugh Scott, and Griffin.

Staff Present: William McWhorter Cochrane, staff director; Chester H. Smith, chief counsel; Hugh Q. Alexander, senior counsel; John P. Coder, professional staff member; Dr. Floyd M. Riddick, professional staff member; Jack L. Sapp, professional staff member; Ray Nelson, professional staff member; Larry E. Smith, minority staff director; Andrew Gleason, minority counsel; Peggy Parrish, assistant chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator Tower, we are happy to have you here with us today as our first witness, and you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN TOWER, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES; ACCOMPANIED BY CURT SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I am the vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, however, the views I express here are my own and may be the views of some of the Members of the committee but certainly not all of them.

I have with me the minority counsel of the Select Committee, Mr. Curt Smothers.

My experience with the Select Committee has taught me that the role of Congress must be that of a partner-and not a silent one-in the intelligence business. But as in any partnership-that relationship must be grounded on mutual confidence and each partner's respect for the prerogatives of the other.

The Executive must understand, as the Ford administration has clearly demonstrated again and again, that Congress has a legitimate right to know about intelligence activities. In exercising this right to know, the Congress must recognize the extreme sensitivity of these executive branch initiatives, and accept the obligation to hold this knowledge secure.

If there is agreement in principle with these concepts which I regard as fundamental-establishment of a separate intelligence oversight committee may be feasible.

Mr. Chairman, both your inquiries and the testimony of many others have highlighted the serious inadequacies of Senate Resolution 400 as a vehicle for competent and secure Senate oversight of the Nation's intelligence activity.

In considering the resolution before you, I would urge the Committee to make a clear distinction between the much needed task of examining abuses-which we have been engaged in for the past year-and the overriding and more permanent requirement for responsible congressional involvement in intelligence policy in the future.

We must keep in mind that the critical questions are both multifaceted and complex. While weighing the best interests of our national security, together with the need to protect the people's liberties, we must, also, ask whether our adversaries will be deterred or heartened by such actions as disclosing the intelligence budget and the inevitable opening of senitive activities to even limited public forum debate.

To perform this task, I am not at all prepared to accept the idea that a separate committee on intelligence is necessary or even desirable. To meet the task of oversight, intelligence should continue to be viewed as integrally related to the other questions within the general jurisdiction of the present standing committees on Foreign Relations. Judiciary, and Armed Services, and I might add to a limited extent, the Finance Committee-rather than exist in the spotlight where intelligence has lived for the last several months.

It is pure fiction to suggest that if a separate intelligence committee is not created, oversight of the intelligence community must necessarily fail. To the contrary, there are a number of steps which could be taken which would insure more effective oversight.

For example, one of the critical findings of the Select Committee will be that the Congress has failed to define its role and aggressively pursue definition of intelligence policy and practices. It would appear to me that a logical first step for the Senate would be a mandate to the effected committees to cure those past deficiencies.

The present standing committees should be mandated, rather than allowed through custom, to oversee intelligence and to participate more actively in the policies of the different agencies.

Where there is a felt need for the committees to exchange information among themselves, then the mandate might include a requirement that each of the present standing committees create a permanent subcommittee on intelligence which would meet jointly and regularly with the other subcommittees to share information of common concern.

There are those who would divide such mandates by labeling them a return to the status quo and I suggest to them that such an approach, though well meaning, is inconsistent with the facts.

First, we must not allow the Congress' past oversight record to dictate simplistic or ill-conceived alternatives for the future. The panacea of a new committee is always attractive as a signal of apparent change. But we must not elevate form over substantive issues.

The Senate clearly signaled its commitment to substantive change when the select committee was established 15 months ago. We were mandated under S. Res. 21 to bring the problems of intelligence into sharper focus and to recommend remedial action strengthening the balance between the rights of American citizens and the Nation's intelligence needs.

I believe the Senate recognized that our inquiry would examine many matters within the jurisdiction of existing committees and subcommittees of this body.

I believe the Senate recognized that the overlapping jurisdiction of our select committee was necessary because intelligence touches so many aspects of American life.

But it does not follow that the overlapping jurisdiction required for a genuine look at a many-faceted problem should be adopted as the vehicle for permanent oversight.

Effective permanent oversight will require that intelligence policy be closely coordinated with other affected government activity. Senator Stennis made this point in his testimony and the Judiciary Committee has taken the position that FBI intelligence activity should not be separated from law enforcement determinations.

I believe that the commitment so evident in this body when S. Res. 21 was adopted continues, and that it would be a gross underestimation of our colleagues to assume that committees having any jurisdiction over these critical issues would ignore mandates designed to correct the abuses of past years and simply return to business as usual.

I do not seek to minimize the political impact of Senate action establishing a new committee, but I believe we need more than political impact. We need realistic, workable oversight. We should and must avoid the expedient solutions. We should and must turn our efforts to the tough task of providing definitive guidelines and mandates to our colleagues the same persons who would sit on any new committees that we believe will enhance the Senate's participatory role in intelligence policy.

In addition to the question of form, there is also a need to be more explicit regarding our anticipated role as policy partners. While the intelligence community needs participatory guidance-it does not need a senatorial board of directors.

The Congress must understand that it is not its role to manage or second-guess what the intelligence community does. Rather, the role of the Congress must be to insure that this country gets what it deserves the assurance of the continuation of the best intelligence in the world, conducted in a manner consistent with basic American principles of freedom and decency.

Then finally, we can accomplish our goals without the continuing myth that the people of this Nation should continue to be misled, as they have been, that secrets are kept from them because their Government does not trust the people or wishes to deceive them. It is clear that our adversaries are the real targets of efforts to insure effective secrecy. However, it is equally clear that to accomplish the goal of keeping our enemies from penetrating our national defense, we must necessarily restrict the number of Americans, and that includes Senators, having full knowledge of intelligence operations.