intelligence system and many sensitive aspects of our overall national security policy. Do we want to put a steady flow of such people into the job market? The possibilities for subsequent employment might include some positions that would not serve the national interest, in terms of the ways the knowledge of our intelligence functions could be used. These aspects of Senate Resolution 400 make it impossible for me to support the measure as reported from the Committee on Government Operations. I would like to indicate my support for the proposals of Senator Nunn, that we consider the establishment of a new intelligence oversight panel to be composed of members from the Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Appropriations Committee. Such a panel, given the broad power of oversight, should be able to deal with the problem of potential abuses without dividing the authorizing and appropriating functions on nonfunctional lines. I might say that one of the problems I see here came just recently in this entire matter. It relates to the Angola experience. As soon as that issue arose, I went to the staff of the Armed Services Committee and asked if we had any information whatsoever dealing with the intelligence situation on Angola. I found that we did not have such information. I then began making inquiries as to what exactly and where is the legal authorization or rules authorization for handling this matter of transfer of CIA funds. The statute I have already mentioned provides for transfer and makes it legal for the CIA to accept such a transfer. So, when I got down to trying to find out what the rules were, there are not any rules. We all think there are rules but if you actually take a look there are no rules in the book as far as I know that have been used for this method of authorizing the transfer. It has been an informal, institutionalized procedure under which the chairman and the ranking members of the Armed Services, Appropriations, and the Foreign Relations Committee have been consulted, but we all thought-I thought it was in the books, but it is not in the book as far as I have been able to find out, and I do think some purpose might be served by the committee if they could somehow institutionalize this somewhat more so there is a more direct responsibility. I do not disagree with Senator Tower on his proposal, but, I think we do need some institutionalization of the procedure for approving the transfer of funds. Senator SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, let me comment on the question of Angola. The Senator raises a good illustration because the only information that we in Foreign Relations were able to get on Angola at the time the matter was current and crucial came first in a very fine briefing from one member who was totally opposed to the entire matter, which led to some attempts at rebuttal from the Department of State, but there was no input whatever from the Armed Services. There was no military input, so that Foreign Relations was actually working in the dark or in an area of obscurity, and an oversight panel would have that advantage. I just mention that because I have not made up my own mind whether this suggestion, or that of Senator Tower or the others, is the alternative way to go. But certainly we ought to have some way of knowing, when some group of Senators raise the question like Angola, what the whole picture is and not two or three pieces out of a jigsaw puzzle. Senator TAFT. Somebody said the transfer was made, presumably some transfer of funds under the statute was made to the CIA for this purpose. I do not know whether it was in a big lump sum amount or it was an individual item. It was put up to some Members of Congress but I never found out who was actually consulted on it and who did it, and there is no responsibility and no real way of checking back on that after the fact when it occurs. I think it would be helpful if we had some kind of separate procedures that we know about that will take care of it at the same time and with the maximum degree of security. Mr. Chairman, I urge the members of this committee to consider these points, and those raised by other witnesses, carefully. I believe that it is vital that we exercise oversight over the intelligence community in a rational and functional manner, and in such a way that the work of that community is not jeopardized. We must not let momentary headlines push us into action which will have long-term negative consequences. Too much is at stake here for us to be hasty or frivolous in this matter. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taft, for a very fine statement. I must say that I agree with a great deal of the points you made in your statement, and they are certainly very valid points. I think we do have to consider them in a rational atmosphere rather than have what I have referred to earlier as a "need" reaction. Every time something happens our first reaction is that we need to appoint another committee to take care of it, but that simply will not make the problem go away. Senator Scott. Senator SCOTT. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Senator GRIFFIN. I have no questions. I think that this is a very, very excellent statement and points out some problems that I think are just unanswerable in the terms of this resolution. I appreciate the time that the Senator has taken to come here. Senator TAFT. Thank you. Senator Scorr. I would like to make one point for the record, not directly to the Senator's testimony, but what are the contrasting motivations here. Those who conceive of Senate Resolution 400 in its present form had an excellent motivation; that is, to prevent future abuses, but they did not really go to the question of how the abuses occurred. The abuses did not occur in the Senate of the United States or the House of Representatives. The other motivation which has been exemplified by the testimony of most of the witnesses is how, as a Nation, we are entitled to have secrets, and if so, how can those secrets be preserved and what distinction can be made between the right of a nation to protect its national security on the one hand and the right of the people to know those things which are essential for them to know. If this committee were conceived on the basis of the first motivation, presumably the dominating membership would be concerned continually and throughout the future with prevention of abuses, and that is a good thing, but it would not be necessarily comprised of the people who would be aware of the danger to national security through massive dissemination of classified information. The CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Allen pointed that out the other day when he stated that the substantial percentage of this resolution is devoted to how information could be made available, rather than providing mechanisms for not disclosing classified information-information that should not be made available. Thank you again, Senator Taft, and we have appreciated your statement. That concludes our witness list, and without objection I will insert at the conclusion of this hearing a number of letters from Members of the Senate and others relating to Senate Resolution 400. Also the committee will hold these hearings open until noon tomorrow to receive any additional statements relative to the resolution. We hope that we would be able to get a meeting next week to start to consider a markup of this proposal or to take whatever other action the committee may decide upon. Senator SCOTT. When will we do that? The CHAIRMAN. Sometime next week. I will get a day open and schedule it. The committee will stand in adjournment. [Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] [Additional written statements and letters received by the committee from persons expressing their views on the provisions contained in S. Res. 400 are as follows:] U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Hon. HOWARD CANNON, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Senate Resolution 400, which the Government Operations Committee reported to the Senate today and which has been referred to your Committee, establishes a new standing Committee on Intelligence Activities. Section 7 of the Resolution sets out a procedure for the disclosure of classified information by the new Committee. Under that procedure, the President would have to be informed of any committee decision to disclose such information, and the Committee would be required to wait five days before making any public disclosure. If, during the five day period, the President certifies his objection to disclosure, the matter would be referred to the full Senate for action at the request of three or more members of the Committee. The provision also provides the Senate the opportunity to review a decision by the Committee not to disclose certain information. Finally, it establishes a procedure to govern instances when the new Committee may make certain information available in confidence to other committees or other Senators. Any Senator who fails to comply with these procedures may, under the provisions of section 7, be cited to the Senate Committee on Standards and Conduct for appropriate action. The Government Operations Committee believes this is a workable solution to the difficult problem of disclosure of information. Further, it is the strong feeling of members of this Committee that the procedures should apply to any Senate committee in dealing with sensitive information of any kind. The Committee did not, however, believe that its jurisdiction extended to committees other than the committee which S. Res. 400 would establish. Accordingly, S. Res. 400 makes no provision for restrictions on disclosure of information by any committee other than the new Committee on Intelligence Activities. However, the Committee votes unanimously to recommend to you, as you consider this measure, that these procedures be made applicable to all standing Senate comImittees and all Senators dealing with sensitive information. Please let us know if we can be of further assistance in this matter. Sincerely, ABE RIBICOFF, Chairman. Hon. HOWARD W. CANNON, U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS, Chairman, Senate Rules Committee, U.S. Senate, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to commend to the attention of the Rules Committee two amendments which I had intended to propose to S. Res. 400 during the Judiciary Committee's consideration of the measure. Because I was called out of town unexpectedly, however, I was unable to attend the mark-up in order to do so. These amendments are directed to the issue of access to and disposition of sensitive information. As Chairman of the Separation of Powers Subcommittee I am concerned that certain procedures in S. Res. 400 may permit the executive branch to assert unacceptable limitations on the proposed Committee's operation. Specifically, I proposed the elimination of all references to the executive branch's classification system and the procedure in Section 7 which formalizes presidential review of every committee decision to disclose sensitive information obtained from the executive branch. My first amendment is designed to ensure that the committee is not bound by the executive branch's classification system. Without question there will be information which is deemed too sensitive to be publicly disclosed. Such a designation, however, should be made by the Committee and not by virtue of a bureaucrat's classification stamp. The Committee's work will be seriously hampered if it allows the executive to control the release of information by the Congress through a classification system established and controlled by the executive branch. Congress should not rely upon any classification system unless it is one established by law. The second amendment I propose is, in my estimation, required to preserve the concept of separation of powers. Cooperation between the branches is essential if the arrangement contemplated under S. Res. 400 is to work. However, such cooperation can be accomplished by less intrusive means. The formal procedure for Presidential review that the resolution would establish institutionalizes an unprecendented involvement by the Executive in the operations of Congress. And. it is made even more dangerous by the loose trigger mechanism. The report on S. Res. 400 states that, "The request that information not be disclosed may consist simply of a restrictive security classification attached to a document at the time it was provided the Committee or it may consist of a specific request to the Committee in response to an inquiry from it." In effect no classified information (which presumably will include almost everything of significance the Committee will receive) can ever be disclosed without first checking with the President. I seriously doubt that the drafters of this resolution intended to restrict in such a manner the ability to the Committee to discharge is responsibilities. The amendment I propose would retain the appeal procedure to the full Senate when three or more members of the Committee object either to the disclosure or withholding of information, without institutionalizing a Presidential check over the Committee's powers. Any objections by a President to the disclosure of certain information could be worked out with the Committee through an ad hoc or informal procedure. And if the Committee disagreed with the President on the necessity to withhold the information, an appeal could be made on behalf of the President's position by Committee members through the normal appeal procedure. In view of the serious consequences which would result to the prerogatives of the Senate if the above provisions are not changed, I urge the adoption of these two amendments. Sincerely, CLASSIFICATION AMENDMENT JAMES ABOUREZK, Chairman. On page 7, line 12, strike the word "classified" and insert in lieu thereof "sensitive intelligence". On page 7, line 23, strike the word "classified". On page 11, line 16, strike "classified". On page 19, between lines 11 and 12 insert the following new subsection : (d) As used in this resolution, the term "sensitive intelligence information" means intelligence information in the possession of the Committee and which, regardless of any security classification, the Committee has determined should not be publicly disclosed... because the threat to the national interest of the United States posed by such disclosure is vital and outweighs any public interest in the disclosure. APPEAL OF COMMITTEE DECISION AMENDMENT On page 8, beginning with line 24, strike all down through "days" on line 16, page 9, and insert in lieu thereof: "such information it shall be disclosed unless within three days after the vote". On page 9, line 22, strike the word "any" and insert in lieu thereof “such”. On page 9, line 22, beginning with "sub-", strike everything following through the word "information" on line 24 and insert in lieu thereof “it”. On page 10, line 8, strike "(5)” and “(6)” and insert in lieu thereof “(3)” and "(4)". On page 10, line 11, strike “(3)” and “(4)” and insert in lieu thereof “(1)” and "(2)". On page 11, line 24, strike "2" and insert in lieu thereof “1”. Redesignate sections 4 through 6 as sections 2 through 4, respectively. Hon. HOWARD W. CANNON, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, U.S. SENATE, Washington, D.C., March 17, 1976. Chairman, Committee on Rules and Administration, DEAR HOWARD: As you know, S. Res. 400 was reported by the Government Operations Committee, on which we both serve, by a unanimous vote and referred to your Committee. In discussing this legislation with our colleagues, it has become apparent that there exists a substantial body of opinion within the Senate which believes that the disclosure provision in Section 7(c) (2) should be further tightened. This section deals with the ability of a member of the proposed committee to communicate classified information to another Senator or to a Senate committee. As the resolution now stands, any Senator is free to make such communications on his own authority, without authorization by the Committee. As an alternative, we suggest that you consider amending Section 7(c) (2) on lines 1 through 6 on page 12 to read "The Committee on Intelligence Activities or any member of such committee may, upon majority vote of the full committee, make any information described in paragraph (1) available to any other committee or any other Member of the Senate." Additionally, we feel that the deletion of all language after the words "Senate" on line 15 through the end of line 19 is appropriate in that it would not allow disclosure without committee approval. We believe that such an amendment would substantially improve S. Res. 400, and we hope that you will give it your consideration. Sincerely, SAM NUNN, U.S. SENATE, Hon. HOWARD W. CANNON, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Chairman, Committee on Rules and Administration, DEAR HOWARD: In your consideration of S. Res. 400, I would like to make some comments in support of the purposes the Government Operations Committee was attempting to achieve. S. Res. 400 seeks to achieve one basic goal-to consolidate the current fragmented oversight of the U.S. intelligence community by the Congress. It seeks to cut down on the proliferation of committees involved in the intelligence oversight process. I totally agree with George Bush, Director of the CIA, when he |