18 1 recommendations for legislative or other actions it deems 2 appropriate, no later than July 1, 1977, and from time to 3 time thereafter as it deems appropriate. 4 SEC. 13. (a) As used in this resolution, the term "intel5 ligence activities" includes (1) the collection, analysis, pro6 duction, dissemination, or use of information which relates 7 to any foreign country, or any government, political group, 8 party, military force, movement, or other association in such 9 foreign country, and which relates to the defense, foreign 10 policy, national security, or related policies of the United 11 States, and other activity which is in support of such activ12 ities; (2) activities taken to counter similar activities directed 13 against the United States; (3) covert or clandestine activ14 ities affecting the relations of the United States with any 15 foreign government, political group, party, military force, 16 movement or other association; (4) the collection, analysis, 17 production, dissemination, or use of information about activ18 ities of persons within the United States, its territories and 19 possessions, or nationals of the United States abroad whose 20 political and related activities pose, or may be considered by 21 any department, agency, bureau, office, division, instrumen22 tality, or employee of the United States to pose, a threat to 23 the internal security of the United States, and covert or 24 clandestine activities directed against such persons. Such 19 1 term does not include tactical foreign military intelligence 2 serving no national policymaking function. 3 (b) As used in this resolution, the term "department or 4 agency" includes any organization, committee, council, estab5 lishment, or office within the Federal Government. 6 (c) For purposes of this resolution, reference to any 7 department, agency, bureau, or subdivision shall include a 8 reference to any successor department, agency, bureau, or 9 subdivision to the extent that such successor engages in 10 intelligence activities now conducted by the department, 11 agency, bureau, or subdivision referred to in this resolution. 12 SEC. 14. Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as constituting acquiescence by the Senate in any practice, or 14 in the conduct of any activity, not otherwise authorized by 15 law. The CHAIRMAN. I believe that this brief description of the purpose of Senate Resolution 400 has included its most important features. I would, however, in this opening statement like to pose rhetorically a number of questions about the proposal which have occurred to me after a preliminary study of the resolution. Hopefully, satisfactory answers to most of those questions will be found during the course of these hearings. QUESTIONS ON SENATE RESOLUTION 400 (1) Senate Resolution 400 would create a Standing Committee on Intelligence Activities with a fixed membership of 11 members, 6 from the majority party and 5 from the minority party. Why should this committee be excepted from the procedure in respect to all other standing committees that the number of majority and minority members changes each Congress to reflect as nearly as possible the ratio of majority and minority in the full Senate? (2) Senate Resolution 400 would impose a 6-year limitation on seryice on the Intelligence Committee. What would this do to the natural process of members gaining seniority on committees? Would not the more experienced members with established seniority on other committees as a result tend to shun service on this new committee? (3) Unlike the practice in respect to all other standing committees of the Senate, the chairman of the Committee on Intelligence would be chosen by the majority members of the committee. Why is it necessary to choose this chairman by this method, which is contrary to the established procedure set forth in rule XXIV of the Standing Rules, under which all standing committee chairmen are approved by the Senate itself? (4) The ranking minority member would be vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee. How would this square with the tradition on standing committees that the next ranking majority member takes over in the absence of the chairman? (5) Senate Resolution 400 would grant the Intelligence Committee authority over authorizations for the intelligence activities of the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, and Treasury. Is there really any feasible method of extracting the authorizations for the intelligence activities of those departments from their overall authorizations, which would remain within the jurisdiction of other committees? For example, if the Committee on Armed Services were stripped of its authorization authority over Defense Department intelligence activities, how could it make sound judgments on overall authorizations with one of the vital elements-intelligence-missing? (6) Would not the 6-year limitation on staff service on the Intelligence Committee make it difficult for the committee to locate and maintain competent staff, since they would know that just about the time they would become accustomed to and really familiar with their duties. they would have to seek other employment? (7) Senate Resolution 400 would express the sense of the Senate that the head of each department and agency of the United States should keep the Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities fully and currently informed concerning intelligence activities of such department or agency. If the Intelligence Committee is to serve its purpose, such information is vital. Yet we have it here as a sense-of-the-Senate request in a simple Senate resolution, which does not have the force of law, and which, the Senate Legislative Counsel advises, the departments and agencies may comply with or not as they choose. Why should not this and possibly other proposals in the resolution be deleted therefrom and be reintroduced in the form of a Senate bill which ultimately would become a public law, binding upon the departments and agencies involved? 8) Why was the joint committee approach, which has worked so well in the sensitive atomic energy field, not utilized for this new sensitive purpose? Now, committee members, these are some of the questions which ocurred to me. I know there will be others as we go along and I hope our witnesses, some of them, would take the opportunity to comment on some of these. Senator GRIFFIN. Could I add one question? The CHAIRMAN. Senator Griffin. Senator GRIFFIN. Could any of the witnesses comment on the fact that the committee could disclose classified information and the proedure that would be provided in the resolution for disclosure. Any omments concerning that would be welcome as far as I am concerned. The CHAIRMAN. That is a very good additional point. Any other comments from the members? Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I think you have quite comprehensively covered the field. Senator Griffin raises an additional question with respect to the divulging or reporting of information and makng it public, and I will have some concerns in these various areas as we go along and I hope as you do, Mr. Chairman, that those who have written the legislation thus far will be able to answer the questions that would be directed toward them. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Allen? Senator ALLEN, No further comments. The CHAIRMAN. As I indicated at the commencement of this statement, the Committee on the Judiciary was directed to report any recmendations it may have in respect to Senate Resolution 400 to the Committee on Rules and Administration not later than April 1, 1976. That committee has so reported to this committee, and I will read into the record a letter I have received from the Honorable James 9. Eastland. chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, transmitng that committee's recommended amendments to Senate Resoluon 400. Also, without objection, I will insert into the record at this nt the text of those amendments and the Judiciary Committee's explanation thereof. [The material referred to above follows:] Hon. HOWARD W. CANNON, Chairman, Senate Rules Committee, U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the March 18, 1976 order of the Senate referring S. Res. 400 to the Commitee on the Judiciary with instructions to make recommendations to the Committee on Rules and Administration, I wish to advise you that the Committee on the Judiciary met on March 30, 1976, and recommends the resolution favorably with amendments. The effect of the amendments approved by the Committee on the Judiciary would be to delete from S. Res. 400 the grant of jurisdiction to the proposed Committee on Intelligence Activities over the intelligence activities of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The amendments would retain in the Committee on the Judiciary its historic jurisdiction over the Department of Justice, including the FBI. A Judiciary Committee print of S. Res. 400, as amended, is attached. Sincerely yours, JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman. |