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If we are going to argue, as your statement does for understandable reasons, what is in the first sentence on the fourth page of your paper, I am sure that that causes a problem.

Furthermore, any member who learns information in this manner may also disclose it to any other Senator. While such a provision is arguably necessary for substantive intelligence, I can see no justification for unlimited dissemination of information about this agency's sources and methods.

We can't say one Senator is entitled to information that another Senator is not entitled to. I don't see how that can be viewed constitutional, whatever practical problems it may create.

Mr. ROGOVIN. With respect to operational intelligence-a narrow slice of information-if the Senate were to set up an Oversight Committee with consolidated jurisdiction and determine that such a committee should be the recipient of not only general foreign intelligence information, but also of operational intelligence, and that committee agreed with the executive branch to an injunction of secrecy, then, as to that narrow slice of information, I think that it would be turned over to the committee since it would be accepted by the committee under such rules.

As to other types of foreign intelligence information, I could see a different rule where it didn't come to the committee under such an injunction of secrecy. That would obviate the problem, but it doesn't resolve the totality of the problem.

Senator CLARK. I wouldn't think so.

It puts one Senator above the other in terms of information that is available to them to operate on.

Lastly, this is tied to all of these points.

The thing I would be concerned about, and I am sure a number of other Members of the Congress are, too, is if our Government is undertaking certain operations perhaps Angola is a good examplethat directly reflect on the welfare of our country, for better or for worse, as one might judge it, then certainly the Members of the Senate or the Members of the House would have the right to know that the Government was doing these things.

And based on that right, they have the right to take any action in terms of cutting off funds or taking any other step necessary to counteract that operation if, in their judgment, it is not in the Nation's best interest.

You may make it impossible for them to carry out their responsibilities under the Constitution, which includes taking such action. Mr. BUSH. We will comply with the law.

We don't have a foot-dragging approach to the law, but the law in this very sensitive field instructs us to do certain things, and we are complying with this law.

The other problem that I have with this discussion is that we do not want to be drawn into the real jurisdictional problems of the Senate.

As my testimony indicates, we were trying to express broad principles, but whatever you come up with, which is compatible with all the Director's responsibilities under the law will certainly be complied with.

Senator CLARK. I understand that.

Mr. BUSH. I was afraid we might be leaving the wrong impression. We have enough problems without being misunderstood on this point.

Senator CLARK. The only problem is that, to this one Member of the Senate, it seems that I have a responsibility and a right to know what our Government is doing so that I can, at least, act on my own best judgment, for better or worse, on that information and presently, under the Hughes amendment, we are doing that. But it seems to me if you do set up a system-and perhaps the Hughes amendment does the same thing: Sets up three committees that have access to other information that other Members of the Senate do not have access to, and, therefore, could not act on, not having the information-it is carrying out a new area of responsibility that I find difficult to believe is consistent with the Constitution.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator will yield, we do have to recognize the fact that the executive branch does have authority to classify information.

The President is Commander in Chief. Some of it is on a need-toknow basis only.

Even though an individual may have a complete clearance to receive complete information, there are many people in this country who have that kind of clearance, that are not entitled to receive sensitive information which is not released to many.

I presume you have that sensitive classification on the need-toknow basis.

Mr. BUSH. We certainly do.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a problem.

Senator CLARK. It is.

In those areas of classification that are clearly within the jurisdiction of the Congress to act on, without having all the information available as to what our Government is already doing, it is almost impossible to act with any intelligence.

I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just going to point out that under the act itself, the principle that seems to me as certainly an important principle comes under "Powers and duties."

It reads:

It shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

And that is its No. 1 direction and authorization in its charter.

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internalsecurity functions: Provided further. That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

There are other duties.

It would seem to me that he has a responsibilty to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure, whatever that may be, and if that classification involved a need-to-know basis in his judgment, I would think probably that would be the rule to be followed.

Senator CLARK. Would it be the chairman's interpretation that certain Members of the Senate would be superior to others in the single sense of the receiving of information?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that I would conclude that, because I don't know that there are any Members of the Senate, per se, that would have to know the intelligence source and method.

I think they would have to know what we are doing, but to know the intelligence source and the method, I would certainly say that should be on the need-to-know basis and I can't conceive how I, as a Senator, would need to know what his intelligence was and what his method was in relation to a particular activity, even though we ought to know generally about the activity.

For instance, in Angola, we ought to have been advised, and we were, that money was being spent in Angola on the intelligence route. Senator CLARK. That raises the question on page 4 as to methods. You are talking about this at the bottom of page 3 of your statement and on page 4.

Section 7(c) (2) of S. Res. 400 further diminishes the effect of the proposed Senate Rule XXV changes on consolidated oversight. This section expressly permits the proposed Committee and its members to disclose any Committee information to any other Senate Committee or individual Senator. Furthermore, any member who learns information in this manner may also disclose it to any other Senator. While such a provision is arguably necessary for substantive intelligence, I can see no justification for unlimited dissemination of information about this agency's sources and methods.

It is your interpretation that Senate Resolution 400 would require you to reveal your sources and methods then?

Mr. BUSH. We are concerned that that interpretation would be placed on it, and it throws me into a very complicated position beause of the language that Senator Cannon just read.

Senator CLARK. It is not my understanding that you reveal your somes and the method to committees you report to.

Mr. BUSH. We do on some aspects.

We are very careful, but we do to oversight committees.

There are names of certain agents that I am sure they don't have, they haven't asked for, and it would cause me great problems under the act to give them. But in terms of other intelligence sources and methods, we brief our oversight committee in considerable detail. That is a dilemma in itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis emphasized that point when he brought up the question of U-2.

That was a source and method of acquiring information. It had to be authorized and appropriated for, and it was for the construction of those particular airplanes, so that information did, of course, have to be released, and it was released to the Intelligence Subcommittee. Senator CLARK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator ROTH. Senator Huddleston and I are appearing together. You want us to come back?

The CHAIRMAN. If you will, please.

We have got permission to sit until 1 o'clock.

It is 5 minutes to 1, so we will recess until 10 o'clock in the morning, and have you both return then.

The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock.

[Whereupon, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, April 1, 1976.]

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The committee met at 10:05 a.m., in room 301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Howard W. Cannon (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Cannon, Pell, Robert C. Byrd, Allen, Williams, Clark, Hatfield, Hugh Scott, and Griffin.

Staff present: William McWhorter Cochrane, staff director; Chester H. Smith, chief counsel; Hugh Q. Alexander, senior counsel; John P. Coder, professional staff member; Dr. Floyd M. Riddick, professional staff member; Jack L. Sapp, professional staff member; Ray Nelson, professional staff member; Larry E. Smith, minority staff director; Andrew Gleason, minority counsel; and Peggy Parrish, assistant chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Senator Church, we will be glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Rules Committee.

Since 1950, there have been over 200 proposals introduced into the Congress which would have created some form of an intelligence oversight committee. The need for effective legislative oversight over the intelligence community has been evident for a long time. The existing standing committees clearly have not been able to meet the total need. A new standing committee with jurisdiction over the national intelligence community is the correct answer to a problem that has been evident for at least 25 years.

Since February of last year, the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, of which I am chairman, has been working on legislation to create such a new standing committee of the Senate on intelligence activities.

As a result on January 29, 1976, I introduced S. 2893, on behalf of myself and seven of my colleagues on the select committee. The bill was referred to the Government Operations Committee, which made certain improvements, including reintroducing the measure as a resolution. Senate Resolution 400.

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