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Senate Resolution 400 is similar in most respects to S. 2893. It retains those elements of the select committee bill which I believe are crucial to the success of an oversight committee on intelligence.

I therefore joined in sponsoring Senate Resolution 400, and I am here today to urge that this committee report the resolution with its essential elements intact.

In order to serve as an effective instrument of congressional oversight over the intelligence community, as it is now organized and directed in the executive branch, a standing committee must have the following characteristics:

It must have jurisdiction over the entire intelligence community as it affects national intelligence. National intelligence includes the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Department of State, and the Intelligence Division of the FBI.

The committee must also have jurisdiction over the national intelligence budget. That budget must be authorized on an annual basis so that, each year, Senators who have acquired expertise in the intelligence field have an opportunity to examine with care the programs which Congress is being asked to fund.

Finally, the committee must have access to information necessary to make wise legislative judgments. Congress cannot legislate without information. Access to such information will be assured by a system of annual authorization of appropriations for intelligence activities. By centralizing jurisdiction over such authorization legislation in the standing intelligence committee, the Senate will assure that the Executive will cooperate with that committee in providing the information necessary to carry out all of its oversight responsibilities.

Mr. Chairman, I have listed the essential elements of intelligence oversight. Senate Resolution 400 includes a number of additional provisions which I believe will contribute significantly to the proposed committee's effectiveness.

Under the resolution the committee membership is to rotate on a staggered basis, a provision which will permit the committee to benefit from fresh perspectives, as well as the expertise of seasoned members. The committee is to have six majority and five minority members. A vice chairman is to be selected by the minority members. These arrangements reflect the necessity for a bipartisan approach to a most sensitive element in the national security structure. Incidently, Mr. Chairman, that kind of arrangement serves the select committee in seating them well and avoiding the partisan divisions which were confidently predicted but which did not occur.

Unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information by Senators or staff is explicitly prohibited, while procedures are outlined for the disclosure of information where appropriate. Procedures for imposing sanctions for unauthorized disclosure are described in some detail.

Standing rule 36 now provides generally for the protection of confidential Senate business, but it has been suggested that a more explicit rule may be necessary with respect to sensitive intelligence information.

It has been brought to my attention that Senate Resolution 400 includes certain provisions which may cause problems for other committees whose jurisdiction touches upon elements of the intelligence

community in some way. Although the intelligence community has never been overseen by one committee whose jurisdiction permits it the authority, time and expertise to provide effective oversight over all national intelligence activities, a number of committees have had jurisdiction over parts of the intelligence community or over certain activities performed by intelligence agencies.

It is my view that to the extent that intelligence activities may affect matters at the heart of the jurisdictions of these committees, their jurisdictions will not be diminished by the creation of a new committee.

For example, according to the standing Senate rules, the Armed Services Committee has jurisdiction over "the defense generally." Obviously, the national defense is affected in critical ways by national intelligence activities. The Armed Services Committee must have an overview of all of the Defense Establishment, including, in particular, the intelligence units of the Department of Defense. But neither the Armed Services Committee nor any other committee has the time, because of its other duties, or the necessary overall jurisdiction to attend to the Nation's national intelligence system. That is why the new committee is necessary.

I can hardly overstate the obvious necessity for the Senate to recognize and reflect the way the executive branch has organized the national intelligence community. And unless we do, then the failure, which has been so evident in the past to adequately supervise these activities is bound to continue in the future.

The Executive budgets for and organizes and directs the national intelligence effort in a way that draws together the various components, and unless the Congress establishes a committee that can do the same, it will continue to fail in its oversight responsibilities.

And, Mr. Chairman, the extent of the abuses which have been brought to light and which have been, in part, disclosed through the public hearings of our committee, and which will be disclosed in detail when the committee issues its report constitutes the most telling evidence of the need for adequate oversight in the future if we are to preserve a free society.

Similarly, the Judiciary Committee has jurisdiction over the FBI as part of the Department of Justice. The Judiciary Committee should not be restricted from obtaining an overview of the activities of the Bureau. Most emphatically it should not be restricted from obtaining information and reporting legislation related to the intelligence activities of any agency insofar as those activities may have an impact upon the constitutional rights of the American people.

Finally, the Foreign Relations Committee, as a consumer of intelligence, must be apprised of information in the possession of the intelligence community which may be related to our relations with foreign countries.

In short, there will be instances where committees other than the Standing Committee on Intelligence will have an interest in legislation affecting the intelligence community. This is not an unusual situation in the Senate. I do not believe that it is possible to create a system of committee jurisdiction that is so well defined that some overlap will not occur.

The Senate has traditionally resolved this overlap by referring proposed legislation to that committee with jurisdiction over the matter

to which the bill principally relates. Where the interest of two com mittees in the measure is strong, joint or sequential referrals hav occurred.

I believe that these traditional solutions will be effective with respe to intelligence matters which may be of interest to committees othe than the Standing Committee on Intelligence Activities.

The members of this committee, the Rules Committee, are be qualified to choose language which is sufficiently flexible to permit th traditions of the Senate to be carried out with respect to the juri diction of a new Intelligence Committee. At the heart of those trad tions is the courtesy which the members of this body have heretofor extended to each other, and the spirit of cooperation with which juri dictional conflicts have been received.

I would like to repeat, however, that it is imperative that the ne committee, in order to serve the Senate, have jurisdiction over all le islation directly affecting the national intelligence community an over all bills to authorize appropriations for national intelligen

purposes.

Without the power of the purse, the committee cannot acquire t knowledge and the authority necessary to exercise effective oversig which has been lacking for 30 years.

Senator Mondale has now joined me at the table.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mondale, do you want to make your sta ment now and then we can go to the questions?

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER F. MONDALE, A U.S. SENATOR FRO THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Senator MONDALE. Mr. Chairman, I have a longer statement th I would ask to be placed in the record. I would just like to make a f points in support of the position taken by our distinguished chairm who has performed so ably and effectively as chairman in this uniq and historic effort to investigate for the first time the operations our intelligence agencies.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will be made a part of the reco [The written statement of Senator Mondale follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER F. MONDALE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF MINNESOTA

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am grateful for the opp tunity to appear here today and to give you the benefit of my views on s of the jurisdictional questions raised by Senate Resolution 400.

I would first like to associate myself with the remarks of our distinguis chairman, Senator Church, and to commend him for his dedication and his lea ship during the past year.

These have been truly historic months. For over a year, a select commi of the Senate, on which I have been privileged to serve, has conducted an depth, exhaustive examination of the entire intelligence community of country. Some of what we learned was not pleasant. Some of what we learned even shocking and painful. But a lot of what we discovered gives us reason great pride.

I believe that this nation can take a great deal of comfort in knowing we have a national intelligence apparatus which is truly second to none. dedicated intelligence officers who daily risk their lives in the service of country deserve our respect, our esteem, and our thanks. We must give t people our support, and we must never let them down.

It seems to me that the best kind of support that we can give our intellig community is a mechanism that will ensure that the good works of the n

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I will not again be undermined by the mistakes or the excesses of the few. The past year has not been a pleasant experience for these agencies. Our focus has been on the negative side-on the wrongs, the abuses, and even on some illegal activities which went on. But-unfortunate though it might have been-it was a problem whose time had come. It had to be examined, it had to be faced, and it has to be exposed. And it was all necessary because that is the way this nation has survived as a democracy for 200 years. We have confronted our mistakes, admitted them, and then-together-we have moved on.

The task before us now, it seems to me, is to make sure that this situation never arises again. I unequivocally support the creation of a new standing committee on intelligence as the mechanism to achieve that goal. If this past year has taught us anything, it is that continuing, sustained and objective vigilance, is the only system which will work. We cannot now close our eyes and make believe these things did not happen. They did! And we in the Senate must now create a new and special machinery to make sure that these abuses never ever happen again.

For the past several months, I have served as chairman of the select committee's subcommittee on domestic intelligence operations. Our focus has been primarily upon the intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the FBI, and I would like to spend a short time here this morning addressing the question of oversight jurisdiction as it relates to the FBI.

Let me say first that:

I believe the Judiciary Committee should continue to exercise oversight over the Department of Justice, including the FBI.

Second, the new Committee on Intelligence should have jurisdiction over all the so-called "national security" and foreign intelligence operations of the Federal Government, no matter which agency is conducting them.

Third, the new Committee on Intelligence should not have jurisdiction to examine any of the FBI's operations which relate to traditional law enforcement, such as organized crime.

Fourth, wherever there is overlap between the jurisdiction of the new committee and the Judiciary Committee, I think the oversight should be concurrent. I am confident, as Senator Church said, that any questions which overlapping jurisdiction might present can be resolved by such traditional solutions as joint referral and the usual spirit of mutual cooperation.

I would like to respond briefly to an argument which I understand has been made that the FBI does not engage in intelligence activities, or, conversely, that the FBI only engages in law enforcement activities, and that therefore there are no FBI intelligence operations which a new standing Committee on Intelligence would oversee. Let me say, first of all, that I wish that were so. As a matter of fact, our subcommittee for a time carefully considered the possibility of recommending that the Bureau be restricted only to traditional law enforcement. What we discovered, however, was that in doing so, we would have had to transfer many of the FBI's foreign and national security intelligence operations to either the CIA or some other agency of the Federal Government. And that would have meant that those operations would no longer have been supervised by the Attorney General. It was our conclusion that because those operations are sometimes directed against, or affect, the rights of American citizens, they must remain under the control of the Department of Justice and the Office of the Attorney General to insure that the rights of our citizens will not be abridged. So the FBI is not just a law enforcement agency.

Their intelligence activities, which are both foreign and domestic, are extensive, and are an integral part of the entire national intelligence apparatus. They actually have a separate division at their Washington headquarters which is called an intelligence division.

The President's recent Executive order on intelligence covered the intelligence activities of the FBI as well as the CIA.

The Bureau's intelligence operations are separately examined by the Justice Department for budget purposes.

Agents receive special training in intelligence operations and techniques. The FBI not only conducts intelligence programs, but counterintelligence operations as well, in order to counter, and protect this country from, threats from abroad. These activities include a whole range of techniques designed to keep our own intelligence operations secure, and also to find out what the other side is up to. These activities have included not only the protection and acquisition of defense intelligence, but the collection of economic intelligence as well. Many of the targets of these operations are foreigners, but we have also discovered

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that in many cases they involve the use of similar techniques against our own citizens as well.

Foreign and domestic intelligence operations are often closely intertwined, and I think it might be useful to spend just a few minutes recalling some of the FBI activities that were the subject of our own committee's public hearings.

Most of the FBI abuses we discovered in our investigations occurred not during the FBI's law enforcement operations, but as a result of what the Bureau actually perceived to have been their mission to go out and collect pure intelligence. For instance, for years the FBI conducted an operation called “Cominfil”that stands for "Communist infiltration”—and investigated virtually every as pect of American life-schools, colleges, women's groups, youth groups, and even churches and other religious institutions. The FBI's theory was that the FBI had a mission to determine whether any of these institutions were being influenced by communism, or by the Communist Party, or by a foreign power The investigations were designed purely and simply to collect intelligence-not evidence for use in criminal prosecutions, but information to enable the Bureau to assess what was going on in the country at a given time. I might add that "Cominfil" investigations are still permitted by the FBI's manual today.

"Cominfil" was the theory for the Bureau's 5-year investigation of Martin Luther King. It was the theory for the investigations of dozens of women's lib groups, antiwar groups, and many, many more organizations which were not violent, were not so-called subversive, and which merely advocated peaceful change in this country. The FBI's theory was that maybe just maybe those groups or institutions were being influenced by Communists or by a foreign power and that the FBI had a responsibility to find out if that was so.

Another theory was that the FBI had to infiltrate and gather intelligence information about peaceful groups and individuals who might become nonviolent at some time in the future.

We also examined the FBI's so-called Cointelpro operations. Those were the programs which were actually designed to disrupt groups, destroy family relationships (husbands and wives, parents and children), get people fired from their jobs, and try to get one group fighting with another group. What we discovered was that one of the reasons these operations came into being was because the FBI was frustrated that they had been unable to obtain prosecutions and convictions under the existing Federal criminal laws. As a result, they decided to use an alternative means and go outside the traditional legal process to ac complish their own disruption of groups and individuals they perceived to be "threats" to the national order. Of course, it was under this theory that the FBI actually designed and implemented a program to destroy Martin Luther King as a civil rights leader, and then put together a plan to actually cultivate and promote someone else of their own choosing as a new leader to take Dr. King's place.

I think it is useful to recall some of these abuses because most of them occurred. not during FBI law enforcement operations, but as a part of intelligence oper ations, designed and operated by an FBI intelligence division which still exists today.

We have seen the bugs in the bedrooms, the opening of thousands of letters and the warrantless wiretaps, and all the other techniques which intelligence investigations include, and we must make sure that these situations never arise again. To that end, our committee is now completing work on a whole series of recommendations for legislation. It will, in effect, constitute for the first time in history-a legal charter for FBI intelligence. That charter must be con sidered here in Congress by a committee whose jurisdiction involves the entire national intelligence community, for it is in the context of that community that the charter must be examined.

In conclusion, I urge you not to exclude the FBI's extensive intelligence and counterintelligence operations from oversight by the new committee. It would be a strange anomaly indeed to create a new Committee on Intelligence with oversight responsibilities where intelligence affects people from other countries, but no responsibility to guard against abuses against our own citizens. That is the danger of unrestricted, unsupervised intelligence power, and we must act now to keep it in check. In my judgment, that is a role to be exercised by the new standing Committee on Intelligence. In the long run, it will strengthen all of our intelligence agencies and enable us to give them our unwavering support. Thank you very much.

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