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fbewn to have had their accomplishment in any one elfe. And therefore as far as this controverfy relates to the Jews, his Lordfhip bath left no room for any farther additions, and his work is justly to be esteemed, as an unanswerable defence of Chriftianity against their exceptions.

The fecond of thefe treatifes, in answer to the Grounds and Reasons, &c. hath a more extensive view; and is defigned, not only to obviate the objections of our Jewish adverfaries, but to fet the conduct of our Saviour and his Apoftles in fuch a light, as may appear rational to every impartial and confiderate mind. I need not acquaint the reader, that this part was near finished, before ever the Bishop's book was promised. The different method I have made use of, the many incidental objections I have confidered, omitted by his Lordship, as not neceffary to his argument, and the different interpretations I have given of particular paffages of Scripture, will abundantly clear me from the imputation of having built upon his Lordship's foundation; tho' whether my foundation be equally firm, is left to the

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judgment of thofe who will be at the pairis to examine it. One thing I can, with all fincerity affirm, that my principal motive to this undertaking, was the just value I bad for Chriftianity my felf, and a defire to vindicate it from the objections of others. If my zeal bath exceeded my knowledge, I fhall not be the first instance of this kind; and fo fhall hope to be as kindly forgotten, as other finall authors, who have gone before me.

The preface to the difcourfe of the Grounds and Reasons is, in my judgment, an excellent defence of that liberty of every one's judging for himself, and of propofing his opinions to others, and of defending them with the best reafons he can, which every one hath a right to, as a Man and a Christian. If we have a right to think at all, we must have a right to judge for ourfelves; because no one, who uses himself to thought and enquiry, can judge any otherwife, than as he is convinced of the truth or falsehood of things; and of confequence we have as certainly a naturalright to communicate our ideas to others, and

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propagate what we apprehend to be the truth, by all the methods of fair reafoning and argument, as we have to fociety and converfe with others; which can only be maintained by a mutual communication of fentiments, i. e. by Speaking our own real opinions, and receiving the knowledge of thofe of others. And it is methinks fo far from being any fault in the prefent adminiftration, that all learned and inquifitive men are fuffered freely to maintain and propagate their opinions, that we must, in juftice, as well as gratitude to his Majesty, publish it to the world, that it is against his Majefty's will, that tyranny of either kind, civil or ecclefiaftical, keeps, or gains ground; and all honeft and impartial minds have this to comfort them, that as his Majefty is the great affertour of the rights of confcience abroad, fo they are fecure of his royal protection, and countenance in the enjoyment of them at home.

Matters of ipeculation and practice are fo vaftly different in themselves, as that they cannot in the nature of things be confounded; and therefore, tho' the civil magiftrate

giftrate hath a right, by all proper means and endeavours, to keep men from violating the publick peace," and to punish them if they do; yet it cannot be argued from hence, that they have a like power, asmagiftrates, and by the fame methods, to put a ftop to freedom of enquiry in matters of religion and fpeculation, to punish men for not believing the religion of their country, or for telling the reasons of their rejecting it to others: because this may be where there is no immorality; and because fome perfons may possibly think that all who differ from them are infidels, and fo immoral, and therefore liable to the cenfure of the civil magistrate; and because the effects of infidelity and libertinifm, and their influence upon focieties, are intirely different; and the methods proper to prevent the one have not the leaft tendency in the world to controul, and hinder the Spreading of the other. And 'till it can be proved, that the Sentiments of mens minds are as properlyfubject to the magiftrates power as fuch, as their external behaviour, that immorality and difference in opinion from others

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are entirely the fame, and that both may be equally cured by the very fame means; it will follow, that "tho' the magiftrates fword may very fitly be employed to prevent all breaches of the publick peace by mens vices, yet that the progress of infidelity must be controuled another way, viz. by convincing mens confciences of the truth of Chriftianity, and fairly answering their objections against it.

'Tis not surprising that men, who take their religion upon trust, and who therefore can know but little of the intrinfick worth of Chriftianity, or of that strong evidence that there is no fupport it, should be in pain for it, when they find it attacked by any new objections, or old ones placed in a fomewhat different view from what they were before; or that they should call out aloud to the magistrate to prevent the making of them, because they know not bow otherwife to answer them.

Tis well for Chriftianity that this is not the cafe of all its defenders ; and the glory of the prefent age that there are men of learning and great abilities, who are not only

obliged