have colonies on the Pacific coast, which would greatly facilitate their operations against it. With these advantages, and with those which the attacking force always has of choice of place and time, an enemy possessing a considerable military marine could, with comparatively little cost to himself, subject us to enormous expense in giving to our Pacific frontier the protection which it is the duty of the General Government to afford.

"In the first year of a war with any great maritime power, the communication by sea could not be relied upon for the transportation of supplies from the Atlantic to the Pacific States. Our naval peace establishment would not furnish adequate convoys for the number of store-ships which it would be necessary to employ, and steamships alone, laden with supplies, could not undertake a voyage of twenty thousand miles, passing numerous neutral ports where an enemy's armed vessels, even of the smallest size, might lie in wait to intercept them.

"The only line of communication, then, would be overland; and by this it would be impracticable, with any means heretofore used, to furnish the amount of supplies required for the defence of the Pacific frontier. At the present prices, over the best part of this

route the expense of land transportation alone for the annual supplies of provisions, clothing, camp equipage, and ammunition for such an army as it would be necessary to maintain. there would exceed $20,000,000, and to sustain troops and carry on offensive operations under those circumstances, the expense per man would be six times greater than it is now; the land transportation for each field. twelve-pounder, with a due supply of ammunition for one year, would cost $2,500; of each twenty-four pounder and ammunition, $9,000; and of a sea-coast gun and ammunition, $12,000. The transportation of ammunition for a year for one thousand sea-coast guns would cost $10,000,000. But the expense of transportation would be vastly increased by a war; and at the rates that were paid on the Northern frontier during the last war with Great Britain, the above estimates would be trebled. The time required for the overland journey would be from four to six months. In point of fact, however, supplies for such an army could not be transported across the continent. On the arid and barren belts to be crossed, the limited quantities of water and grass would soon be exhausted by the numerous draught animals required by heavy trains; and for such distance forage could not be carried for their sustenance.

"On the other hand, the enemy would send out his supplies at from one-seventh to onetwentieth the above rates, and in less time -perhaps in one-fourth the time-if he could get command of the Isthmus routes.

Any reliance, therefore, upon furnishing that part of our frontier with means of defence from the Atlantic and interior States, after the commencement of hostilities, would be in vain, and the next resource would be to accumulate there such amount of supplies and stores as would suffice during the continuance of the contest, or until we could obtain command of the sea. Assigning but a moderate limit to this period the expense would yet be enormous, the fortifications, depots, and storehouses would necessarily be on the largest scale, and the cost of placing supplies there for five years would amount to nearly one hundred millions of dollars.

"In many respects the cost during peace would be equivalent to that during the war. The perishable character of many articles would render it impossible to put provisions in depot for such a length of time; or in any case there would be deterioration amounting to some millions of dollars per year.

"These considerations, and others of a strictly military character, cause the Department to examine with interest all projects

promising the accomplishment of railroad communication between the navigable waters of the Mississippi and those of the Pacific Ocean. As military operations depend in a greater degree upon the rapidity and certainty of movement than upon any other circumstance, the introduction of railway transportation has greatly improved the means of defending our Atlantic and inland frontiers; and to give us a sense of security from attack upon the most exposed portion of our territory, it is requisite that the facility of railroad transportation should be extended to the Pacific coast. Were such a road completed our Pacific coast, instead of being farther removed in time, and less accessible to us than to an enemy, would be brought within a few days of easy communication, and the cost of supplying an army there, instead of being many times greater to us than to him, would be about equal. We would be released from the necessity of accumulating large supplies on that coast, to waste, perhaps, through long years of peace; and we could feel entire confidence that, let war come, when and with whom it may, before a hostile expedition could reach that exposed frontier an ample force could be placed there to repel any attempt at foreign invasion."

CHAPTER XXXVII.

FOURTH REPORT.

MR. DAVIS's fourth annual report was presented to Congress December 1, 1856.

562.

The actual strength of the army was 15,During the year an expedition had been sent to the Indian districts of Minnesota; the Indian difficulties on the Plains had ended, except with the Cheyennes; in Texas and New Mexico Indian outbreaks had been unfrequent, but in Florida the efforts of the Department had been unavailing to effect the removal of the Seminole Indians. General Harney had been sent with a force to protect the citizens of Florida from their ravages.

The Secretary recommended a revision of the policy of locating small military posts in advance of settlement, now that civilization had passed the line of general fertility.

Assuming," he wrote, "that the limits of the fertile regions have been sufficiently well ascertained, and that future operations should be made to conform to the character of the country, the true interests of the public service would seem to suggest that instead of dis