a self

to recognize explicitly the truth that religion requires a personal object. As a consequence of this failure, he seems to have fallen into certain inconsistencies. He defines religion, considered subjectively, as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider divine." But in his remarks on what is to be understood by "divine," he says there are religions which do not positively assume a God, and cites Buddhism as an example. He seems to think that the divineness of the universe for the religious consciousness may conceivably be "a mere quality like the eye's brilliancy or the skin's softness" and not " conscious life."t That such a view is based on an imperfect analysis of the religious consciousness, we have tried to show above. We would here point out only that, in other parts of his work, Professor James employs expressions which we are unable to reconcile with the breadth of his definition. Toward the end of his volume he says, for example, "Prayer in this wide sense," "as meaning every kind of inward communion or conversation with the power recognized as divine," "is the very soul and essence of religion." By prayer he understands "no vain exercise of words, no mere repetition of certain sacred formulæ, but the very movement itself of the soul, putting itself in a personal relation of contact with the mysterious power of which it feels the presence." Concerning this language it is to be observed that when the expressions communion," "conversation," personal relation," etc., are employed, the personality of the religious object is tacitly assumed. Now if prayer requires a personal object, and if prayer "is the very soul and essence of religion," we ought to conclude that religion requires a personal object. In fact, the word "power," as employed here, has quite a different value from the unequivocally impersonal "force," and seems to imply intelligence and will.

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The foregoing discussion is calculated perhaps to create the * Page 31.

† Page 33.

+ Page 464.

in

impression that there prevails great diversity of opinion as to the nature of religion. A survey of the definitions of other philosophers and scholars than those cited would at first deepen this impression.* A careful analysis, however, would show that opinions, though by no means exhibiting unanimity, are not so various as the language employed in different definitions seems to indicate. Many of the so-called definitions were never intended to be scientific statements. Such, for example, is Matthew Arnold's characterization of religion as "morality touched with emotion." Others state merely what a writer accepts in place of religion, and are not seriously meant to describe "religion" at all; as Renan's profession of faith: "My religion is now as ever the progress of reason, other words the progress of science "; and as Comte's: "Religion consists in regulating each one's individual nature, and forms the rallying point for all the separate individuals.” Still others are attempts to define religion or some aspect of it in terms of a particular system of philosophy, and do not necessarily imply a repudiation of all other formulated statements. In this sense we are to take Hegel's language, when he says that religion is "The knowledge possessed by the finite mind of its nature as absolute mind." It would evidently be a mistake to suppose that every variation in the phraseology employed when speaking of religion represents a fundamental difference of conception.

Since historical, comparative, and psychological studies in religion were begun in a scientific spirit, there has been in fact very notable progress toward substantial agreement as to what it is that we are to call religion. In his admirable book on "The Study of Religion," Professor Jastrow has taken pains to trace carefully the historical development of thought on this subject, and finds that, while there is no unanimity as to

* For a number of definitions cited from writers of reputation see the "Appendix" of an excellent article by Professor Leuba entitled, "Introduction to the Psychological Study of Religion" in The Monist, January, 1901. The citations that follow we have taken from this.

the origin of religion, there is now general agreement on the following points: (1) There is a connection of some kind between religion and life; (2) One element of religion is the feeling of dependence upon a Power or Powers beyond man's control; (3) The votaries of religion attempt to establish proper relations between themselves and these Powers; and (4) Religion manifests a tendency toward organization. It will be observed, however, that the vital point, whether the religious object is necessarily personal or not, is left in vague uncertainty. To be sure, the word "Power" is here employed, and, as we remarked above, this word ought to imply personal qualities, but in fact it is not always used with a clear consciousness that this is what is meant. When used without further qualification it is after all so vague that it permits a writer, according to the exigencies of the moment, to assume either that it means 66 personal power or that it does not. Professor Jastrow could not, of course, be expected to be more explicit than those whose opinions he records. The fact is, there exists so much non-commital on this point that language more definite than his would be inaccurate. But it is time it were generally and clearly recognized, not only that religion possesses the characters enumeratd above, but also that it requires a personal object. Romanes does not express more than the truth, when he says: "To speak of the Religion of the Unknowable, the Religion of Cosmism, the Religion of Humanity, and so forth, where the personality of the First Cause is not recognized, is as unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle, or the rationality of the equator."

In conclusion, we would repeat that we are not here concerned with the question whether something else may be found. to take the place of what has traditionally been called religion. Writers who reject all theological conceptions as groundless, generally contend that the unbeliever who is thoroughly moral, or is sincerely interested in the betterment of society, or is permeated by an enthusiasm for humanity, or is devoted to

the increase of useful knowledge, will be no less valuable to mankind and will be no less secure personally both in this life and in a hypothetical life to come, than he whose character and conduct are determined by theological assumptions.* This contention we are willing to leave unchallenged for the present, provided it is admitted that these kinds of life are not religion, but mere substitutes for religion.

* For a systematic statement of this position see J. S. Mill's essay on "The Utility of Religion." It is to be commended for its frankness at least.

IV.

BIOLOGY, THE HANDMAID OF THEOLOGY.

BY PROF. GEORGE LESLIE OMWAKE.

The doctrine of antitheses yielding their contention in a higher synthesis has no better illustration than in the matter of science and theology. The latter part of the nineteenth century saw science and theology engaged in bitter strife. So pronounced were their disagreements that even so careful a scholar as Mr. Andrew D. White was led into the fatal mistake of naming his elaborate work "A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology." The book, valuable as it is, is not popular to-day. Its name is against it. Men are no longer conceiving of the relation of science and theology as a "warfare." It is an unwelcome thought. Such is the change that has come over the thinking world within a decade of years. The army of scientists, armed with their instruments of investigation, shouted as their battle cry, "Ye shall know the truth." The army of theologians, armed with the traditional dogmas, shouted back the same battle cry, "Ye shall know the truth." Finally, above the din of battle, they heard each other's voice. The useless conflict ceased, and now "the truth has made them free." Science and theology have at last discovered the essential unity of their purpose, and have become united in the pursuit, not of merely scientific truth as such, nor of theological truth as such, but of the "eternal verities" of God.

This union in a common search for truth does not involve the unqualified acceptance on the part of theology of all that science has proposed, nor does it require science to yield to all the teachings of theology. Both theologian and scientist is free to accept or reject from either field. The main feature