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every command of God alike, as they all stand upon the same authority.

Because such an allowance would in effect amount to a toleration of every vice in the world.

And because, the strain of scripture language excludes any such hope. When our duties are recited, they are put collectively, that is, as all and every of them required in the Christian character. "Add to your faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge, and to knowledge temperance, and to temperance patience, and to patience godliness, and to godliness brotherly kindness, and to brotherly kindness charity."* On the other hand, when vices are enumerated, they are put disjunctively, that is, as separately and severally excluding the sinner from heaven. "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, shall inherit the kingdom of heaven."

Those texts of scripture, which seem to lean a contrary way, as that" charity shall cover the multitude of sins ;" that "he which converteth a sinner from the errour of his way shall hide a multitude of sins ;"§ cannot, I think, for the reasons above mentioned, be extended to sins deliberately, habitually, and obstinately persisted in.

3. That a state of mere unprofitableness will not go unpunished.

This is expressly laid down by Christ, in the parable of the talents, which supersedes all further reasoning upon the subject." Then he which had received one talent, came and said, Lord, I know thee that thou art an austere man, reaping where thou hast not sown, and gathering where thou hast not strawed; and I was afraid, and hid thy ta

* 2 Pet. i. 5, 6, 7. VOL. III.

†1 Cor. vi. 9, 10.

1 Pet. iv. 8.

James v. 20.

8

lent in the earth: lo, there thou hast that is thine. His lord answered and said unto him, Thou wicked and slothful servant, thou knewest (or knewest thou ?) that I reap where I sowed not, and gather where I have not strawed; thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and then at my coming I should have received mine own with usury. Take therefore the talent from him, and give it unto him which hath ten talents; for unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath; and cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness, there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.”*

III. In every question of conduct, where one side is doubtful, and the other side safe, we are bound to take the safe side.

This is best explained by an instance; and I know of none more to our purpose than that of suicide. Suppose, for example's sake, that it appear doubtful to a reasoner upon the subject, whether he may lawfully destroy himself. He can have no doubt, but that it is lawful for him to let it alone. Here therefore is a case, in which one side is doubtful, and the other side safe. By virtue therefore of our rule, he is bound to pursue the safe side, that is, to forbear from offering violence to himself, whilst a doubt remains upon his mind concerning the lawfulness of suicide.

But our

It is prudent, you allow, to take the safe side. observation means something more. We assert that the action, concerning which we doubt, whatever it may be in itself, or to another, would, in us, whilst this doubt remains upon our minds, be certainly sinful. The case is expressly so adjudged by St. Paul, with whose authority

Matt. xxv. 24, &c.

we will for the present rest contented.

"I know and am

persuaded by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself, but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean. -Happy is he that condemn

eth not himself in that thing which he alloweth ; and he that doubteth is damned (condemned) if he eat, for whatsoever is not of faith (i. e. not done with a full persuasion of the lawfulness of it) is sin."*

* Romans xiv. 14, 22, 23.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

BOOK II.

MORAL OBLIGATION.

CHAPTER

I.

THE QUESTION, WHY AM I OBLIGED TO KEEP MY WORD? CONSIDERED.

WHY am I obliged to keep my word?

Because it is right, says one.-Because it is agreeable to the fitness of things, says another.-Because it is conformable to reason and nature, says a third.-Because it is conformable to truth, says a fourth.-Because it promotes the publick good, says a fifth.-Because it is required by the will of God, concludes a sixth.

Upon which different accounts, two things are observable:

FIRST, that they all ultimately coincide.

:

The fitness of things, means their fitness to produce happiness the nature of things, means that actual constitution of the world, by which some things, as such and such actions, for example, produce happiness, and other misery: reason is the principle, by which we discover or judge of this constitution: truth is this judgment expressed or drawn out into propositions. So that it necessarily comes

to pass, that what promotes the publick happiness, or happiness on the whole, is agreeable to the fitness of things, to nature, to reason, and to truth: and such (as will appear by-and-by) is the divine character, that what promotes the general happiness, is required by the will of God; and what has all the above properties, must needs be right; for right means no more than conformity to the rule we go by, whatever that rule be.

And this is the reason that moralists, from whatever different principles they set out, commonly meet in their conclusions; that is, they enjoin the same conduct, prescribe the same rules of duty, and, with a few exceptions, deliver upon dubious cases the same determinations.

SECONDLY, it is to be observed, that these answers all leave the matter short; for the inquirer may turn round upon his teacher with a second question, in which he will expect to be satisfied, namely, why am I obliged to do what is right; to act agreeably to the fitness of things; to conform to reason, nature, or truth; to promote the publick good, or to obey the will of God?

The proper method of conducting the inquiry is, FIRST, to examine what we mean, when we say a man is obliged to do any thing, and THEN, to shew why he is obliged to do the thing which we have proposed as an example, namely, "to keep his word."

CHAPTER II.

WHAT WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY A MAN IS OBLIGED TO DO A THING.

A

MAN is to be said to be obliged, "when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another."

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