of modern Calvinists, and especially those of the established church, which I have undertaken to plead. And let our oppenents prove, if they can, that one in ten, or twenty of those, who have committed themselves, by publishing their sentiments, hold that God decreed to consign any portion of mankind to everlasting misery, without regard to their foreseen conduct as deserving it. This at least, I avow, and a large majority of my brethren will join with me; that I wholly disclaim all such nominal Calvinists, as deliberately maintain that sentiment. The Lambeth articles, though very open to objection, say: Those who are not predestinated to 'salvation, shall be necessarily damned for their sins.' Even in the decrees of the synod of Dort, which are peculiarly obnoxious, they who are secluded from

saving grace,' are considered, not merely as creatures, but as sinners; else why should impenitency have been mentioned? But, supposing that even Calvin, and other eminent persons clogged their doctrines with sentiments, which we avowedly consider as unscriptural; are these same sentiments, overcharged and distorted, to be imputed to those very persons, who disavow them: merely because, in the grand outline of their creed, they coincide with these eminent men? I must own I cannot see either justice, or mercy,' in this way of exposing us to publick odium and contempt. In respect of the concluding part of this quotation' So 'inconsistent with the attributes of infinite justice and ' infinite mercy, that I cannot bring myself to believe 'it;'t I would by no means excuse the doctrine, concerning which this is said. I have already shown how essentially it differs from our doctrine: but we all have our difficulties, and some things meet us, in the Scrip

⚫ See Chap. vii.

† See Remarks on p. 243, Refutation.

tures, which we cannot reconcile with our ideas of the divine perfections. Few have experienced this more, than I have done. But shall we, on this ground, reject any revealed truth? Shall we hesitate about crediting the "sure testimony of God?" We may indeed, carefully and humbly examine the language of inspiration, that we may be satisfied of its real import: but, that being ascertained, we must bow our understanding to the declaration and testimony of God. I am a fool, a child, a rebel: I am too partial in my own cause, to be a competent judge, how it behoves the Sovereign of the world to deal with rebels: I must sit at the feet of him, who is THE TRUTH, to learn the first principles of heavenly wisdom; and especially I must learn to adore the depths, which I cannot fathom.

P. ccl. 1. 25. " This, &c.'* If God has decreed the eternal damnation of any, who will be found at the day of judgment, not to have deserved it; this pathetic representation will appear to be founded on truth and fact. But, if this will not be the case, it must of course fall to the ground. The concluding part, as detached from the preceding statement concerning the decrees of God, might serve the purpose of one, who believed the doctrine of universal salvation. An irrevocable sentence of 'everlasting torment is itself a whole, and open to no misconception; endless and irremediable pain, known

This is not a difficulty in the dispensations of God towards men, which ' relates to this world only, and may be corrected in that which is to come; • it comprehends both worlds, both states of human existence, present and 'future; it is a decree extending to all eternity, absolute and irreversible. Nor is it a system partially and imperfectly described, in which we may be ' at present deceived, but which may hereafter appear wise, just, and merci'ful, when completely revealed, and fully understood-an irrevocable sen. tence of everlasting torment is of itself a whole, and open to no misconcep. 'tion-endless and irremediable pain, known by the sufferers to be such, ad'mits of no palliative, no consolation, no hope.'

by the sufferers to be such, admits of no palliative no 'consolation, no hope.' Now suppose this spoken, not concerning an eternal decree, but concerning the sentence of the Judge, at the last day, "Depart from me,

ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil "and his angels;" in order to excite men's passions against the sentence and the Judge; or to induce them to conclude, that it will never be pronounced and inflicted: how would an Anti-calvinist, who firmly believed, that the sentence will be both pronounced and inflicted, answer such a pathetic declaimer? Would he not say, 'The only question is, Whether the wicked ' deserve their doom: if they do, "their mouths must "be stopped;" and they must "be silent in dark"ness." Now, will any more crimes be proved against the wicked, at the day of judgment, when, "God shall

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bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and ma"nifest the counsels of all hearts;" than he foreknew, that they would commit, when he decreed to leave them to the consequences and punishment of their sins? And in what respect is the decree more liable to objection, as grounded on this foreknowledge, than the sentence will be, as at length pronounced and executed by the Judge himself?

P. ccli. Note from Grotius translated. As God, &c.'*

'As God from eternity foreknows all things, which shall actually take 'place; and therefore knows, that this man would believe in Christ unto the end; but that man would not so believe: it is certain, that God decreed, ta this man, thus considered, life, to that eternal death. For whatsoever he 'doeth in time, that he decreed to do from eternity: but in time he saveth ⚫ this man who believes, and damns that man, who believes not. Therefore, that we may speak with Fulgentius, he predestinated those unto punish'ment, who, he foreknew, would depart from him, by the fault of a wicked 'will; and he predestinated to the kingdom, those whom he foreknew, by 'the help of his preventing mercy, would believe; and by the aid of his follow'ing mercy would remain in him; and this decree of saving individual persons, 'through faith foreseen, but not on account of faith foreseen, all the catholick writers, understood by the name of predestination, before the times of Au. 'gustine.'

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This note, from such a man as Grotius, is of great importance; for we are quite sure, that he would not concede more, on our side of the argument, than he was constrained by unanswerable argument to concede. Yet he here allows, that predestination to life,' nay, predestination to death eternal, is personal and individual; and not that of nations, or collective bodies: that predestination, as he explains it, was known to the Catholick fathers, before the times of Augustine: that the preventing and subsequent mercy of God concurred in producing that faith, and that continuance in the faith, which were foreseen in those, predestinated to life:' and that it was through faith foreseen,' but not on ' account of that faith,' that they were thus predestinated. Surely Grotius, in this passage, approximates to a Calvinistick creed! It may be asked, indeed, in what does he differ from the Calvinists? At least, from modern Calvinists. In nothing that I can perceive, but, in speaking of 'preventing mercy;' instead of special and efficacious regenerating grace.' He means to establish that co-operation of man with God, in the first instance, in producing the willing mind, to believe in Christ, which has already been fully considered. As to the rest, we are of opinion, that the non-elect are decreed to destruction, on account of their foreseen wickedness, impenitence, and unbelief: and that God, in decreeing the eternal salvation of the elect; decreed also by his grace, to render them penitent, believing, and holy. Only, had he left them without his special grace, they too would have lived and died, impenitent, unbelieving, and unholy.

P. cclii. 1. 13. I reject, &c.'* 'I reject the doc

I reject the Calvinistick doctrine of predestination, not because it is incomprehensible, but because I think it irreconcilable with the justice and

'trine, because I think it irreconcileable with the justice and goodness of God.' If the doctrine is unscriptural, it ought to be rejected, whatever we may think of it in this respect; if scriptural, evidently scriptural, our thoughts, which may be erroneous, (indeed in that case must be erroneous, nay, presumptuous,) should be repressed and silenced The predestination of Calvinists is, in my judgment, of the latter description.' Is there no danger, in such decisions, of "leaning to our own understanding?" There is much important truth in the rest of the quotation.

P. cclii. Note. • The, &c.'*

P. ccliv. 1. 17. "

Surely, &c.'t It has been stated,

goodness of God. I do not reject the doctrine of the prescience of God, ⚫ though I profess myself Incapable of comprehending how it consists with the other attributes of the Deity, and with the free-agency of Man. I do 'not say, that God's prescience is not consistent with his other attributes ' and the free agency of Man, but I say, that I am incapable of comprehend⚫ing how they consist. The fact I believe, but the manner of accomplishing ' it, I do not understand. This is a very material distinction in theological * subjects. Incomprehensibility is not a just ground for rejecting a doctrine; ⚫ but if a doctrine contradicts any plainly revealed truth, it ought to be re 'jected. The predestination of Calvinists, is in my judgment, of the latter ⚫ description; the prescience of God, considered with reference to the freeagency of man, is of the former description; I therefore reject the one, and ⚫ admit the other. It is our duty, in a great variety of cases, to believe what we do not comprehend. We are called upon to exercise caution and ⚫ humility in judging of the mysterious dispensations of God, and of his incomprehensible attributes, as a part of the trial to which we are subjected ' in this probationary state. The pride of the understanding, as well as the 'pride of the heart, is to be repressed. We are not to imagine that we have "searched out God," or that we comprehend the reasons and designs of all that "he doeth in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the "earth." "Such knowledge is too wonderful for us; we cannot attain unto it." • The reconciling the prescience of God with the free-will of Man, Mr. Locke, after much thought on the subject, freely confessed he could not do, ⚫ though he acknowledged both. And what Mr. Locke could not do, in reasoning upon subjects of a metaphysical nature, I am apt to think few men, if any, can hope to perform.' (Lord Lyttleton's Letter to Mr. West.)

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'Surely there is no want of candour in saying, that those who maintain the Calvinistick doctrine of election, must also admit that of reprobation,