butes of each elude our keenest research, yet the slightest reflection cannot hesitate to make the ground of our entity to be the seat of our permanent identity. The essence of this our faculties are not, perhaps, competent to reach ; but be it what it may, it is doubtless in its own nature indestructible and immortal, and that to which we must look as the true basis of the doctrine of the resurrection. The erroneous estimate which, as we conceive, has been formed of this doctrine, has arisen from confounding some fancied identity of the body with that of the person. Mr. Locke has, indeed, developed the distinction with pre-eminent ability, but the assumed exigencies of theology have frowned upon its recognition, and it still finds a slow and reluctant admission. But the eventual triumph of truth cannot fail to sweep away the last barrier that opposes its access to the inmost convictions of the human mind.*

* "The present seems a fit opportunity for introducing two or three observations on the subject of personal identity. It has been said, and is admitted, that the body is constantly changing, undergoing decay and renovation, yet the individual is conscious of being the same person, because some particles of the original body remain. Now, this is an error; for, first, we have no reason to believe that any molecule of matter now existing in our bodies will not have been effectually changed some years since, and perhaps oftentimes; for no part is exempted from the general law, and therefore the consciousness of personal identity cannot depend upon the material fact of some part remaining unchanged, as a lingering nucleus on which to ground a reasoning in proof of identity.

The truth admits of a much easier and more rational explanation, since the consciousness of personal identity flows from that of continued existence. The whole may be changed; not a single particle of the original body may remain, yet the change has proceeded so gradually that the greater number of old particles remain while the new ones are prepared; and therefore, at any one given moment, there are in the body a much greater number of old than new particles; and the consciousness of personal identity has been transferred from one set of particles to another without any perceptible change. The decay and renovation have gone on by an unperceived process, and it has been only as a matter of science and

It is well known to have been ascertained by chemistry that the body is made up of no less than nine different substances-gases, earths, metals, and salts. These substan

reasoning that we have known any thing of this change; the consciousness of personal identity cannot, therefore, rest on any material condition. In fact this consciousness does not depend on the body, but on the mind; it has nothing to do with the material particles, but rests for its existence upon the immaterial spirit, and upon the sense of its continued existence. Now, this is, after all, to be referred to a species of memorya recollection of former self as coincident with present self."-Newnham on Recip. Infl. of Bod. and Mind, p. 124, 5.

* Magendie makes the number of these elements to be eleven, and still regards it as doubtful whether even this be strictly correct. We may probably consider the truth as lying between these extremes. The following extract from the same writer may be pertinently introduced in this connexion:-"Whatever may be the number and diversity of the phenomena presented by men during life, they may be reduced at last to these two principal ones, viz., nutrition and vital action."-" The life of man, and that of other organized bodies, is preserved by the habitual assimilation of a certain quantity of matter, called aliment. If they are deprived of this for a given period, it will be necessarily followed by a cessation of life. On the other hand, daily observation shows that the organs of man, and other living beings, are constantly losing a certain portion of the matter of which they are composed. A necessity, therefore, for repairing the loss which is thus constantly sustained, is the reason why the habitual use of aliments is required. From these data, and from some other circumstances which we shall mention by and by, it has been justly concluded that living bodies are not composed, identically, of the same matter at every period of their existence, but that they undergo a total renovation. The ancients imagined that this was accomplished in the space of seven years. But, without admitting this conjecture to its full extent, it is extremely probable that all parts of the body, during life, are undergoing a change, which has the double effect of expelling those molecules which have served their appointed time in the composition of the organs, and of replacing them by new molecules. It is this which constitutes nutrition. This process does not fall, indeed, under the cognizance of our senses; but the effects are so palpable, that it would be the height of skepticism to doubt it. In the present state of physiology, this operation cannot be attributed to chemical affinity, that power which controls the action of minute particles of matter upon each other in dead

ces, in the living body, are held in combination by some agency which we call life, and which is continually exerting an antagonistic force against the tendencies to dissolution. The component particles of these substances are undergoing incessant changes under the ceaseless action of that mysterious power which dismisses some and attracts others. This power maintains a perpetual sway, unchanged itself amidst all the changes which it works, until death ensues, when the body becomes a corpse, and the elements fall asunder. The life then retires, and with the life goes forth the intelligence, which conjointly constitute the essence of the man. this surely is not the extinction of his being. Though invisible, he still lives; though no longer physical, he is still psychical; nor can it be shown that the phrase, psychical body, is not a fitting expression for that mode of existence upon which he enters at death.

But

We are well aware that we are here treading upon the outermost limits of our knowledge; but, as the fact is incontestable, that a vital principle, pervading the whole frame, coexists with the intellectual principle in the body, is not the presumption perfectly legitimate that they coexist also out of the body? In other words, that we go into the spiritual world with a psychical body? This, in strictness of speech, is perhaps a more appropriate epithet by which to denominate the body of the resurrection than spiritual, for the reason that it is not entirely clear that this latter term is used in the Scriptures in a metaphysical sense. The original term, πνευματικος, is derived from πνευμα, spirit, and it cannot be doubted that the dominant usage of this word by the sacred writers is not in opposition to material, but to carnal, as when it is said, "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." Still it is evident that these senses, which we may call the metaphysical and the moral, do border so closely upon, as occasionally to run into, each other; and

bodies, nor, indeed, do we know of any satisfactory explanation of it."Magendie's Elements of Human Physiology, p. 26.

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where angels and demons are termed лvενματα, spirits, the ground of the appellation is doubtless the immaterial nature which they possess. For this reason we have frequently employed the phrase "spiritual body" in these pages in the metaphysical sense-a sense in which it would apply to the future bodies of the wicked, as well as of the righteous. At the same time we cannot but deem the term psychical, derived from yʊzn, soul, life, the seat of sensation, as conveying a more strictly accurate idea in this connexion than the other, although aware that this also is occasionally used in a moral sense.' * We here repeat the remark which we have substantially made before, that we cannot admit that our inability to define with scientific exactness the intrinsic nature of the substance which, on the authority of Scripture, we denominate spiritual, vacates the general force of our reasonings on the subject. If our conclusions are denied on this score, what are those which are affirmed?

CHAPTER III.

The True Body of the Resurrection, as inferred by Reason.

We trust it may not be forgotten that we are prosecuting exclusively the rational argument in respect to the resurrection. The conclusions derived from the Scriptural view of the subject will be matter of subsequent consideration. At present we take philosophy for our guide, just as the geol

* Some writers have adopted, by way of distinction, on this subject, the terms sarkosomatous and pneumasomatous, which will at once disclose their meaning to scholars as implying the flesh-body and the spiritbody, and to which there is no objection but their strangeness to English

ears.

ogist takes the earth for his theme, and from its own phenomena endeavors to ascertain its past and future history. There is doubtless a science pertaining to each—a science yielding truths in which the reason, by the very laws of its actings, must rest with absolute assurance. These results of the reason, when rightly established, must agree with the sense of revelation, when rightly understood. As both reason and revelation acknowledge the same Divine Author, it is impossible that there should be any conflict in their genuine teachings. In regard to the point in question, we have shown, if we mistake not, that a sound and strict philosophy does encounter difficulties in the resurrection of the same body which may be pronounced insuperable, while it perceives none in the resurrection of the same person. The nature of these difficulties we may develope a little more at length, and under somewhat of a new aspect, with a view to come somewhat nearer to a conception of the true theory of the future life.*

The succession of particles in the human body may be compared to the successive members of a corporate society

*In the mean time I crave leave to ask whether there be any propositions your lordship can be certain of that are not divinely revealed? And here I will presume that your lordship is not so skeptical but that you can allow certainty attainable in many things by your natural faculties. Give me leave, then, to ask your lordship whether, when there be propositions of whose truth you have certain knowledge, you can receive any proposition for divine revelation which contradicts that certainty? If you cannot, as I presume your lordship will say you cannot, I make bold to return your lordship's questions put to me in your own words: "Let us now suppose that you are to judge of a proposition delivered as a matter of faith, where you have certainty by reason, can you, my lord, assent to this as a matter of faith, when you are already certain of the contrary? How is this possible? Can you believe that to be true which you are certain is not true? How can you believe against certainty?" Certainty is certainty, and he that is certain is certain, and cannot assent to that as true which he is certain is not true."-Locke's Reply to Bp. of Worcester, p. 217-18.