cord, and how much their zeal had provoked and ftirred up others to be liberal: but then from this very circumstance he juftifies his application to them, and urges them in a very powerful manner to make good their fair promifes, left haply if they should after all be found unprepared at his coming, both he and they should be ashamed in their confident boafting. I fhould not have taken notice of this argument made ufe of by the Apostle to ftir up the Corinthians' charity, which is not indeed founded on the nature of the good work itself, or in the promises of the Gospel, but for the fake of observing to you, that it is not only lawful, but laudable, to make the natural paffions and inclinations of men fubfervient to the cause of virtue and religion; that it is no way unbecoming a preacher of the Gospel to apply to that fense of fhame, to that love of credit and good report, which God has implanted in men, to be perpetual incitements to actions virtuous and praiseworthy. These motives however must be kept in their proper place; we may recommend, but they cannot make a duty; the ground of our obedience lies deeper. The honour of God, the good of our brethren, the care of our own happiness, are the springs from whence all duties flow; and though we may confider these as diftinct heads, yet they always unite in one ftream, and run together without divifion: for whilft we do good to others, we do honour to God, and takę the best care of ourselves: and the honour we have for God will as naturally fhew forth itself in the love of the brotherhood, as it will certainly end in our own happiness.

From these principles the Apostle exhorts the Corinthians to fet forward the charity proposed to them with a liberal hand, affuring them, that it would be abundant to the honour and glory of God, through many thanksgivings; that it would supply the wants of the faints; and that it would return to them in bleffings, through the prayers that would be offered to God in their behalf.

We must not imagine that these principles are peculiar to works of charity and beneficence, for they really extend to all parts of our duty; all religion is derived from them; and there is nothing we are bound to, but as it relates either to the honour of God, or the good of mankind, or our own welfare.

In treating therefore of this fubject, I fhall confider,

First, How these principles influence religion in general..

Secondly, How plainly and evidently they lead us to works of charity and mercy.

Thirdly, I will shew you how effectually they do confpire to recommend to us that good work, for the promoting of which we are this day met together in the presence of God.

First then, let us confider how these principles influence religion in general.

Man is a religious creature, in confequence of his being a rational one; our obligations to do right arise from the natural powers with which we are endowed, to distinguish between right and wrong; and when in any case, in which we are concerned to act, our reafon discovers to us what is right, it at the

fame time unavoidably fixes our duty and obliga

tion.

It is but too plain, that to know and feel the obligations we are under, is one thing, and to comply with them in practice, is another; all wilful finners feel the obligations they are under to do right, and yet are carried by other inducements, which have greater force upon their minds, to do wrong; and where men comply with their duty, it is not always, nay, it is perhaps but rarely, for the fake of that natural light of reafon only, which creates the duty; but for other reasons, which affect their own intereft and convenience. And this fhews the difference between the principles, and the mere motives of religion.

A rational mind ought especially to be influenced by the power of reason; and if we could separate men from the corrupt paffions and affections which hang about them, the fame light of reason which fhews them their duty would fufficiently move and influence their wills to obedience; in which case the principles and the motives of religion would be exactly the fame; and the act of obedience would be fincere and pure, and of the fame kind with the light of reason from which it flows. Such obedience as this is in the highest degree rational and religious; and though laws, both human and divine, are guarded with hopes and fears, yet the workings of such hopes and fears cannot add to the religion of fuch obedience; unless you suppose that there is more religion in being moved by our own paffions, than in being conducted by the clear light of our reafon and understanding.

When once a man has attained to the knowledge of God, and of the relation he bears to him, and feels the natural obligations from thence arifing to love, honour, and obey his Maker; though other confiderations may come in with good effect to incline his will to his duty, yet no other confiderations can add to his obligations, or make the duty of obedience more a duty, or more an act of true religion, than it was before: for he who honours and obeys God, because he knows that God ought to be honoured and obeyed by him, his creature and his fervant, acts upon as high and as true a principle of religion, as a rational mind is capable of.

The fecond principle of duty, which is the love of our neighbour, may be confidered in two views, either as it refults from the common relation which all men bear to God, or from the relation which men bear to each other: in the firft view, to love our neighbour is properly a religious act, and part of the duty we owe to God; and he knows but little of God and his attributes, who cannot from thence difcern, that to do good to our fellow-creatures is an acceptable part of obedience to him; that to vex, injure, and opprefs them, is injurious to him, the common Father and Maker of all men.

But befides this, could we fuppofe men to forget God, without forgetting themselves, and lofing the reafon with which they are endowed; the very light of reafon, affifted by the natural faculty of what is right and wrong, would oblige men to use each other with juftice, and with tenderness: for reafon itself is a law to a reasonable mind: and in

the prefent cafe, you must either fay, that it would be altogether as reasonable an act in a man, who believes not in God, to murder an innocent child, as to nourish and support it; or you must allow that reafon alone in this cafe makes a difference, and creates fuch an obligation as a reasonable mind muft ever be fenfible of, and inclined to follow. I would not call this religious obedience; but it is obedience to the law of our own minds: and could we be so stupid as to forget the hand which planted this law in our hearts, yet whilft the law itself lives in us; that is, as long as we continue to have reafon and sense, so long fhall we feel the obligations we are under in obedience to it; fo long fhall we be diffatisfied with ourselves for acting contrary to what we fee, and know, and feel to be right and becoming.

But join these two confiderations together, and you fee into the very source of all the obligations a man can be under to do good to his fellow-creatures. We can confider men only as they stand related to us, or as they and we ftand equally related to God, our common father; and under these views we may discover whatever we owe to man for his own fake, or for the fake of God who made him; and difcern the whole compafs of our duty with respect to the second great branch of it, Thou fhalt love thy neighbour as thyself.

Let us then proceed to the third thing, viz. the love of ourselves, and our own happiness; and confider how far this will and ought to influence our religious obedience.

It is very evident from the common and univer