them to worship God who know him, and uses this ignorant and prefumptuous expression, among many others of the fame ftamp," Let philofophy make me equal with God." Varro reckons up two hundred and eighty-eight different opinions concerning the chief good; and not one of these opinions makes it to confift in the eternal enjoyment of GOD. Jamblicus, a Platonic philofopher, has this remarkable faying, It is not eafy, fays he, to know what God will be pleafed with, unlefs we be immediately inftructed by himself, or by fome perfon he has conversed with; which is as good as confeffing the neceffity of a divine revelation. Epictetus fays, Every one muft facrifice according to the custom of his country. Most of them plead for self-murder, and several other unnatural vices. Very few of them acknowledge the unity of the Godhead, and the few that did fo, were reputed Atheists. Many of them, indeed, taught a specious and shining morality, but it was deftitute of fufficient motives, or folid principles. A contracted felflove, or, at fartheft, a regard to the external advantages of fociety, were the only principles which lay at the bottom of all their fhining virtues; for they seem to have had no regard to the future rewards of virtue, nor any certain belief of a life to come. AND now, if these greatest lights of the heathen world were fo full of darkness, what can we expect from the mere unaffifted light of nature, in matters of religion? If a few infidels in Chriftendom have spoke more juftly of GOD and morality, than these masters of the heathen world, it is not because they have ex celled celled them in reafon or deep thinking; but because they they have learned these jufter notions from that very revelation, which they ungratefully turn into ridicule and contempt. BUT let us, for argument's fake, grant it poffible, that fome mere man fhould be enabled, by the light of nature, to make a clear discovery of the will of GoD, and represent mens obligations in the full extent; or, let us fuppofe, that fuch a fyftem of truths and duties as this, could be collected from all the moral writings of the heathen world; yet fuch a fyftem of religion, in order to prevail against vice, and accomplish a general reformation in the world, would require the marks of a proper authority to awaken men to confideration, and fubdue their hearts to obedience. How excellent foever reason is in itself, and how much foever it may be the boaft, glory, and idol of man, yet it is most certain, that, in the present ftate, it is a very doubtful and uncertain thing. It is fo often mimicked by counterfeit appearances, and so much clouded by luft, paffion, prejudice, and private interest ; that we can fcarcely difcern it, and even when we do difcern it, we can scarcely diftinguish it from illufion. Reason was one thing in the fchool of Socrates, and another in that of Epicurus. The Stoicks, the Platonists, and the Peripatetics differed widely about reason; and the reafon of Hobbes, Spinofa, and Vaninus is mere abfurdity, with a crowd of other infidels. One man is fuch a proud and ignorant thing, that he will not be controuled or governed by another man's reafon. Hence it appears, that a fyftem a fyftem of religion, however rational you may suppose it, yet needs fomething more than its mere rationality to give it a proper weight and momentum with the confciences of men, namely, a proper authority; but this authority no human name can give. Amongst a crowd of human names, which have fet themselves up as guides to the human mind, fo widely differing in their schemes and fentiments, which fhall we follow? Which has most right to lead us, Zeno or Epicurus, Hobbs or Bolingbroke? Or how can one of these have more right to impofe his religion on us than another, unless he could produce fufficient credentials from GOD, by miracles or otherwife? Befides, felf-love, prejudice, and paffion will be found an overbalance for all human authority, in matters purely moral and religious, and every man will judge his own reasons and opinions best, when they are only confronted by the reasons and opinions of another man. Hence you may fee the neceffity of an authority which is divine, to give religion its proper force. BESIDES, granting that human reason had all that power and authority which it can demand; granting it efficacious enough to fix the opinions, to regulate the lives, and govern the hearts of men, yet we will find its lights greatly defective in discovering unto us many very material articles of religion. For inftance, mere reason can never inform us what the proper reward of virtue, or punishment of vice; or, what degree of virtue will be rewarded; or, what kinds or degrees of vice GOD will forgive; or, if he will forgive any ;-or, upon what what terms and conditions he will forgive;or how long the rewards of virtue, or punishments of vice will endure. With respect to thefe, and many other important articles of religion, human reafon is not only weak and obfcure, but blind and ignorant. Hence, mere unaffifted reafon can never free us from the doubts and misgivings of our own guilty minds, nor afford us any fufficient motives and encouragements to break off from inveterate habits of vice, and pursue a course of strict virtue amidst the flattering offers of fin on the one hand, and fufferings and afflictions on the other. Now all these confiderations laid together are fufficient to convince every reasonable person of the neceffity and expediency of a more exprefs revelation from GOD than mere reafon can afford us in the prefent ignorant and degenerate ftate of human nature. Now, THE poffibility of such a revelation cannot be difputed. The very beafts have a language by which they exprefs their defires to each other. Men by words and geftures make known their fentiments to each other, and fignify their will to domestic animals, in a ftill more perfect manner. And certainly the father of fpirits can have fuch immediate accefs to human fpirits, which are his own offspring, as to give them a revelation of his own will. What! Cannot he who formed the fpirit of man within him, imprefs it with a knowledge of himself, and of his will, in fuch a clear and certain manner as to free it from all suspicion of deception and illufion?-this is so plain a cafe, that I think no infidel would difpute or deny it. AND AND as fuch a revelation is poffible, fo I think it must be allowed by all men, that it would be highly defireable. How highly, may we think, would Socrates, and many others of the more honeft Pagans, who were so much embarraffed about the unity of the GODHEAD; the origin of moral evil, the nature and certainty of a future ftate,-I fay how highly, may we imagine, would thefe more honeft, virtuous, and inquifitive Pagans been pleased to have found all thefe doubts cleared up and difficulties relieved in a book making pretenfions to divine revelation, upon the fame authority and evidence with our fcriptures? How many hecatombs would they have offered to the true God for fuch a difcovery, had they found fuch facrifices to have been agreeable to his will? With what joyful Eurekamens would they have hailed fuch a ray of light and truth coming down from the father of lights, and the fountain of truth? -At leaft, it would have well become their characters thus to have received the truth in the love of it. For, let the light of natural reafon in man be fuppofed as clear and fatisfying as we will, yet it is an evident truth of natural religion, that God is an infinite incomprehenfible being; that he is a boundless, bottomless ocean of perfection; that many things in his nature, will, decrees and difpenfations ftill remain profound and unfearchable mysteries to our natural reason. Would it not therefore be highly defirable, by fome farther revelation, to obtain more plain, certain, exprefs, and extenfive difcoveries of God's nature and will, and of our own nature, dependency, duty, danger, |