from the first of powers: and as all their beings cannot be conceived to depend of any but an infinite essence, so all those powers cannot proceed from any but an infinite power. Secondly, God may be called omnipotent, because there can be no resistance made to his power, no opposition to his Isai. xiv. 27. will, no rescue from his hands'. The Lord of hosts hath purposed, and who shall disannul it? His hand is stretched Dan. iv. 35. out, and who shall turn it back? He doth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou? According to the degrees of power in the agent and the resistant, is an action performed or hindered: if there be more degrees of power in the resistant than in the agent, the action is prevented; if fewer, it may be retarded or debilitated, not wholly hindered or suppressed. But if there be no degree of power in the resistant in reference to the agent, then is the action totally vigorous; and if in all the powers, beside that of God, there be not the least degree of any resistance, we must acknowledge that power of his, being above all opposition, to be infinite. As Jehoshaphat said, power and might, so that none is able to withstand thee? From hence there is no difficulty with God to perform any thing: no greater endeavour or activity to produce the greatest than the least of creatures; but an equal facility in reference unto all things which cannot be imagined but by an infinite excess of power, above and beyond all resistance". 2 Chron. xx. In thine hand, O God, is there not 6. : Thirdly, God is yet more properly called omnipotent, because his own active power extendeth itself to all things'; neither is there any thing imaginably possible, which he cannot do. Thus when God several ways had declared his Job xlii. 1,2 power unto Job, Job answered the Lord, and said, I know that thou canst do every thing. Now that must needs be infinite activity, which answereth to all kinds of possibility. Thus the power of God is infinite extensively, in respect of its 1 'Neque enim ob aliud veraciter vocatur omnipotens, nisi quoniam quidquid vult potest; nec voluntate cujuspiam creaturæ voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus.' S. August. Enchir. ad Laur. c. 96. [§ 24. Vol. VI. p. 231 G.] 2 Nisi omnipotens esset, non una eademque facilitate summa atque ima fecisset.' Fulgent. de Fide ad Petrum, c. 3. [§ 25. p. 511.] 3 'Quis est omnipotens, nisi qui omnia potest?' S. August. de Trin. 1. iv. c. 20. [§ 27. Vol. v. p. 828 B.] object, which is all things; for whatsoever effects there be of his power, yet still there can be more produced: intensively, in respect of the action, or perfection of the effect produced; for whatsoever addition of perfection is possible, is within the sphere of God's omnipotency. The object then of the power of God is whatsoever is simply and absolutely possible, whatsoever is in itself such as that it may be; and so possible every thing is, which doth not imply a contradiction. Again, whatsoever implieth a contradiction is impossible, and therefore is not within the object of the power of God, because impossibility is the contradiction of all power. For that is said to imply a contradiction, which if it were, it would necessarily follow, that the same thing would be and not be. But it is impossible for the same thing both to be and not to be, at the same time and in the same respect: and therefore whatsoever implieth a contradiction, is impossible. From whence it followeth, that it may be truly said, God cannot effect that which involveth a contradiction, but with no derogation from his power and it may be as truly said, God can effect whatsoever involveth not a contradiction, which is the expression of an infinite power. Now an action may imply a contradiction two ways, either 288 in respect of the object, or in respect of the agent. In respect of the object, it may imply a contradiction immediately or consequentially. That doth imply a contradiction immediately, which plainly and in terms doth signify a repugnancy and so destroys itself, as for the same thing to be and not to be, to have been and not to have been. And therefore it must be acknowledged, that it is not in the power of God to make that not to have been which hath already been': but that is no derogation to God's power, because not within the object 1 Τὸ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γε- Μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεὸς στερίσκεται, Pliny objects, [Nat. Hist. 1. ii. c. 7. § 5.] Ne Deum quidem possefacere ut qui vixit non vixerit, qui honores gessit non gesserit;' as this proves nothing against omnipotency, because it is no act of possibility. Had the act objected been feasible, and God had not the power to effect it, then had he wanted some power, and consequently had not been omnipotent. But being it is not want of power in the agent, but of possibility in the object, it proveth no deficiency in God. of any power. And he may certainly have all power, who hath not that which belongeth to no power. Again, that doth imply a contradiction consequentially, which in appearance seemeth not to be impossible, but by necessary consequence, if admitted, leadeth infallibly to a contradiction. As that one body should be at the same time in two distinct places, speaks no repugnancy in terms; but yet by consequence it leads to that which is repugnant in itself; which is, that the same body is but one body, and not but one. Being then a covert and consequential contradiction is as much and as truly a contradiction as that which is open and immediate, it followeth that it is as impossible to be effected, and therefore comes not under the power of God. That doth imply a contradiction in respect of the agent, which is repugnant to his essential perfection; for being every action floweth from the essence of the agent, whatsoever is totally repugnant to that essence, must involve a contradiction as to the agent. Thus we may say, God cannot sleep, God cannot want, God cannot die1; he cannot sleep, whose being is spiritual; he cannot want, whose nature is all-sufficient; he cannot die, who is essentially and necessarily existent. Nor can that be a diminution of his omnipotency, the contrary whereof would be a proof of his impotency, a demonHeb. vi. 18. stration of his infirmity. Thus it is impossible for God to lie, to whom we say nothing is impossible; and he who can 1 'Neque enim et vitam Dei et præscientiam Dei sub necessitate ponimus, si dicamus necesse esse Deum semper vivere et cuncta præscire; sicut nec potestas ejus minuitur, cum dicitur mori fallique non posse. Sic enim hoc non potest, ut potius, si posset, minoris esset utique potestatis. Recte quippe omnipotens dicitur qui tamen mori et falli non potest. Dicitur enim Omnipotens faciendo quod vult, non patiendo quod non vult: quod ei si accideret, nequaquam esset Omnipotens. Unde propterea quædam non potest, quia Omnipotens est.' S. August. de Civ. Dei, l. v. c. 10. [Vol. VII. p. 125 A.] 'Nam ego dico quanta non possit. Non potest mori, non potest peccare, non potest mentiri, non potest falli. Tanta non potest; quæ si posset, non esset Omnipotens.' Idem, de Tempore Serm. 213. [§ 1. Vol. v. p. 939 B.] 2 Numquidnam mentitur Deus? Sed non mentitur: quia impossibile est mentiri Deum. Impossibile quoque istud numquidnam infirmitatis est? Non utique. Nam quomodo omnia potest, si aliquid efficere non potest? Quid ergo ei impossibile? Non quod virtuti arduum, sed quod naturæ ejus contrarium. Impossibile, inquit, est ei mentiri. Impossibile istud non infirmitatis est, sed virtutis et majestatis; quia veritas non recipit mendacium, nec Dei virtus levitatis errorem.' S. Ambros. Annot. in Num. [Ep. 50. §1. Vol. 1. p. 993 B.] 'Si volunt invenire quod Omnipotens non potest, habent prorsus; ego dicam, mentiri non do all things, cannot deny himself. Because a lie is repugnant 2 Tim. ii. 13. to the perfection of veracity, which is essential unto God, as necessarily following from his infinite knowledge and infinite sanctity. We who are ignorant may be deceived; we who are sinful may deceive: but it is repugnant to that nature to be deceived, which is no way subject unto ignorance; it is contradictory to that essence to deceive, which is no way capable of sin. For as it is a plain contradiction to know all things and to be ignorant of any thing; so is it to know all things and to be deceived. As it is an evident contradiction to be infinitely holy and to be sinful; so is it to be infinitely holy and deceive. But it is impossible for any one to lie, who can neither deceive nor be deceived; therefore it is a manifest contradiction to say that God can lie, and consequently it is no derogation from his omnipotency, that he cannot. Whatsoever then God cannot do, whatsoever is impossible to him, doth not any way prove that he is not Almighty, but potest. Credamus ergo quod potest, non credendo quod non potest.' S. August. de Civ. Dei, l. xxii. c. 25. [Vol. VII. p. 693 Α.] 1 This was the argument of Elymas the sorcerer before mentioned; to which Dionysius Areopagita gives this answer: Η ἑαυτοῦ ἄρνησις ἔκπτωσις ἀληθείας ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ὅν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας ἔκπτωσις τοῦ ὄντος ἔκπτωσις. Εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ἀλήθεια ὅν ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἄρνησις τῆς ἀληθείας τοῦ ὄντος ἔκπτωσις, ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἐκπεσεῖν ὁ Θεὸς οὐ δύναται· καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἄν τις φαίη, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι οὐ δύναται, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι κατὰ στέρησιν οὐκ οἶδεν. De Divin. Nom. c. 8. [§ 6.] Φαμὲν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐ δύναται αἰσχρὰ ὁ Θεός, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ Θεὸς δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι Θεός εἰ γὰρ αἰσχρόν τι δρᾷ ὁ Θεός, οὐκ ἔστι Θεός. Orig. cont. Cels. l. v. [§ 23. Vol. I. p. 595 A.] Jobius gives this solution to the same objection: "Α φαμεν μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ θεῖον, ταῦτα τῶν μήτε ὄντων ἐστί, μήτε δυνατῶν ὅλως ύφεσ τάναι. ποῦ γὰρ ὑφέστηκε τὸ ἀρνήσασθαι τὸν Θεὸν ἑαυτόν, ἢ ἡ τροπή, ἢ ἡ τῆς ἀγαθότητος ἔκπτωσις, ἢ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ψεῦδος γενέσθαι; Παντοδύναμος δὲ ὑμνεῖται καὶ λέγεται, ὡς τά τε πρέποντα αὐτῷ καὶ σωτήρια τῶν δημιουρ PEARSON. γημάτων πάντα δυνάμενος, ὅτε βούλεται. 35 only shew that the rest of his attributes and perfections are as essential to him as his power; and as his power suffereth no resistance, so the rest of his perfections admit no repugnance. Well therefore may we conclude him absolutely omnipotent, who, by being able to effect all things consistent with his per- 289 fections, sheweth infinite ability1: and by not being able to do any thing repugnant to the same perfections, demonstrateth himself subject to no infirmity or imbecility. And in this manner we maintain God's omnipotency, with the best and eldest, against the worst and latest, of the heathen authors2. 1 Theodoret, having proved that there were many things which fell not under the power of God, at last thus concludes: Πολλὰ τοίνυν εὑρήκαμεν ἀδύ νατα ὄντα τῷ παντοδυνάμῳ Θεῷ.Αλ. λὰ τὸ μὴ δυνηθῆναί τι τούτων, ἀπείρου δυνάμεως, οὐκ ἀσθενείας τεκμήριον· τὸ δέ γε δυνηθῆναι, ἀδυναμίας δήπουθεν, οὐ δυνάμεως.—Ότι τούτων ἕκαστον τὸ ἄτρεπτον τοῦ Θεοῦ κηρύττει καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον. Dial. iii. [Vol. iv. p. 185.] And Origen contra Celsum 1. iii. [§ 70. Vol. 1. p. 493 F.] gives this for the Christian's general rule: Δύναται καθ ̓ ὑμᾶς πάντα ὁ Θεός, ἅπερ δυνάμενος, τοῦ Θεὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, καὶ σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ἐξίσταται. And the words of Celsus, though ill intended, are yet very true: Αὐτὸς γὰρ (ὁ Θεὸς) ἐστὶν ὁ πάντων τῶν ὄντων λόγος, οὐδὲν οὖν οἷός τε παρὰ λόγον οὐδὲ παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἐργάσασθαι. Αpud Orig. 1. v. [§ 14. p. 588 B.] And so Origen in his answer confesses: ̓Αλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν οἷός τε παράλογον οὔτε παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἐργάσασθαί ἐστιν ὁ Θεός. [3 24. p. 596 A.] 2 It was the constant opinion of the most ancient heathens, as appeareth by Homer, who expresseth it plainly, Odyss. Κ. 305. Χαλεπὸν δέ τ' ὀρύσσειν Ανδράσι γε θνητοῖσι, θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα δύο νανται. And the same sense is attributed to Linus, in a distich cited for his by Stobaus [Tit. 110. 1]; but may rather be thought to have been made by some of the Pythagoreans. For this was the plain doctrine of Pythagoras, who taught his scholars to believe miracles, and to doubt of nothing said to be done by the gods, because all things were possible to them. Οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ τῶν θεῶν, (vel potius τοῖς θεοῖς) τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατα, ὥσπερ οἴεσθαι τοὺς σου φιζομένους, ἀλλὰ πάντα δυνατά· καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστι τῶν ἐπῶν, ὁ ἐκεῖνοί φασι μὲν εἶναι Λίνου, ἐστὶ μέντοι ἴσως ἐκείνων· Ελπεσθαι χρὴ πάντ ̓ ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστ ̓ οὐδὲν ἄελπτον Ρᾴδια πάντα Θεῷ τελέσαι, καὶ ἀνήνυτον οὐδέν. Iamb. de Vit. Pythag. c. 28. [p. 117.] So Epicharmus a disciple of Pythagoras: 'Αδύνατον οὐδὲν Θεῷ. [4p. Grot. Excerpt. ex Trag. et Comad. Gr. p. 481.] So Pater Omnipotens, and Jupiter Omnipotens, familiar in Virgil and the poets before and after him. These do far overweigh the authority in Plutarch, and that of Pliny, with the addition of Galen, who opposeth the opinion of the philosophers to that of Moses expressly, and to our Saviour obliquely: Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ βουληθῆναι τοιαύτας γενέσθαι μόνον ἦν αὐταρκες· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ τὴν πέτραν ἐξαίφνης ἐθελή. σειεν ἄνθρωπον ποιῆσαι, δυνατὸν αὐτῷ. Which seems to be opposed to those words of our Saviour's, God is able to raise children unto Abraham out of these stones. Καὶ τοῦτ ̓ ἔστι, καθ ̓ ὁ τῆς Μωσέως δόξης ή θ' ἡμετέρα καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν παρ' Ελλησιν ὀρθῶς μεταχειρισαμένων τοὺς περὶ φύσεως λόγους, διαφέρει. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀρκεῖ, τὸ βουληθῆναι τὸν Θεὸν κοσμήσαι τὴν ὕλην, ἡ δ ̓ εὐθὺς κεκόσμηται· πάντα |