man, relying upon human authority, and the testimony of God to man, founded upon divine authority: which two kinds of testimony are respective grounds of two kinds of credibility, human and divine; and, consequently, there is a twofold faith distinguished by this double object, a human and a divine faith. Human faith is an assent unto any thing credible merely an faith, upon the testimony of man. Such is the belief we have of the words and affections one of another. And upon this kind of faith we proceed in the ordinary affairs of our life; according to the opinion we have of the ability and fidelity of him which relates or asserts any thing we believe or disbelieve. By this a friend assureth himself of the affection of his friend; by this the' son acknowledgeth his father, and upon this is his obedience wrought. By virtue of this human faith it is that we doubt not at all of those things which we never saw, by reason of their distance from us, either by time or place. Who doubts whether there be such a country as Italy, or such a city as Constantinople, though he never 5 passed any of our four seas? Who questions now whether there were such a man as Alexander in the east, or Cæsar in the west? And yet the latest of these hath been beyond the possibility of the knowledge of man these sixteen hundred years. There is no science taught without original belief, there are no letters3 learnt without preceding faith. There is no justice executed, no commerce maintained, no business prosecuted, without this; all secular affairs are transacted, all great achievements are attempted, all hopes, desires, and inclinations, are preserved, by this human faith grounded upon the testimony of man. sacerdotum, haruspicum, conjectorum: humanum, quod spectatur ex auctoritate, et ex voluntate, et ex oratione aut libera aut expressa; in quo insunt scripta, pacta, promissa, jurata, quæsita.' Cic. Orat. Partit. c. 2. 1 'Nec dicant, non credimus, quia non vidimus; quoniam, si hoc dicant, coguntur fateri incertos sibi esse parentes suos.' De fide rerum invisib. [§ 4. Vol. vi. p. 143 E.] &mongst the works of St Augustin. Αὐτὸν γὰρ οὐδεὶς οἶδε, τοῦ ποτ' ἐγένετο Menander apud Stob. ap. Eustath. in 2 Υποβάθρα μέντοι καὶ κρηπὶς τῆς 3 Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα στοιχεία μαθεῖν οἷόν τε μὴ τῷ γραμματιστῇ πεπιστευκότα. Ibid. [717.] 4 Πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τελούμενα, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τῆς ἐκκλησίας τῇ πίστει τελεῖται. S. Cyril. Hier. Catech. 5, § 2 [p. 73 A.] Orig. cont. Celsum, l. i. § 11. [Vol. 1. p. 329.] Eus, de Præp. Evang. l.i. c. 5. Arnob. adver. Gen. 1. ii. c. 8. In which case we all by easy experience' may observe the nature, generation, and progress, of belief. For in any thing which belongeth to more than ordinary knowledge, we believe not him whom we think to be ignorant, nor do we assent the more for his assertion, though never so confidently delivered: but if we have a strong opinion of the knowledge and skill of any person, what he affirmeth within the compass of his knowledge, that we readily assent unto; and while we have no other ground but his affirmation, this assent is properly belief. Whereas, if it be any matter of concernment in which the interest of him that relateth or affirmeth any thing to us is considerable, there it is not the skill or knowledge of the relator which will satisfy us, except we have as strong an opinion of his fidelity and integrity: but if we think him so just and honest, that he hath no design upon us, nor will affirm any thing contrary to his knowledge for any gain or advantage, then we readily assent unto his affirmations; and this assent is our belief. Seeing then our belief relies upon the ability and integrity of the relator, and being the knowledge of all men is imperfect, and the hearts of all men are deceitful, and so their integrity to be suspected, there can be no infallible universal ground of human faith. But what satisfaction we cannot find in the testimony of 1 John v. 9. man, we may receive in the testimony of God; If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater1. Yea, let God be true, the ground of our divine, and every man a liar, the ground of our human faith. Rom. iii. 4. As for the other member of the division, we may now plainly perceive that it is thus to be defined: Divine faith is an assent unto something as credible upon the testimony of God. This assent is the highest kind of faith, because the object hath the highest credibility, because grounded upon the testimony of God, which is infallible. Balaam could tell Num. xxii. Balak thus much, God is not a man, that he should lie; 19. 1 Sam. xv. 20. and a better prophet confirmed the same truth to Saul; The Strength of Israel will not lie; and because he will not, 1 Quam indignum, ut humanis testimoniis de alio credamus: Dei oraculis de se non credamus!' S. Ambros. lib. i. de Abraham, c. 3. § 21. [Vol. I. p. 289.] Πῶς δ ̓ οὐκ εὐλογώτε ρον, πάντων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πίστεως ἠρτημένων, ἐκείνων μᾶλλον πιστεύειν τῷ Oew; Orig. cont. Cels. 1. i. § 11. [Vol. I. p. 329 c.] because he cannot, he is the Strength of Israel, even my Psal. xviii. 2. God, my strength, in whom I will trust. For, first, God is of infinite knowledge and wisdom, as Hannah hath taught us, The Lord is a God of knowledge', 1 Sam. ii. 3. or rather, if our language will bear it, of knowledges, which are so plural, or rather infinite in their plurality, that the Psalmist hath said, Of his understanding there is no number?. Psal. cxlvii. 5. He knoweth therefore all things, neither can any truth be hid from his knowledge, who is essentially truth, and essentially knowledge, and, as so, the cause of all other truth and knowledge. Thus the understanding of God is infinite in respect of comprehension3, and not so only, but of certainty also and evidence. Some things we are said to know which are but obscurely known, we see them but as in a glass or through a cloud: but God is light, and in him is 1 John i. 5. no darkness at all: he seeth without any obscurity, and whatsoever is propounded to his understanding is most clear 6 and evident; neither is there any creature that is not mani- Heb. iv. 13 fest in his sight; but all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do. Wherefore, being all things are within the compass of his knowledge; being all things which are so, are most clear and evident unto him; being the knowledge he hath of them is most certain and infallible; it inevitably followeth that he cannot be deceived in any thing. 4. Secondly, The justice of God is equal to his knowledge, nor is his holiness inferior to his wisdom: A God of truth Deut. xxxii. (saith Moses) and without iniquity, just and right is he. From which internal, essential, and infinite rectitude, goodness, and holiness, followeth an impossibility to declare or deliver that for truth which he knoweth not to be true. For if it be against that finite purity and integrity which is required of man, to lie, and therefore sinful, then must we conceive it absolutely inconsistent with that transcendent purity and infinite integrity which is essential unto God. Although therefore the power of God be infinite, though he can do all Job xlii. 2. things; yet we may safely say, without any prejudice to his omnipotency', that he cannot speak that for truth which he knoweth to be otherwise. For the perfections of his will are as necessarily infinite as those of his understanding; neither can he be unholy or unjust, more than he can be 2 Tim. ii. 13. ignorant or unwise. If we believe not, yet he abideth faithful, he cannot deny himself. Which words of the apostle, though properly belonging to the promises of God, yet are as true in respect of his assertions; neither should he more deny himself in violating his fidelity, than in contradicting his veraHeb. vi. 17, city. It is true, that God willing more abundantly to shew unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath; that by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, we might have a strong consolation but it is as true, that all this confirmation is only for our consolation; otherwise it is as impossible for God to Heb. vi. 18. lie, without an oath, as with one: for being he can swear by 18. no greater, he sweareth only by himself, and so the strength even of the oath of God relieth upon the veracity of God. Wherefore being God, as God, is of infinite rectitude, goodness, and holiness; being it is manifestly repugnant to his purity, and inconsistent with his integrity, to deliver any thing contrary to his knowledge; it clearly followeth, that he cannot deceive any man. It is therefore most infallibly certain, that God being infinitely wise, cannot be deceived3: being infinitely good, cannot deceive*: and upon these two immovable pillars standeth the authority of the testimony of God. For since we cannot doubt of the witness of any one, but by questioning his ability, as one who may be ignorant of that which he affirmeth, and so deceived; or by excepting against his integrity, as one who may affirm that which he knoweth to be false, and so have a purpose to deceive us: where there is no place for either of these exceptions, there can be no doubt of the truth of the testimony. But where there is an intrinsical repug1 Δύναται δὲ καθ ̓ ἡμᾶς πάντα ὁ [Vol. VII. p. 693 A.] Θεός, ἅπερ δυνάμενος, τοῦ Θεὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, καὶ σοφὸς εἶναι, OVK ěžíσTATαι. Orig. contra Celsum, 1. iii. [§ 70. Vol. I. p. 493 F.] 2'Si volunt invenire quod omnipotens non potest, habent prorsus: ego dicam, Mentiri non potest.' S. August. de Civ. Dei, 1. xxii. c. 25. 3 Cum sit omnipotens, mori non potest, falli non potest, mentiri non potest.' S. August. de Symb. ad Catechum. 1. i. c. 2. [Vol. vi. p. 547 c.] 4 'Deus facere fraudem nescit, pati non potest.' Chrysol. Serm. 62. [col. 372.] nancy of being deceived in the understanding, and of deceiving in the will, as there certainly is in the understanding and will of God, there can be no place for either of those exceptions, and consequently there can be no doubt of the truth of that which God testifieth. And whosoever thinketh any thing comes from him, and assenteth not unto it, must necessarily deny him to be wise or holy: He that believeth not 1 John v. 10. God (saith the apostle), hath made him a liar. That truth then which is testified by God, hath a divine credibility: and an assent unto it, as so credible, is divine faith. In which the material object is the doctrine which God delivereth, the formal object is that credibility founded on the authority1 of the deliverer. And this I conceive the true nature of divine faith in general. Now being the credibility of all which we believe is founded upon the testimony of God, we can never be suffi7 ciently instructed in the notion of faith, till we first understand how this testimony is given to those truths which we now believe. To which end it will be necessary to give notice that the testimony of God is not given unto truths before questioned or debated; nor are they such things as are first propounded and doubted of by man, and then resolved and confirmed by interposing the authority of God: but he is then said to witness when he doth propound, and his testimony is given by way of Revelation, which is nothing else but the delivery or speech of God unto his creatures. And therefore upon a diversity of delivery must follow a difference, though not of faith itself, yet of the means and manner of assent. Wherefore it will be farther necessary to observe, that divine Revelation is of two kinds, either immediate, or mediate. An immediate Revelation is that by which God delivereth himself to man by himself, without the intervention of man. A mediate Revelation is the conveyance of the counsel of God trinseca repugnantia deceptionis seu falsitatis, quam habet divinum judicium, et in intrinseca repugnantia actus voluntatis imperantis testimonium extrinsecum non consentiens judicio interno; quæ per terminos positivos actus intellectus infallibiliter veri, et actus voluntatis intrinsece et necessario recti, poterit explicari.' 1 'Divina est auctoritas, cui |