2. More moderate Calvinists contend that transgressors are responsible for their evil acts, because they are done willingly, although their will could not but choose them. We reply, that this is only the case where the time of trial is past, as in devils and apostates; and then only because these are personally guilty of having vitiated their own wills: but the case is different as to probationers; for,

(1.) It is decided by the Word of God, that men who perish might have "chosen life." (P. 438.)

(2.) The natural reason of mankind is in direct opposition to the doctrine. (P. 439.)

3. The metaphysical doctrine is, that the will is swayed by motives which arise from circumstances beyond the control of man; but, (p. 439,) (1.) This still leaves us in the difficulty, that men are bound by a chain of events established by an almighty power.

(2.) The doctrine is contradicted by the language of men in all countries and ages.

(3.) We deny the necessary connexion between motive and volition.

That the mind acts generally under the influence of motives may be granted, but that it is operated upon by them necessarily, is contradicted,

(a.) By the fact of our often acting under the weakest reason, which is the character of all sins against judgment; and,

(b.) By the fact that we have power to displace one motive by another, and to control those circumstances from which motives flow.

(IV.) The divine sovereignty. (P. 422.)

The Calvinistic doctrine is, that God does what he wills, only because he

wills it. But it can be shown from Scripture, that the acts of the divine will are under the direction of the divine wisdom, goodness, and justice.

(V.) The case of heathen nations is sometimes referred to by Calvinists as presenting equal difficulties to those urged against election and reprobation. But the cases are not parallel, unless it be granted that heathen, as such, are excluded from heaven. (P. 444.)

1. Heathen are bad enough, but the question is not what they are, but what they might be: they are under the patriarchal dispensation; and

2. St. Paul affirms that the divine law has not perished from among them, but that if they live up to the light which they possess they may be saved.

(VI.) Irresistible grace. We admit that man, in his simply natural state, is insufficient of himself to think or do anything of a saving tendency; and that when the Holy Spirit is vouchsafed, we are often entirely passive in the first instance; but we contend that the grace of God has

been bestowed upon all men, inasmuch as all are required to do those
things which have a saving tendency. These premises

1. Establish the justice of God in the condemnation of men, and
2. Secure the glory of our salvation to the grace of God. (P. 448.)

(D.)—FURTHER BENEFITS OF REDEMPTION. (Ch. xxix.)

I. Entire sanctification of believers. That there is a distinction between a regenerate state and a state of perfect holiness, is sufficiently proved by the exhortations to believers in 1 Thess. v, 23, and 2 Cor. vii, 1.

1. The time when we are to expect this blessing has been disputed. It is admitted that the soul must be entirely cleansed before it can pass into heaven, but many contend that the final stroke to corruption can only be given at death; but

(1.) The promise of sanctification is nowhere restricted in Scripture to the article of death.

(2.) The soul's union with the body is nowhere represented as a necessary obstacle to its entire sanctification. Romans vii, has indeed been adduced in proof of this, but it is clear that the apostle is giving the experience of one yet under the law, and not in a state of deliverance by Christ.

(3.) This doctrine is disproved by those passages which connect sanctification with the subsequent exhibition of its fruits in life.

(4.) It is disproved, also, by all those passages which require us to bring forth the fruits of the Spirit; for these are required of us in perfection and maturity, and necessarily suppose the entire sanctification of the soul from the opposite and antagonist evils.

(5.) This doctrine involves other antiscriptural consequences:-that the seat of sin is in the flesh; and that the flesh must not only lust against the spirit, but on many occasions be the conqueror.

We conclude, then, that as sanctification can neither be referred to the hour of death, nor placed subsequently to this life, it is an attainment to which believers are called during this life.

2. The manner of sanctification. It may be, (1) gradual, or (2) instantaneous.

3. Objections to this doctrine.

(1.) It supposes future impeccability. Nay: the angels sinned, and so did our first parents.

(2.) It renders the atonement and intercession of Christ superfluous. Nay: for this state of sanctification is maintained by the constant influences of the Holy Spirit, vouchsafed through Christ's intercession. (3.) It shuts out the use of the prayer, "Forgive us our trespasses." But, a) this prayer is designed for men in a mixed condition. b) All sin must not be continued, in order that this prayer may be employed.

And c) The defects and infirmities of a being naturally imperfect, are not inconsistent with moral holiness.

II. The right to pray is another benefit which accrues to believers; and so is

III. The special providence of God.

IV. Victory over death is also awarded to them.

V. The immediate reception of the soul into a state of blessedness. "The sacred writers proceed on the supposition that the soul and the body are naturally distinct and separable, and that the soul is susceptible of pain or pleasure during that separation." Quotation from Campbell.

VI. Resurrection of the body. There is some dispute in regard to this doctrine —whether it implies a resurrection of the substance of the body, or of a minute and indestructible germ.

1. The only passage of Scripture which seems to favour the germ theory is 1 Cor. xv, 35: "How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" These two questions both imply a doubt as to the fact, not an inquiry as to the modus agendi; and the apostle answers them by showing, in answer to the first question, that there is nothing incredible in the thing; and in answer to the second, that the doctrine of our reunion with the body implies nothing contrary to the hopes of liberation from the "burden of this flesh," because of the glorified qualities which God is able to give to matter. (P. 463.)

2. There are several difficulties connected with this theory; for on its hypothesis

(1.) There is no resurrection of the body; for the germ cannot be called the body.

(2.) There is no resurrection from death at all, but a vegetation from a

secret principle of life.

(3.) It is substantially the same with the pagan doctrine of metempsychosis.

An objection to the resurrection of the body has been drawn from the changes of its substance during life. This does not affect the doctrine, that the body which is laid in the grave shall be raised up. 'But," we are told, "the same bodies that sin may not be punished." We answer, that the soul is the only rewardable subject—the body is its instrument.

(1.) The morals of the New Testament are not presented to us in the form of a regular code.

(2.) The divine authority of the Old Testament is everywhere presupposed.

I. The moral laws of the Old Testament pass into the Christian code. (Pp. 469, 470.)

1. The ceremonial law is repealed, being adumbrative and temporary; 2. The political law also; but

3. The moral precepts are not repealed; but even incidentally re-enacted. Scil., Christ's declaration, “I am not come to destroy the law, but to fulfil ;" and Paul's, "Do we then make void the law through faith?" The argument, then, from the want of formal re-enactment, has no weight.

4. The entire decalogue is brought into the Christian code by a distinct injunction of its separate precepts. (Pp. 470, 471.)

II. These laws, in the Christian code, stand in other and higher circumstances than under the Mosaic dispensation.

1. They are extended more expressly to the heart.

2. They are carried out into a greater variety of duties.

3. There is a more enlarged injunction of positive and particular virtues.

4. All overt acts are connected with corresponding principles.

5. These laws are connected with promises of divine assistance.

6. They have a living illustration in the example of Christ.

7. They are connected with higher sanctions.

III. All attempts to teach morals, independent of Christianity, must be of mischievous tendency. (Pp.472-474.)

1. Because such attempts convey the impression that reason alone could discover the duty of man.

2. Because they displace what is perfect for what is imperfect.

3. Because they turn away from the revealed law to inferior considerations, such as beauty, fitness, &c.

4. Because they either enjoin duties merely outward in the act, or else assume that human nature is able to cleanse itself.

5. Because that by separating doctrines from morals, they propose a new plan, other than that of the gospel, for renovating and moralizing the world. Yet moral philosophy, if properly guarded, and taken in connexion with the whole Christian system, is not to be undervalued.

IV. As to the reasons on which moral precepts rest, it may be remarked,

1. Some rest wholly on the authority of a revealer;

2. Others are accompanied with manifest rational evidence;

3. Others partially disclose their rationale to the anxious inquirer.

V. With respect to the application of general precepts, wide observation is ne

cessary.

1. The precepts must be general.

2. Exceptions to general rules should be watched with jealousy.

VI. Grounds of moral obligation.

1. “Eternal and necessary fitness of things," leaves the question still open.. 2. "Moral sense,” also unsatisfactory; for

(a.) Its indications are neither perfect nor uniform.

(b.) Its mandates have no authority.

3. "Doctrine of the greatest good:" circuitous, and impossible in practice. 4. The will of God, then, the only true ground of moral obligation. The obligation is founded on the relation of the creature to the Creator.

VII. Nature of moral rectitude. (Payne's view.)

1. We sustain various relations to God.

2. We sustain various relations to each other.

Virtue is the conformity or harmony of man's affections or actions, with the various regulations in which he has been placed; and since these relations were constituted by God, rectitude may be regarded as conformity to the moral nature of God, the ultimate standard of virtue.

VOL. I.-F.