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be useful in reading the names of Egyptian kings, but will not, probably, ever lead even to a superficial understanding of the Egyptian inscriptions, and numerous writings on papyrus found in tombs. So that M. C., when he undertakes to translate the most inconsiderable phrase, is obliged to invent for this purpose words which are not Coptic, and which he cannot justify by any authority. In this manner M. Klaproth examines the Lettres au Duc de Blacas ; the Pantheon Egyptien, and the Précis du Systéme Hieroglyphique des Anciens Egyptiens, published at different times by M. Champollion in all of which, according to our critic, he has · accumulated "conjecture on conjecture, and contradiction on contradiction." Thus the second edition of his Précis partly does away what the first edition had given as demonstrated; and to render his hypotheses more plausible, M. Champollion has been forced to construct a new Egyptian Mythology, which is itself hypothetical, and founded on "nothing." (p. 6.) The proofs of these and similar charges occupy the remainder of this work, to which we must refer the reader, who may be desirous of a minute examination: remarking, however, that one of the most serious accusations against M. Champollion is that, not content with arbitrary and unauthorised interpretations, he falsified the monument of Abydos; a most valuable fragment of antiquity, found in 1818, by Mr. W. J. Bankes, among the ruins called El-haraba by the Arabs.

Considering that as yet no person is capable of spelling more than three or four consecutive words in the alphabetico-demotic characters of the Rosetta inscription, M. Klaproth expresses his surprise at the boldness with which M. Champollion affects to translate it. At Aix he persuaded M. Sallier, a gentleman who possessed three papyrus rolls covered with demotic Egyptian characters, that one contained the history of the campaigns of SesostrisRamsès, (also called Sethos, Sethosis, or Seeosis) composed after the ninth year of that prince's reign, par son chantre et son ami. Yet it appears that these rolls were not communicated to M. Champollion till he was on the eve of departure, and that he had scarcely time to look over them.

But we must hasten to the conclusion, wherein M. Klaproth states the result of his critical observations, which in his opinion demonstrate,

1st. That to the late Dr. Young belongs incontestably the honor of having first discovered the nature of a part of the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphical signs; but that M. Champollion corrected the learned Englishman's mistakes, and considerably augmented his discovery.

2nd. That this discovery can only facilitate the reading of the proper names of kings and of some other personages, and of a part of the auxiliary signs of discourse, while it is of no avail in the reading of ideographic and symbolical hieroglyphics; and

Oxford English Prize Essay, for 1829. 155

that M. Champollion almost always fails in his endeavors to explain these last-mentioned.

3rd. That the system of this savant does not rest on any fixed bases; and that he changes at will the sense which he assigns both to the phonetic and symbolic characters.

4th. That the imperfect knowlege of the ancient Egyptian idiom, which we may be able to acquire through the medium of Coptic, will never suffice for ascertaining the sense of an hieroglyphic inscription, even though we should suppose it wholly written in phonetic letters.

5th. That the Alteration of the Table of Abydos, published by M. Champollion, shows what degree of confidence may be placed in the result of his labors on Egyptian antiquities.

6th. That there is a still less chance of obtaining an explanation of Egyptian monuments inscribed with the demotic characters, although the demotic part of the Rosetta inscription is in almost perfect preservation.

We shall here close our account of this work, by observing that it is (as far as we know) the first in which the hieroglyphical signs of characters are printed from moveable types, cast for the purpose under M. Klaproth's direction: these occur in their proper places, ranging with the letter-press like the characters used in our common quotations of Greek or Hebrew passages.

OXFORD ENGLISH PRIZE ESSAY,
FOR 1829.

The Power and Stability of Federative Governments.

ARGUMENT.

The infinite variety in the local and otherwise peculiar circumstances of differ ent nations urged as a principal reason for the wide discrepancies which exist between governments bearing a common appellation. Hence the difficulty of pronouncing any general conclusion on their power and stability.

The nature of confederation commented on; and its place among constitutions of government.

The argument against its capacity for power.

An objection, which might be raised from the fact of the existence of great power in the United Provinces, answered by an inquiry into the sources of that power, showing how it was affected by the peculiarity of their constitution. The stability of federative governments considered, and shown to be incompatible with power.

Examination of the principal features of the Helvetic confederacy.

Sum of the Argument.

Brief review of the political circumstances of the United States.

POLITICAL Science, however founded on the experience of ages, and illustrated by the highest efforts of human wisdom, is nevertheless of a doubtful and ill-ascertained character. This defect is inherent in its

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nature, and inseparable from its subject-mattér, arising as well from the unceasing fluctuation in the habits and circumstances, in the moral and social relations of mankind, as from the complex operation of external causes. There exists indeed but little community of opinion or uniformity of practice beyond the circumscribed limits of those maxims in politics, which are deducible by direct inference from moral truths'; for the great mass of those rules and principles, which have a more immediate influence on practice, and give to a government its tone and peculiar organisation, are of a description purely local; deriving their force from local circumstances and local interests, and therefore, however just, are only applicable in their full extent to the particular case. Hence it is, that constitutions, nominally and externally the same, have little or no interior resemblance, and in many instances only so far correspond as to justify us in referring them to one common standard.

Closely allied to the difficulties of the science are those impediments to fair and candid investigation which exist with different degrees of strength in the mind of the inquirer. The voice of truth may indeed be heard, but is far too feeble to be obeyed, unless where reason bas been enabled to establish around her a calm and perfect silence by stilling the angry and unruly feelings of the human breast. The caution against any attempt to form a comprehensive theory, so just in reference to all subjects which furnish but precarious grounds for rea soning, applies with peculiar force to political discussion, which in volves too many questions of interest and prejudice, not to provoke at every step a ready appeal from the judgment to the passions,

The boundaries, then, of this subject are vague and undefined, but comprise in their extent a wide field beaten and explored, and familiar to our knowlege. There are principles of increase and decay, of weakness and energy, common to all governments whatever. Others again develope themselves more fully and powerfully in constitutions of a peculiar kind. The danger, for instance, of an undue assumption of power by the executive exists more or less in all governments; while in republics more particularly we should look for an excess of faction and party spirit.

In like manner, in all federative constitutions there are many points of common origin, on the investigation of which we may arrive at a common conclusion, to be subsequently modified by an inquiry into the peculiar circumstances of each separate example.

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The system of federation may be partially regarded as a choice of evils, a species of compromise between subjection and independence originating in the inherent weakness of each member of the confederacy. Advantages indeed it proposes and secures, to which a number of small and unconnected states could individually form no reasonable pretension, but which involve in their very attainment a sacrifice of free agency on the part of the respective members. So far it bears a close resemblance to the social compact, by which every man surrenders a portion of his natural rights in exchange for an assurance of a more full and secure enjoyment of those he reserves. But at this point the parallel must cease. In the great system of society the objects of mutual cooperation are infinite in number and extent; and we admire the peculiar beauty of an order of things, which places its ultimate end in the advancement of human happiness, and furnishes us with a means of attaining it, at once the only one we can imagine, and in all its parts the

most admirably complete. In a federal union, on the contrary, the immediate objects of co-operation are necessarily fewer; the means too for securing them are not only precarious and incomplete, but inferior in many principal points to others, which have been devised for compassing the same end, which are open to observation, and matter of actual experience.

But the excellencies and deficiencies of federal constitutions must be examined, not so much by a comparison with those incident to other forms of government, as by a separate and independent process of investigation; since it would seem a fair assumption in the outset of our inquiry, that, supposing it possible to consolidate any system of confederated states into one single and thoroughly compacted body, without depriving them of any advantages, natural or acquired, which they had previously enjoyed, the chances of prosperity, of power, and stability, would be indefinitely increased. In a word, any government, single and indivisible, is surely preferable to one whose tendency, unless counteracted by the operation of more prevailing causes, is disunion and decay. Nor is it any answer to adduce examples of confederated states, which have attained a higher degree of glory and prosperity than nations possessing a consolidated government; since this would be omitting to notice many important elements of conside ration in the manners and habits, temper and situation, of the people thus forced into comparison, all and each of which are to the full as important as their form of government. That there are real advantages belonging more peculiarly to federative constitutions, when organized on just principles, is not wished to be denied: but there are also countervailing obstacles to the extension and durability of national power, which may be said to form part of the essence of federation. Again, the advantages of any state or number of states may be great and unquestionable, and yet the government may be such as to check their growth and increase, and disappoint the fair promise of national prosperity. It will be seen that a federal government necessarily partakes more or less of this character; that it has, in short, a direct tendency to defeat in the end the very object it was devised to pro

mote.

The question of government is a question of the application of means to an end, that end being, in general terms, the happiness and prosperity of the people; and this idea of government supposes a power vested in the hands of a few or more individuals for the benefit of the community. Now it is clear that delegated power ought in all cases to be equal to its object; since it is doubtless unreasonable to make men responsible for the discharge of a sacred trust, while you deny them all adequate means for its fulfilment and execution. It follows that a government, fettered, and shackled in its operations by an illtimed and improper jealousy, cannot be expected to provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the independent character of the commonwealth. How indeed can its administration be any thing else than a succession of impotent and temporizing expedients? How can it undertake with confidence, or execute with promptitude and success, any liberal or enlarged plans for the public good?

The public good cannot from its very nature admit of precise and accurate definition. Nor is it possible to assign to it at any given moment fixed and certain limits, which it may not be expedient and even necessary to transgress at some future period in order to its pre

servation. Those, therefore, who are intrusted with power for the protection and advancement of national interests, must have full and unlimited scope for the exercise of their functions. This power in a free government (and it is such only we are considering) is lodged in the legislature, composed either entirely or in part of the representatives of the people; and he who would give a constitution to his country, prescribing bounds to the legislative authority, would, in his anxiety to avoid an imaginary danger, lay the foundation of practical and extensive injury. The true check and safeguard against the usurpation of the few lies not in controlling the operations of the legislature, but in making it responsible to public opinion, and in giving the nation frequent opportunities of marking that opinion, of testifying their approbation or disavowal, their rejection or support.

The impossibility of avoiding in a federal constitution the defect which necessarily attaches to a limitation of the legislative authority, is placed in a clear point of view by the practice of the United States, which have an unquestionable title to be regarded as the best model of that form of government, whether in ancient or modern times. With a view to balance the powers of the central and the state governments, and to prevent the former from overstepping its proper limits, a power has been there conceded to the judiciary, which has in no other instance, we believe, been vested in that department. Thus, if the American legislature should in the passing of any law have transgressed its legitimate bounds, the citizen, who is prosecuted for the violation of that law, may defend himself on the plea of its being at variance with the principles or practice of the constitution; and, notwithstanding the act may have passed both houses of the legislature, and have been ratified by the chief magistrate in accordance with all the usual forms, should the supreme court of judicature find that it contravened the constitution, it would be pronounced null and of no authority. In this manner state laws, even on matters over which congress has exclusive jurisdiction, have actually been abrogated.

It does not appear necessary to consider here in what manner the due exercise of the several branches of legislative authority conduces to the vigor and stability of government; but we may safely conclude on the evidence of reason and confirmation of history, that a supremacy of authority, undivided and uncontrolled in the exercise of its delegated powers, must be lodged in some quarter, and that that quarter can be no other than the legislature.

In the application of this principle to the question of the power of a federative constitution, the inquiry naturally presents itself in two distinct points of view. 1. Can a power of this nature, fully competent to its object, exist at all in a confederacy? 2. Is it in the nature of things to expect that confederate states will be inclined to concede even that full degree of power to the federal head, which is compatible with the principles of their constitution?

Now to both these questions the answer is in the negative. To suppose indeed the existence of such a power in a confederacy involves a contradiction of terms. A supremacy of general authority admits of no participation or interference, and is therefore incompatible with the rights of sovereign and independent states. On the other hand, if we suppose all idea of local administration to be abandoned, and every power, executive, legislative, and judicial, lodged in the component parts of the federal head, the confederacy would no longer exist in any

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