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shape but in that of a mere territorial division. We may add, that however slight might be the influence of these divisions on the national administration, in the event of so entire a consolidation of the states, yet would they be quite sufficient to foster old prejudices, to give frequent occasion for umbrage and jealousy, and thus keep alive the embers of dissension and disunion in the very heart of the community.

The denial of the latter of the above questions is grounded on the acknowleged principles of human nature. The grand and primary object of an association of states under one government consists in the improved relations of security, of dignity, and independence, in which they will thereby stand to foreign nations. In the same proportion, therefore, as these interests come less home to the breasts of the greater portion of the community than such as are domestic and of daily recurrence, will the desire of giving efficiency and vigor to the power employed on them be weak and transient. In the same proportion will the citizens of each separate state repose their confidence in the members, and interest themselves in the measures, of their own government, while they are either inattentive to the concerns of the federal administration, or regard its conduct with jealousy and suspi

cion.

If again by a confederacy is meant an assemblage of independent states into one great state for national purposes, it follows, that all the powers not ceded by them severally, and delegated in express terms to the federal head, must continue to reside in their own respective administrations. These therefore being, in a peculiar manner, the guardians of local interests, and protectors against the encroachments of the federal head, will always possess a higher relative degree of influence over the people of their respective states: "a circumstance," says a celebrated republican," which teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions, and that too much pains cannot be taken in their organization to give them all the force consistent and compatible with the principles of liberty."

This division of authority involves, among many other sources of inconvenience and danger, the very difficult and delicate question of a concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, where funds are to be provided as well for the maintenance and purposes of the federal administration, as for those of the state governments, there must not only exist a necessity for an extreme care and prudence in regulating the collection of imposts, and defining the precise province of each jurisdiction, but also for a degree of moderation and mutual forbearance in enforcing these regulations, which is seldom to be met with amid the eager passions and jarring interests of numerous societies.

On referring to the history of confederate states, as well ancient as modern, we shall find ample cause for assenting to the proposition, which asserts the power of such governments to be in exact proportion to the weakness or efficiency of the federal head. The denial of supreme authority to this body has in most cases been attended with fatal results, inasmuch as it comprises, among various other sources of evil, one great radical and vital error, in the principle which assigns to the

1 Mr. Hamilton, one of the most distinguished advocates of the present consti. tution of the United States.

national council under a federative constitution the power of legisla ting for its members in their collective capacities of states, but denies them all power over the individuals composing those states. Now, supposing a demand to be made by this body on the members of their confederacy for supplies of men, a demand coupled with no constitutional authority for the actual levying of those supplies, the requisition will have practically the force of a mere recommendation, and not of law. The states, on their part, will observe or disregard it at their option, in compliance with the dictates of local interests, or of any faction which may chance to prevail, and accordingly as they shall deem themselves capable or not of prescribing their own terms. For this state of anarchy and disobedience the sole remedy is force; the sole result of such a species of coercion is commonly the aggrandise→ ment of the more powerful states at the expense of their refractory associates.

1

These remarks are confirmed by observing, that wheresoever a confederacy has been partially free from this error, the result has been favorable to its political existence. Thus the common council of the Lycian confederacy, which is instanced by Montesquieu as the best model of that form of government with which he was acquainted, was intrusted with a very delicate species of interference in the appointment of the officers and magistrates of the various cities composing the confederacy. This concession of authority justifies us in concluding, that a union of a very intimate nature subsisted between these cities; one indeed approaching as nearly as possible to a consolidated government.

4

Again, in the Achæan league, which has shared with the Lycian the applause of political writers, the federal head possessed very ample powers; while so closely drawn were the bonds of union, that all the cities had the same laws and usages, the same weights and measures, and the same money. Thus, when Lacedæmon was brought into the league by Philopoemen, the change was attended by an abolition of the laws and institutions of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achæans. The natural result of this wise organization was the attainment of great power and consideration; however little calculated to withstand the force of internal jealousies, fostered and promoted by the ambition and ascendancy of Rome.

It can hardly be necessary to instance the pretence of union among the Greeks under the feeble and inefficient sanction of the Amphictyonic council. They had scarcely any claim to the title of a confederacy; none certainly, if the distinction be allowed, to that of a federative government. The notorious vices and imperfections of their union, with all its attendant anarchy and bloodshed, may, nevertheless, be

1 We say 'partially,' because there has never been an instance (the United States, as we shall see hereafter, possessing a constitution of a mixed character) of the investment of sovereign power in the federal head; and for the plain reason, that such a government would not be a confederacy, but a consolidation of states. 2 Esprit des Loix, ix. 3.

• See the character given of the Lycians, and the account of their constitution, Strabo, 1. xiv.

4 Plutarch, Life of Philopomen, ch. 16. Also c. 8. and Life of Aratus, c. 9. 5 Περὶ δὲ τοὺς ̓Αχαίους παράδοξος αὔξησις καὶ συμφρόνησις τοῖς καθ ̓ ἡμᾶς καιροῖς yéyove, k. T. λ.—Polybius, ii. 37. Idem, iv. 1.

easily referred to the operation of the same mistaken principle, when taken in connexion with the impossibility of harmonizing the discordant elements of oligarchy and democracy, of popular licence and stern republicanism, both of which exercised at the same moment their uncontrolled influence within the narrow limits of ancient Greece.

2

In more modern times, the most remarkable example of federation, as well from its extent as from its general influence on the affairs of Europe, was the Germanic body. This curious political fabric, which, it may be remarked, bore no uninstructive analogy to the Amphictyonic league, had its foundation and origin in the feudal system, which succeeded to the reality of imperial power enjoyed by the immediate descendants of Charlemagne. We find, accordingly, that it labored under the feeble and confused organization of an imperfect confederacy, engrafted on all the vices and anomalies of that system. Were we to judge indeed from the parade of constitutional powers vested by the Germanic union in the federal head, from the ample authority intrusted to the diet, and from the extensive influence enjoyed by the executive magistrate in virtue of his numerous prerogatives, we should arrive at no conclusion, but one favorable to the domestic tranquillity and power of the empire. But the facts of the case are far otherwise the principle, which formed the basis of this confederacy, that the empire was a community of sovereigns, that the diet was a representation of sovereigns, and that the laws were addressed to sovereigns, rendered it a nerveless and unwieldy body; equally incapable of internal regulation, and of security from the pressure of external danger. So far indeed was it from presenting any appearance of concert and unanimity, that the generality of its wars were waged between its own members; nor is there any one instance throughout its whole history in which it can be said to have united in offering a steady resistance to foreign arms.

The history of Germany is a history of wars and tumults, of foreign interference and foreign intrigue, of violence, rapine, and oppression, of refusals to comply with the decisions of the diet, and of attempts to enforce them either abortive, or attended with bloodshed and civil war. In the 16th century the emperor, with one half of the empire, was engaged against the princes and states composing the remainder. Again, previously to the peace of Westphalia, Germany was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the emperor and part of the empire were opposed to Sweden, aided by many members of the confederacy. Peace was at length negotiated and dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign powers were parties, became fundamental principles of the Germanic constitution.

1 Vers le milieu du 13e siècle, la dignité impériale perdit son éclat, soit par les brouilleries avec la cour de Rome, soit par les abus toujours croissans du régime féodal. Avec le pouvoir des empereurs la constitution de l'empire fut altérée. Ce vaste état dégénéra insensiblement en une sorte du systême fédératif, et l'empereur ne fut plus, par la suite du temps, que le chef commun et le seigneur suzerain des vastes états, dont ce systême était composé.-Tableau des Révolutions, vol. i. p. 173.

2 Imperfect both in principle and practice, and faulty in the extreme from the admission of many members to a share in the confederacy, who possessed dominions not included under the provisions of the federal compact in other countries of Europe.

Hence it is that we look in vain for the power which ought naturally to have followed on the organization of so extensive a confederacy; for allowing the existence of great strength and abundant resources in the Germanic body, yet we find them seldom or never called into united action, from the prevalence of conflicting interests, without any adequate means of adjustment; from the want of substantial authority in the diet, and the consequent necessity of referring all disputes of moment to the decision of the sword..

Now it would seem that as all questions of the power of federative governments may be resolved into that of the efficiency of the federal head, and as we have shown this to be more or less incompatible with the principles and feelings of all confederacies, the conclusion must be unfavorable to their capacity for power.

But the reserve necessary in the admission of any rule in the science of politics, and the caution with which we must examine all the circumstances in the history of a nation, before we pronounce its constitution to be incapable of a high degree of political power, is no where more strongly forced on our consideration than in the present case.

It is quite true that in the great majority both of ancient and modern confederacies we have a striking picture of weakness and instability. There are some, however, which bear a contrary aspect; and one in particular, which, although in a certain degree exposed to the latter of these imputations, cannot certainly be taxed with a want of power. It will easily be understood that allusion is here made to the United Provinces.

In order to understand in what manner the extraordinary power enjoyed by this nation during a great portion of the 17th century was affected by the constitution of their government, we must recur to the origin of their political existence; since our question is not so much, whether the fact of a people possessing a federal constitution is of itself sufficient to account for the presence or absence of power, as, how far such a constitution may affect the existing causes of weakness or prosperity. A free government is but an epitome of the nation where it exists; and the real springs of power have their source in the peculiar circumstances, principles, habits, and feelings of the people. Good government will develope and assist these in their course; bad government will choke and exhaust them.

The power of the United Provinces derived both its origin and subsequent support from their extensive commerce; and this, although it arose at an early period of their independence, and prior to the existence of their federative government, was in after times much indebted to the peculiarity of their constitution. History indeed teaches us, that in all ages free governments have been the most favorable to commerce. Nor is the fact more evident, than the reasons and principles on which it might be established: but this would lead us into a digression foreign to our purpose.

The federal constitution, which had for its basis the union of Utrecht in 1579, found in the four maritime provinces of the league,2 in those which have from the earliest times been the depositories of the strength

1 We may instance also the Hanseatic league, which took its rise in the 13th century, and which may justly be considered to have given the first great impulse to the commerce of modern Europe.

2 Holland, Zealand, Friesland, Groningen.

and riches of the Netherlands, a people whose whole thoughts and feelings were centred in two grand objects, and these identified the one with the other, their independence and their commerce. The religious persecutions which raged in France, England, and Germany, during the course of the 16th century, had compelled multitudes of those professing the reformed discipline to take shelter in the Low Countries, where the government had long been of a milder character, and the privileges of the cities inviolate. The course of these emigrations took a natural direction towards such of the provinces as held out the fairest prospect of success in the consolidation of their independence; and thus the above-mentioned provinces became the seat of a redundant, but wealthy and enterprising population. The result in favor of commerce was powerful and immediate; and with the growth of their commerce their independence may be fairly said to have been identified, since it was commerce alone which supplied them with the means of a protracted resistance to the Spanish power. Further still, it afforded them so great facilities for the destruction of the Spanish wealth derived from her East Indian possessions,1 that the desire to put a stop to their further successes and depredations in that quarter was among the chief reasons which extorted from Spain the first recognition of their independence in 1609.

Under such circumstances it was plainly impossible for the federal government to close its eyes to the importance of trade, even had it wished to give a different direction to the current of popular feeling. Fortunately, however, the members of that government were themselves engaged in the same pursuits with the great body of the nation. They were sensible how much depended on the encouragement of commerce; and therefore fell in entirely with its habits, and with its consequences on society. It is to these causes that we may in great measure attribute the traits of frugality, of industry, and perseverance, so indelibly stamped on the character both of the administration and the people.

But the operation of the federal government on commerce, although at first silent and secondary, became in after-times its main spring and support, as will easily appear from a brief review of certain results of that singular constitution.

There is perhaps no example in history which reads us a more forcible lesson on the precarious nature of political wisdom, or which can teach us by a more striking appeal to facts, that the most faultless and unexceptionable theories of government are not always the best adapted to practice, or the best calculated to insure the grand objects of national happiness and national prosperity. A plan for a constitution like that of the United Provinces, could hardly form any part of the speculations of the politician, unless he were desirous to demonstrate the probable consequences of so glaring a perversion of the principles of his science. It was indeed an edifice constructed to all appearance of ill-assorted and heterogeneous materials; a compound of monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy; which has been dignified with the title of a republic, without the existence of one particle of popular government throughout its whole composition.

There were in this constitution four main elements. The first and

1 Portugal and her Indian dependencies had been subdued by Philip II. in 1580. She did not recover her independence till 1640.

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