government and will. And of the great Messiah, the Mediator of the covenant of the Gospel, it invariably speaks as the man Christ Jesus; never even intimating that his nature and person are mysterious, and certainly holding forth no such intelligence in the sentences on which I am commenting.

Further; It ought not to be concluded from the last clause, 'he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him,' that Jesus communicates to any of his followers a private or individual revelation of the nature or the mind of God. This mistake is very current, and tends to produce in some men spiritual pride, in others religious despondency. It is a public revelation which our Lord here mentions; one that was made in part by his own instrumentality, in part by that of his apostles. There are two passages in the New Testament with which the words before us ought especially to be compared: John i. 18, "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father," i. e. who has a compleat acquaintance with the Divine counsels for the salvation of the world, " he hath declared him :" Matt. xiii. 16, 17, "-verily, I say unto you that blessed are your eyes, &c.; for many prophets and righteous men have desired to see those things which ye see, and have not seen them, and to hear those things which ye hear, and have not heard them."

So far therefore is the phraseology which has been the subject of these remarks from stating or implying the existence of a mysterious union between the Father and the Son that it declares a plain and most interesting truth: I mean, the concurrence of God and Christ as to the grand objects and vast extent of the Christian Revelation; a truth particularly valuable to those professors of the Gospel who are of Gentile parentage! N.

of his characters, is adopted in The Racovian Catechism ;* a manual which, I hope, will soon be more extensively known among my readers, and froin which I shall now make two extracts on a subject to which their attention has lately been directed :†

"-was he [Christ] not a priest till he entered into the heaven? not when he hung upon the cross?"

"A. At no hand; for, as you beard even now, the divine author to the Hebrews, ch. viii. 4, expressly saith that if Christ were upon the earth, he would not be a priest. Besides, forasmuch as the same author testifieth that Christ ought in all things to be made like unto his brethren, that he might become a faithful and merciful high priest to God ward, it is evident that until he had been made like unto his brethren in all things, that is in afflictions and death, he was not our merciful and faithful high priest."

The following question and answer, deserve the notice of careful inquirers into the sense of Scripture:

"Why doth the Scripture, treating of Christ's priesthood, say that he intercedeth for us?”

"A. Both that the care which Christ takes of our salvation might, by the requests which he is said to make to God, appear to us; and also that the prerogative and eminency of the Father above Christ might remain entire and inviolate."

Here the compiler of the Catechism alludes to Heb. vii. 24, 25. But the word intercession, which occurs in that passage, does not necessarily and exclusively import the act of offering supplications for the welfare of others. It is a term of very extensive signification, and means the management of the concerns of our fellow men.

The intercession of Christ, therefore, is not his pleading with offended jus tice, or his interposing to avert Divine wrath it is a part of his mediation or ministry as the APPOINTED Messenger of God and Saviour of mankind; and thus, in the language of this Catechisın, it illustrates "the prerogative and eminency of the Father." N.

* Translated into English. Amsterdam, 1652. pp. 163, &c. Catechesis Ecclesiarum Polonicarum. 325, &c.

†M. Repos. XI. 402, 403.

W

E opened this book with considerable expectation. After the great minds which have engaged in the investigation of the subject of which it treats, the number and importance of the facts which they have left upon record relative to it, and the variety and beauty of the illustrations with which they have adorned it; though we did not anticipate much that was new, yet we did allow ourselves to hope that the benevolent and pious bequest of Mr. Burnett would call forth a work of ability and usefulness, possessing at least closeness of reasoning and clearness of illustration-a work which the philosopher might read with pleasure, and the theological student and the general reader with profit. When we heard that the prize had been adjudged to the Essay of the Principal of MarischalCollege, we were still willing to believe that our expectation was well founded: page after page, notwithstanding the misgivings which soon began to gather on our minds, we ching fondly to this hope, trusting that the author would rise with the interest and importance of the subject;-but after having read to the end, we closed the book with the melancholy regret that the munificence of the worthy founder of this prize should only have added another proof to the sad catalogue which shows that the best efforts of benevolence are doomed in this world to disappoint

ment.

The Reverend Principal divides his Essay into Three Books. The First treats of the Evidence of the Being of God; the Second of his Perfections, namely, his Power, Wisdom and Goodness, and enters particularly into

the consideration of the objections to the two latter, arising from the existence of natural and moral evil; and the Third comprehends the solution given to these difficulties by Revelation, especially by the Gospel, together with some Practical Inferences deducible from the speculative part of the Essay.

After some observations on the meaning of the terms Necessary Existence, Cause and Effect, the author arranges his proofs of the existence of God into the metaphysical proof; the proof from design; from the constitution of the faculties of the human mind; from the almost universal assent of mankind to the truth of this opinion; from the appearances which the world exhibits of a recent origin, and the traditions concerning it; and from the testimony of Scripture.

The metaphysical proof stated origi nally by Clarke with an acuteness and force, which, notwithstanding an extreme prolixity, and even when his arguments fail to produce conviction, awe the mind into veneration of the strength and profoundness of the understanding that conceived them, is here given without closeness and without ability: it extends through nearly thirty pages with an uncommon feebleness; it has scarcely the strength of the echo of an echo; and in the very midst of an argument which supposes the greatest precision and accuracy, there occur such affirmations as the following:

the existence of mind as a substance entirely "We have evidence equally strong for distinct from the body, as we have for the existence of this last, and of its peculiar properties, namely, consciousness and the internal perception of our mental energies, as entirely distinct from any quality of matter. Nay, perhaps this evidence is stronger than that of our external senses, by which we ascertain corporeal substance and the properties belonging to it."-P. 64.

And again:

"Nor in reality is it more difficult to admit the creation of matter, that is, its original production, than the production of any thing which did not exist before. The only difference lies in the superior power required and in the nature of the effects.

To all genius a species of creative power, that is, a faculty of producing something new is ascribed. A fine statue is indeed hewn out of a block of marble; but where were the beauty, the symmetry, the proportion and exquisite composition which the statue displays?" Again :

"In fact, if the case be accurately examined, it displayed perhaps a greater exertion of divine power to superinduce on rude, uninformed matter, that symmetry, beauty and admirable construction which the universe exhibits, than to call into being the chaotic mass."-Pp. 70. 72.

So that according to the learned Principal, it is more difficult to conceive how a beautiful statue should be hewn out of a block of marble, than how marble itself should be produced out of nothing.

The proof of the being of God, from the manifestation of design in the works of nature, is in itself complete and decisive. On this rock the Theist may take his stand; and it is not possible for all the artifice which human ingenuity can employ, to shake for a moment the firm foundation of his faith. Wherever there is design there must have been a designer; wherever there is contrivance there must have been a contriver. This simple argument is level to the comprehension of every capacity; and to him who is worthy of the name of a philosopher, it appears with an evidence which is absolutely irresistible. Show to any rational being a piece of mechanism, explain to him how one part is adapted to another, and how all the various parts are fitted to bring about some one particular result; and he must admit the existence of a wisdom to conceive and of a power to execute that result. If he affirm that he does not, all reasoning must be at an end with him; for it is no longer possible to hold an argument with a person who declares that he does not perceive the relation between what is admitted to be contrivance and what is termed a contriver. In the great controversy therefore between the Theist and the Atheist, the only question of real importance is-Are there or are there not indications of design in the works of nature? Doctor Brown says there are, and he refers in general to several things in evidence of the fact, but he does not prove the fact. He does not give, and he does not attempt to give any illustration of it, any in

stance which brings it home to the understanding with irresistible persuasion, and upon which the mind may rest in those moments of doubt and difficulty which sometimes come to all. Nothing it is true was more easy; it had indeed been perfectly done before; but Paley by no means exhausted the subject; and if Doctor Brown did not chuse to repeat what this admirable writer has said about the structure of the valves of the human heart, or the ligament attached to the head of the thigh bone, all nature was open before him-the sublime and most interesting adaptations of objects to each other on the most magnificent and on the humblest scale with which chemistry has made us acquainted; the structure of the simplest flower or the formation and the fall of the dew of heaven that ministers to its sustenance. And the omission to state in detail at least some one of those striking and wonderful adaptations with which by the light of philosophy we know that every part of nature abounds, and the simple statement of which baffles the sceptic and silences his sophisms in the same manner as the philosopher by the act of walking silenced the sciolist who endeavoured to persuade him that there was no such thing as motion in the world, appears to us to be a capital defect, because it is neglecting by far the most convincing argument in support of the truth, for the clear and popular illustration of which the prize was instituted.

In the next chapter Doctor Brown, wonderful as it may seem, endeavours to prove the existence of God from the immateriality of the soul. Now without entering into the dark and difficult dispute which has been agitated about the nature of matter and of mind, we are humbly of opinion that no judicious person who has at all attended to that controversy, or who is even acquainted with the opinions of Metaphysicians and Theists in the present age, would have ventured to ground such a truth upon such a basis. But indeed there is in every part of this work a looseness, an inattention to the strict accuracy of the statements, the appositeness of the illustrations, the proper selection and the judicious application of the arguments, which take from it all its value as a philosophical, and much, very much, of its usefulness as a popular work. What is to be thought of the

acuteness of the man as a philosopher, and of his attainments as the Principal of a University, who could give the following account of conscience, and endeavour to confirm it by the illustration with which it is concluded!

"By conscience, or a moral sense, I understand that internal perception which we have of right and wrong, of moral good and evil, of virtue and vice, antecedently to any reasoning concerning the more remote consequences of habits and actions, either to individuals or to society. This internal sense furnishes principles for judging of moral subjects, as intellect affords principles for truth and error. The exercise of the moral faculty, however, it

is to be remarked, is always accompanied by certain feelings either of complacence or disgust."

"We feel contempt or indignation rising in our minds towards those who have acted in an unworthy and base manner, and love and esteem for such as maintain a conduct just and beneficent. These principles, whether of morals or of speculative reason, are not the mere effect of education, but are implanted in the soul. For without study or inquiry they present themselves to the mind. Nay, what is more, if they were not innate principles, education could no more be carried on, than a building could be raised without a foundation, or a tree produced without its original seed. that education does is to direct, improve and enlarge these original principles, and to lead them to their proper results. Whoever contests this affirmation, may try to instruct a dog or a horse in morality !”Pp. 112. 116.

:

All

Here the learned Principal affirms that conscience, or as he terms it the moral sense, is an innate principle; and his proof is that if it were not so, education could no more be carried on than a tree could be produced without its seed and why? Because do what you will you cannot instruct a dog in morality! But the worthy Principal would find it rather a difficult task to teach a dog mathematics, or even to make it enunciate his favourite proposition that the whole is greater than a part: yet because his labour would be entirely thrown away upon such a pupil, but would not be wasted upon a boy, the learned Principal must admit, upon his own showing, that mathematics and even the very faculty of speech are in the boy innate principles.

Passing over the chapters on the proof of the being of God, from the

537

almost universal assent of mankind to this opinion, which is not a very solid argument; from the appearance which the world exhibits of a recent origin, and from the tradititions concerning it, which is equally equivocal and inconclusive; from the Scriptures, which in this argument cannot be referred to as affording any proof with out really, not apparently, reasoning in a circle; and omitting also the chapters on the conclusion which follows these various proofs of the existence of God, and on the causes of Atheism, which are the commonplace observations of a thousand serplace manner; we come to the Second mons expressed in a most commonBook, which treats of the perfections of the Deity, namely, his infinite power, wisdom and goodness. And here we are happy to say the author writes with somewhat more closeness and accuracy. He seems to have formed in the abstract a just conception of the divine goodness, for he defines it to be

"That affection and habit of mind which prompts to communicate and to diffuse happiness, which is gratified by the contemplation of it; and is averse from the infliction and the view of misery."attribute strictly moral must be a constant "The goodness of the Deity being an and immutable disposition to communicate and extend the highest measure of happiness to all his creatures. This definition when applied to omnipotence and infinite wisdom implies the commmunication of all possible happiness to the whole and to every part of his sensitive creation.”"If it could be shewn that in any case such faculties were clearly designed for misery, and the beings to which they belonged were irresistibly impelled to the exercise of them, the inference would be unavoidable that the Supreme Power was malevolent. But the first branch of this supposition is contrary to universal fact, and the second is in itself incomprethat any being, endued with activity, hensible. For it is impossible to conceive would delight to exercise powers which were constantly attended with pain and misery. Inactivity must in this case be the inevitable result. We must therefore

conclude that he also has bestowed on every sensitive being its powers of perception and action; must desire those to be exercised and to produce their natural results; and since in the exercise and gratification of those the happiness of every such being