Supreme Court have entertained a different doctrine in the prize cases. This, in the judgment of the undersigned, is a clear misapprehension. One of the questions in those cases was, whether in such a contest as was being waged for the extinguishment of the insurrection, belligerent rights, as between the United States and other nations, belonged to the former. The court properly held that they did, but the parties engaged in the rebellion were designated as traitors, and liable to be tried as traitors when the rebellion should terminate. If the Confederate States, by force of insurrection, became foreign States, and lost their character as States of the Union, then the contest was an international one, and treason was no more committed by citizens of the former against the latter than those of the latter against the former. Treason necessarily assumes allegiance to the Government, and allegiance necessarily assumes a continuing obligation to the Government. Neither predicament was true except upon the hypothesis that the old state of things continued: in other words, that the States, notwithstanding the insurrection, were continuously and are now States of the United States, and their citizens responsible to the Constitution and the laws.

Secondly. What is there, then, in the present political condition of such States that justifies their exclusion from representation in Congress? Is it because they are without organized governments, or without governments republican in point of form? In fact, we know that they have governments completely organized, with legislative, executive, and judicial functions. We know that they are now in successful operation. No one within their limits questions their loyalty, or is denied their protection. How they were formed, under what auspices they were formed, are inquiries with which Congress has no concern. The right of the people of a State to form a government for themselves has never been questioned. In the absence of any restriction, that right would be absolute; any form might be adopted that they might determine upon. The Constitution imposes but a single restriction, that the Government adopted shall be of a republican form," and this is done in the obligation to guarantee every State such a form. It gives no power to frame a constitution for a State. It operates alone upon one already formed by the State. In the words of the Federalist (No. 44) "it supposes a preexisting government of the form which is to be guaranteed." It is not pretended that the existing governments of the States in question are not of the required form. The objection is that they were not legally established. But it is confidently submitted that that is a matter with which Congress has nothing to do. The power to establish or modify a State government belongs exclusively to the people of the State. When they shall exercise it, what provision it shall contain, it is their exclusive right to decide, and when decided, their decision is obligatory upon everybody, and independent of all congressional control, if such government be republican. To convert an obligation of guaranty into an authority to interfere in any way in the formation of the government to be guaranteed is to do violence to language. If it is to be said that the President did illegally interfere in the reorganization of such governments, the answers are obvious. First, If it were true, if the people of such States not only have not, but do not complain of it, but, on the contrary, have pursued his advice, and are satisfied with and are living under the governments they have adopted, and those governments are republican in form, what right has Congress to interfere or deny their legal existence? Second. Conceding, for argument's sake, that the President's alleged interference was unauthorized, does it not, for the same reason, follow that any like interference by Congress would be equally unauthorized? A different view is not to be maintained, be

cause of the difference in the nature of the powers conferred upon Congress and the President--the one being legislative and the other executive-for it is equally and upon the same ground beyond the scope of either to form a government for the people of a State once in the Union, or to expel such a State from the Union, or to deny temporarily or permanently the rights which belong to a State and her people under the Constitution.

Congress may admit new States, but a State once admitted ceases to be within its control, and can never again be brought within it. What changes her people may at any time think proper to make in her constitution is a matter with which neither Congress nor any department of the Government can interfere, unless such changes make the State government anti-republican, and then it can only be done under the obligation to guarantee that it be republican. Whatever may be the extent of the power conferred upon Congress in the third section, article 4, of the Constitution, to admit new States, in what manner and to what extent they can under that power interfere in the formation and character of the constitution of such States preliminary to admission into the Union, no one has ever pretended that when that is had the State can again be brought within its influence. The power is exhausted when once extended, the subject forthwith rising out of its reach. The States admitted, like the original thirteen States, become at once and forever independent of congressional control. A different view would change the entire character of the Government, as its framers and their contemporaries designed and understood it to be. They never intended to make the State governments subordinate to the General Government. Each was to move supreme within its own orbit, but as each would not alone have met the exigencies of a government adequate to all the wants of the people, the two, in the language of Mr. Jefferson, constituted "coordinate departments of one single and integral whole, the one having the power of legislation and the administration in affairs which concerned their own citizens only," the other, "whatever concerned foreigners or citizens of other States." Within their respective limits each is paramount. The States as to all powers not delegated to the General Government are as independent of that government as the latter in regard to all powers that are delegated to it is independent of the governments of the States. The proposition, then, that Congress can, by force or otherwise, under the war, or insurrectionary or any other power, expel a State from the Union, or reduce it to a territorial condition, and govern it as such, is utterly without foundation. The undersigned deem it unnecessary to examine the question further. They leave it upon the observations submitted, considering it perfectly clear that States, notwithstanding occurring insurrections, continue to be States of the Union.

Thirdly. If this is so, it necessarily follows that the rights of States under the Constitution, as originally possessed and enjoyed by them, are still theirs, and those they are now enjoying as far as they depend upon the executive and judicial departments of the Government. By each of these departments they are recognized as States. By the one all the of ficers of the Government required by law to be appointed in such States have been appointed, and are discharging without question their respective functions. By the other they are, as States, enjoying the benefits and subjected to the powers of that department, a fact conclusive to show that, in the estimation of the judiciary, they are, as they were at first, States of the Union, bound by the laws of the Union, and entitled to all the rights incident to that relation. And yet, so far, they are denied that right which the Constitution properly esteems as the security for all the others, that right without which government is any thing but a republic-is, indeed, but a tyranny-the right of having a voice in the

legislative department, whose laws bind them in person and in property. This, it is submitted, is a state of things without example in representative republican government, and Congress, as long as it denies this right, is a mere despotism. Citizens may be made to submit to it by force or dread of force, but a fraternal spirit of good feeling toward those who impose it, so important to the peace and prosperity of the country, are not to be hoped for, but rather unhappiness, dissatisfaction, and enmity. There is but one ground on which such conduct can find any excuse--the supposed public necessity, the peril of destruction to which the Government would be subjected if the right were allowed. But for such a supposition there is not, in the opinion of the undersigned, even a shadow of foundation.

The representatives of the States in which there was no insurrection, if the others were represented, would, in the House, under the present apportionment, exceed the latter by a majority of seventy-two votes, and have a decided preponderance in the Sen ate. What danger to the Government, then, can possibly arise from Southern representation? Are the present Senators and Representatives fearful of themselves? Are they apprehensive that they might be led to the destruction of our institutions by the persuasion or any other influence of Southern members? How disparaging to themselves is such an apprehension! Are they apprehensive that those who may succeed them from their respective States may be so fatally led astray? How disparaging is that supposition to the patriotism and wisdom of their constituents! Whatever effect on mere party success in the future such a representation may have we shall not stop to inquire. The idea that the country is to be kept in turmoil, States to be reduced to bondage, and their rights under the Constitution denied, and their citizens degraded, with a view to the continuance in power of a mere political party, cannot for a moment be entertained, without imputing grave dishonesty of purpose and gross dereliction of duty to those who may entertain it. Nor do we deem it necessary to refer particularly to the evidence taken by the committee, to show that there is nothing in the present condition of the people of the Southern States that even excuses, on that ground, a denial of representation to them. We content ourselves with saying that, in our opinion, the evidence most to be relied upon, whether regarding the character of the witnesses or their means of information, shows that representatives from the Southern States would prove perfectly loyal. We especially refer for this only to the testimony of Lieut. General Grant-his loyalty and investigations no one can doubt. In his letter to the President, of the 18th December, 1865, after he had recently visited South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia, he says:

Both in travelling and whilst stopping, I saw much and conversed freely with the citizens of those States, as well as with officers of the army who have been among them. The following are the conclusions come to by me: I am satisfied that the mass of the thinking men of the South accept the present situation of affairs in good faith. The questions which have heretofore divided the sentiments of the people of the two sections, slavery and State rights, or the right

of a State to secede from the Union, they regard as having

been settled forever by the highest tribunal (arms) that man can resort to. I was pleased to learn from the leading men whom I met that they not only accepted the decision arrived at as final, but now that the sinoke of battle had cleared away and time had been given for reflection, that this decision had been a fortunate one for the whole country, they receiving the like benefits from it with those who opposed them in the field and in the cause. My observations lead me to the conclusion that the citizens of the Southern States are anxious to return to self-government within the

Union as soon as possible; that whilst reconstructing, they want and require protection from the Government; that they are in earnest in wishing to do what they think is required by the Government-not humiliating to them as citizensand that if such a course were pointed out, they would pursue it in good faith. It is to be regretted that there cannot be a greater commingling at this time between the citizens of the

two sections, and particularly of those intrusted with the law-making power.

Secession, as a practical doctrine ever hereafter to be resorted to, is almost utterly abandoned. It was submitted to and failed before the ordeal of battle. Nor can the undersigned imagine why, if its revival is anticipated as possible, the committee have not recommended an amendment to the Constitution, guarding against it in terms. Such an amendment, it cannot be doubted, the Southern as well as the Northern States would cheerfully adopt. The omis sion of such a recommendation is pregnant evidence that secession, as a constitutional right, is thought by the majority of the committee to be practically a mere thing of the past, as all the proof taken by them show it to be in the opinion of all the leading Southern men who hitherto entertained it. The desolation around them, the hecatombs of their own slain, the stern patriotism of the men of the other States, exhibited by unlimited expenditure of treasure and of blood, and their love of the Union, so sincere and deep-seated that it is sure they will hazard all to maintain it, have convinced the South that as a prac tical doctrine secession is extinguished forever. State secession then abandoned and slavery abolished by the Southern States themselves, or with their consent, upon what statesmanlike ground can such States be denied all the rights which the Constitution secures to the States of the Union? All admit that to do so at the earliest period is demanded by every consideration of duty and policy, and none deny that the actual interest of the country is, to s great extent, involved in such admission. The staple productions of the Southern States are as important to the other States as to themselves. Those staples largely enter into the wants of all alike, and they are also most important to the financial credit of the Government. Those staples will never be produced as in the past until real peace, resting, as it can alone rest, on the equal and uniform operation of the Constitution and laws on all, is attained.

To suppose that a brave and sensitive people will give an undivided attention to the increase of mere material wealth, whilst retained in a state of political inferiority and degradation, is mere folly. They de sire to be again in the Union, to enjoy the benefits of the Constitution, and they invoke you to receive them. They have adopted constitutions free from any intrinsic objection, and have agreed to every stipulation thought by the President to be necessary for the protection and benefit of all, and, in the opinion of the undersigned, they are amply sufficient. Why exact, as a preliminary condition to representation, more? What more are supposed to be necessary? First, the repudiation of the rebel debt; second, the denial of all obligations to pay for manumitted slaves; third, the inviolability of our own debt. If these provisions are deemed necessary they cannot be defeated, if the South were disposed to defeat them, by the admission into Congress of their representatives. Nothing is more probable, in the opinion of the undersigned, than that many of the Southern States would adopt them all; but those measures the committee connect with others, which, They are asked to disfranchise a numerous class of we think, the people of the South will never adopt. their citizens, and also to agree to diminish their representation in Congress, and, of course, in the electoral college, or to admit to the right of suffrage their colored males of twenty-one years of age and ignorance), thus placing them on the same political upward (a class now in a condition of almost utter footing with white citizens of that age. For reasons so obvious that the dullest may discover them, the right is not directly asserted of granting suffrage to the negro. That would be obnoxious to most of the Northern and Western States-so much so that their consent was not to be anticipated. But as the plan adopted, because of the limited number of negroes in such States, will have no effect on their

representation, it is thought it may be adopted, whilst in the Southern States it will materially lessen their number. That these latter States will assent to the measure can hardly be expected. The effect, then, if not the purpose, of the measure is forever to deny representatives to such States, or, if they consent to the condition, to weaken their representative power, and thus probably secure a continuance of such a party in power as now control the legislation of the Government. The measure, in its terms and its effect, whether designed or not, is to degrade the Southern States. To consent to it is to consent to their own dishonor.

The manner, too, of presenting the proposed constitutional amendment, in the opinion of the undersigned, is impolitic and without precedent. The several amendments suggested have no connection with each other. Each, if adopted, would have its appropriate effect if the others were rejected, and each, therefore, should be submitted as a separate article, without subjecting it to the contingency of rejection if the States should refuse to ratify the rest. Each by itself, if an advisable measure, should be submitted to the people, and not in such a connection with those which they may think unnecessary or dangerous as to force them to reject all. The repudiation of the rebel debt and all obligation to compensate for the loss of slave property, and the inviolability of the debt of the Government, no matter how contracted, provided for by some of the sections of the amendment, we repeat, would meet the approval of many of the Southern States. But these no State can sanction without sanctioning others, which, we think, will not be done by them or some of the Northern States. To force negro suffrage upon any State by means of the penalty of a loss of part of its representation will not only be to impose a disparaging condition, but virtually to interfere with the clear right of each State to regulate suffrage for itself without the control of the Government of the United States. Whether that control be exerted directly or indirectly, it will be considered, as it is, a fatal blow to the right which every State in the past has held vital-the right to regulate her franchise. To punish a State for not regulating it in a particular way, so as to give to all classes of the people the privilege of suffrage, is but seeking to accomplish incidentally what, if it should be done at all, should be done directly. No reason, in the view of the undersigned, can be suggested for the course adopted, other than a belief that such a direct interference would not be sanctioned by the Northern and Western States, whilst as regards such States, the actual recommendation because of the small proportion of negroes within their limits will not in the least lessen their representative power in Congress, or their influence in the Presidential election, and they may therefore sanction it. This very inequality in its operation upon the States renders the measure, in our opinion, most unjust, and, looking to the peace and quiet of the country, most impolitic. But the mode advised is also not only without, but against all precedent. When the Constitution was adopted it was thought to be defective in not sufficiently protecting certain rights of the States and the people. With a view of supplying a remedy for this defect, on the 4th of March, 1789, various amendments, by a resolution constitutionally passed by Congress, were submitted for ratification to the States. They were twelve in number. Several of them were even less independent of each other than are those recommended by the committee; but it did not occur to the men of that day that it was right to force the States to adopt or reject all. Each was therefore presented as a separate article. The language of the resolution was, "that the following articles be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as amendments of the Constitution of the United States all or any of such articles, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, are valid to all intents and pur

poses as part of the Constitution." The Congress of that day was willing to obtain either of the submitted amendments-to get a part, if not able to procure the whole. They thought--and in that we submit they but conformed to the letter and spirit of the amendatory clause of the Constitution-that the people have the right to pass severally on any proposed amendments. This course of our fathers is now departed from, and the result will probably be that no one of the suggested amendments, though some may be approved, will be ratified. This will certainly be the result, unless the States are willing practically to relinquish the right they have always enjoyed, never before questioned by any recognized statesman, and all-important to their interests and security, the right to regulate the franchise in all their elections. There are, too, some general considerations that bear on the subject, to which we will now refer:

First. One of the resolutions of the Chicago Convention, by which Mr. Lincoln was first nominated for the Presidency, says, "that the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States" is essential to the balance of power on which the prosperity and endurance of our political fabric depends. In his inaugural address of March 4, 1861, which received the almost universal approval of the people, amongst other things he said: "No State of its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union;" "and that in the view of the Constitution and the laws the Union is unbroken, and to the extent of my ability I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States."

Second. Actual conflict soon afterward ensued. The South, it was believed, misapprehended the purpose of the Government in carrying it on, and Congress deemed it important to dispel that misapprehension by declaring what the purpose was. This was done in July, 1861, by their passing the following resolution of Mr. Crittenden:

That in this national emergency, Congress, banishing all feeling of mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country; that this war is not waged upon our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of those States; but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the States unimpaired; that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

The vote in the House was 119 for, and 2 against it, and in the Senate 30 for, and 5 against it. The design to conquer, or subjugate, or to curtail, or interfere in any way with the rights of the States, is in the strongest terms thus disclaimed, and the only avowed object asserted to be "to defend and maintain the spirit of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union, and the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired.' Congress, too, by the act of July 13, 1861, empowered the President to declare by proclamation "that the inhabitants of such State or States, where the insurrection existed, are in a state of insurrection against the United States," and thereupon to declare that "all commercial intercourse, by and between the same, by the citizens thereof and the citizens of the United States, shall cease and be unlawful, so long as such condition of hostility shall continue." Here, also, Congress evidently deals with the States as being in the Union, and to remain in the Union. It seeks to keep them in by forbidding commercial intercourse between their citizens and the citizens of the other States, so long, and so long only, as insurrectionary hostility shall continue. That ended, they are to be as at first, entitled to the same intercourse with citizens of other States that they enjoyed before the insurrection. In other words, in this act, as in the

resolution of the same month, the dignity, equality, and rights of such States (the insurrection ended) were not to be held, in any respect, impaired. The several proclamations of amnesty, issued by Mr. Lincoln and his successor, under the authority of Congress, are also inconsistent with the idea that the parties included within them are not to be held in the future restored to all rights belonging to them as citizens of their respective States. A power to pardon is a power to restore the offender to the condition in which he was before the date of the offence pardoned.

It is now settled that a pardon removes not only the punishment, but all legal disabilities consequent on the crime. (7 Bac. A. B., Tit. Par.) Bishop on Criminal Law (vol. i., p. 713) states the same doctrine. The amnesties so declared would be but false pretences if they were, as now held, to leave the parties who have availed themselves of them in almost every particular in the condition they would have been in if they had rejected them. Such a result, it is submitted, would be a foul blot on the good name of the nation. Upon the whole, therefore, in the present state of the country, the excitement which exists, and which may mislead Legislatures already elected, we think that the mature sense of the people is not likely to be ascertained on the subject of the proposed amendment by its submission to existing State Legislatures. If it should be done at all, the submission should either be to Legislatures hereafter to be elected or to conventions of the people chosen for the purpose. Congress may select either mode, but they have selected neither. It may be submitted to Legislatures already in existence whose members were heretofore elected with no view to the consideration of such a measure. And it may consequently be adopted, though a majority of the people of the States disapprove of it. In this respect, if there were no other objections to it, we think it most objectionable. Whether regard be had to the nature or the terms of the Constitution, or to the legislation of Congress during the insurrection, or to the course of the judicial department, or to the conduct of the Executive, the undersigned confidently submit that the Southern States are States in the Union, and entitled to every right and privilege belonging to the other States. If any portion of their citizens be disloyal, or are not able to take any oath of office that has been or may be constitutionally prescribed, is a question irrespective of the right of the States to be represented. Against the danger, whatever that may be, of the admission of disloyal or disqualified members into the Senate or House, it is in the power of each branch to provide against by refusing such admission. Each by the Constitution is made the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members. No other department can interfere with it. Its decision includes all others. The only correction when error is committed consists in the responsibility of the members to the people. But it is believed by the undersigned to be the clear duty of each House to admit any Senator or Representative who has been elected according to the constitutional laws of the State, and who is able and willing to subscribe to the oath required by constitutional law.

It is conceded by the majority that "it would undoubtedly be competent for Congress to waive all formalities and to admit those Confederate States at once, trusting that time and experience would set all things right." It is not, therefore, owing to a want of constitutional power that it is not done. It is not because such States are not States with republican forms of government. The exclusion must, therefore, rest on considerations of safety or expediency alone. The first, that of safety, we have already considered, and as we think proved it to be without foundation. Is there any ground for the latter, expediency? We think not. On the contrary, in our judgment, their admission is called for by the clear

est expediency. Those States include a territorial area of 850,000 square miles, an area larger than that of five of the leading nations of Europe. They have a coast line of 3,000 miles, with an internal water line, including the Mississippi, of about 36,000 miles. Their agricultural products in 1850 were about $360,000,000, in value, and their population 9,664,656. Their staple productions are of immense and growing importance, and are almost peculiar to that region. That the North is deeply interested in having such a country and people restored to all the rights and privileges that the Constitution affords, no sane man, not blinded by mere party considerations, or not a victim of disordering prejudice, can for a moment doubt. Such a restoration is also necessary to the peace of the country. It is not only important, but vital to the potential wealth of which that section of the country is capable, that cannot otherwise be fully developed. Every hour of illegal political restraint, every hour the possession of the rights the Constitution gives is denied, is not only in a political, but a material sense, of great injury to the North as well as to the South. The Southern planter works for his Northern brethren as well as for himself. His labors heretofore inured as much, if not more, to their advantage than to his. Whilst harmony in the past between the sections gave to the whole a prosperity, a power, and a renown of which every citizen had reason to be proud, the restoration of such harmony will immeasurably increase them all. Can it, will it be restored as long as the South is kept in political and dishonoring bondage? And can it not, will it not be restored by an opposite policy-by admitting her to all the rights of the Constitution, and by dealing with her citizens as equals and as brothers, not as inferiors or enemies? Such a course as this will, we are certain, soon be seen to bind them heart and soul to the Union, and inspire them with confidence in its Government by making them feel that all enmity is forgotten, and that justice is being done to them. The result of such a policy, we believe, will at once make us in very truth one people, as happy, as prosperous, and as powerful as ever existed in the tide of time; whilst its opposite cannot fail to keep us divided, injuriously affect the particular and general welfare of citizens and government, and, if long persisted in, result in danger to the nation. In the words of an eminent British Whig statesman, now no more: "A free constitution and large exclusions from its benefits cannot subsist together; the constitution will destroy them, or they will destroy the constitution." It is hoped that, heeding the warning, we will guard against the peril by removing the cause.

The undersigned have not thought it necessary to examine into the legality of the measures adopted, either by the late or the present President, for the restoration of the Southern States. It is sufficient for their purpose to say that, if those of President Johnson were not justified by the Constitution, the same may, at least, be said of those of his prede

cessor.

We deem such an examination to be unnecessary, because, however it might result, the people of the several States, who possessed, as we have before said, the exclusive right to decide for themselves what constitutions they should adopt, have adopted those under which they respectively live. The mo tives of neither President, however, whether the measures are legal or not, are liable to censure. The sole object of each was to effect a complete and early Union of all the States; to make the General Government, as it did at first, embrace all, and to extend its authority, and secure its privileges and blessings to all alike. The purity of motive of President Johnson in this particular, as was to have been expected, is admitted by the majority of the committee to be beyond doubt. For whatever was their opinion of the unconstitutionality

of his course, and its tendency to enlarge the executive power, they tell us that they "do not for a moment impute to him any such design, but cheerfully concede to him the most patriotic motives." And we cannot forbear to say in conclusion, upon that point, that he sins against light, and closes his eyes to the course of the President during the rebellion, from its inception to its close, who ventures to impeach his patriotism. Surrounded by insurrectionists, he stood firm. His life was almost constantly in peril, and he clung to the Union and discharged all the obligations it imposed upon him even the closer because of the peril. And now that he has escaped unharmed, and by the confidence of the people has had devolved upon him the executive functions of the Government, to charge him with disloyalty is either a folly or a slander-folly in the fool who believes it, slander in the man of sense, if any such there be, who utters it.

REVERDY JOHNSON, A. J. ROGERS, HENRY GRIDER.

An Act for the Union of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and the Government thereof, as passed by the Parliament of Great Britain.

Whereas, the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed their desire to be federally united into one dominion, under the crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom;

And whereas such a union would conduce to the welfare of the Provinces, and promote the interests of the British empire;

And whereas, on the establishment of the union, by authority of Parliament, it is expedient not only that the constitution of the legislative authority in the dominion be provided for, but also that the nature of the executive government therein be declared;

And whereas it is expedient that provision be made for the eventual admission into the union of other parts of British North America;

Be it, therefore, enacted and declared by the Queen's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

I. PRELIMINARY.

1. This act may be cited as "The British North American Act, 1867."

2. The provisions of this act referring to her majesty the Queen, extend also to the heirs and successors of her majesty, kings and queens of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

II. UNION.

3. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the advice of her majesty's most honorable privy council, to declare, by proclamation, that on and after a day therein appointed, not being more than six months after the passing of this act, the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick shall form and be one dominion, under the name of Canada; and on and after that day those three Provinces shall form and be one dominion under that name accordingly.

4. The subsequent provisions of the act shall, unless it is otherwise expressed or implied, commence and have effect on and after the union, that is to say, on and after the day appointed for the union taking effect in the Queen's proclamation; and in the same provisions, unless it is otherwise expressed or implied, the name Canada shall be taken to mean Canada as constituted under this act.

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5. Canada shall be divided into four provinces, named Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick.

6. The parts of the Province of Canada (as it exists at the passing of the act) which formerly constituted respectively the Provinces of Upper Canada and Lower Canada shall be deemed to be severed, and shall form two separate Provinces. The part which formerly constituted the Province of Upper Canada shall constitute the Province of Ontario, and the Province of Lower Canada shall constitute the Province of Quebec.

7. The Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick shall have the same limits as at the passing of this act.

8. In the general census of the population of Canada, which is hereby ordered to be taken in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one, and in every tenth year thereafter, the respective populations of the four Provinces shall be distinguished.

III. THE EXECUTIVE POWER.

9. The executive government and authority of and vested in the Queen. over Canada is hereby declared to continue and be

10. The provisions of this act referring to the governor-general extend and apply to the governorgeneral for the time being of Canada, or other the chief executive officer or administrator for the time

being carrying on the government of Canada on behalf and in the name of the Queen, by whatever title he is designated.

11. There shall be a council to aid and advise in the government of Canada, to be styled the Queen's Privy Council for Canada; and the persons who are to be members of that council shall be from time to time chosen and summoned by the governor-general thereof may be, from time to time, removed by the and sworn in as privy councillors, and members governor-general.

12. All powers, authorities, and functions which, under any act of the Parliament of Great Britain, or of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or of 'the Legislatures of Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Canada, Nova Scotia, or New Brunswick, are at the union vested in, or exercisable by, the respective governors or lieutenant-governors of those Provinces, with the advice and consent of the respective executive councils thereof, or in conjunction with those councils, or with any number of members thereof, or by those governors or lieutenant-governors individually, shall, as far as the same continue in existence and capable of being exercised after the union in relation to the government of Canada, be vested in and exercisable by the governor-general, with the advice or with the advice and consent of or in conjunction with the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, or any members thereof, or by the governor-general individually, as the case requires, subject nevertheless (except with respect to such as exist under acts of the Parliament of Great Britain or of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland) to be abol ished or altered by the Parliament of Canada.

13. The provisions of this act referring to the governor-general in council shall be construed as referring to the governor-general, acting by and with the advice of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada.

14. It shall be lawful for the Queen, if her majesty thinks fit, to authorize the governor-general from time to time to appoint any person, or any persons, jointly or severally, to be his deputy or deputies, within any part or parts of Canada, and in that capacity to exercise, during the pleasure of the governor-general, as the governor-general deems it necessary or expedient to assign to him or them, subject to any limitations or directions expressed or given by the Queen; but the appointment of such a