and on December 11 plaintiff duly perfected a lien upon the property for the amount due for material furnished. The lien statement was not filed within 90 days from August 17, the time when the work was practically completed and defendant took possession, but was filed within 90 days from September 19 and October 31, upon which dates certain material, called for by the contract, was delivered upon the premises for use in final completion of the building. Defendant interposed in defense that the lien was not perfected within the time prescribed by law, and was therefore of no validity. In support of this defendant alleged in his answer that the items of material delivered on September 19 and October 31 were wrongfully, unreasonably, and without excuse withheld and not delivered until the dates stated, for the purpose of attempting to extend and lengthen the time within which the lien could be filed and recorded. The trial court found that these allegations were not true, and after finding other necessary facts ordered judgment for plaintiff. It further appears that plaintiff did not, before the commencement of the action, or at all, file its claim with the probate court against the estate of the deceased contractor. 1. The findings of the trial court to the effect that the delay in delivering the items of material referred to was not for the purpose of unreasonably extending the time within which a lien might be perfected are sustained by the evidence, at least the evidence did not require a finding to the contrary. The case in this respect is not unlike Anderson v Donahue, 116 Minn. 380, 113 N. W. 975, where a similar issue was presented and the findings of the court were sustained. 2. Defendant further contends that it was essential to the right to foreclose the lien that the amount of plaintiff's claim be first de termined by the probate court, the contractor being dead. No claim has been filed with that court. It was held in Northwestern C. & C. P. Co. v. Norwegian D. E. L. A. S. 43 Minn. 449, 45 N. W. 868, that a final determination, as between the lien claimant and the contractor of the amount due the claimant, is essential to the right of foreclo sure, and that for this purpose the contractor is a necessary party te the foreclosure action; the theory of the decision being that an adjudication upon that subject between the owner of the property and the lien claimant would not be binding upon the contractor unless a party to the action, and in a given case the owner might be compelled to pay more on the lien than he would be entitled to enforce over against the contractor. While that decision was rendered under a former mechanic's lien statute, no reason occurs to us why the general rule there laid down should not be applicable under our present statute, yet we do not deem it neccssary to determine the question in the present action. The sole purpose of the rule is the protection of the owner of the property, and to guard against a possible excessive claim by some subcontractor or materialman. We think that protection is given in this case. And though, as urged by counsel for defendant, an administrator cannot be sued to recover upon a claim against the estate he represents until the same has been presented to and passed upon by the probate court, he was in fact made a party to this action and thus afforded an opportunity to protect the estate, and is bound by the judgment rendered against him. It is true that no personal judgment could be rendered against him; none was asked for; yet the action to foreclose was rightfully brought, the statutes require that it be commenced within a year, and in such case the amount claimed as a lien may be litigated without infringing the jurisdiction and authority of the probate court. The district court had full and complete jurisdiction to hear and determine every question essential to the right of plaintiff to a judgment, and it was not bound to await the action of some other tribunal having or possessing jurisdiction of some question incidentally involved. We therefore hold that the determination in this action of the amount due plaintiff is conclusive against the estate of the contractor. Order affirmed. GEORGE H. GARD v. COUNTY OF OTTER TAIL.1 December 26, 1913. Nos. 18,273-(166). Title of act. 1. The title to chapter 250, Laws 1911, held to sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that no law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in its title. Special law not amended. 2. Section 4 of the act, providing for compensation of clerks of the district court of certain counties for the duties thereby imposed, held not to extend or amend chapter 423, Sp. Laws 1891, fixing the compensation of the clerk of the district court of Otter Tail county. Classification of counties reasonable. 3. Section 5 of the act excludes from the operation of section 4 all counties having a population of 100,000. It is held that the classification is not arbitrary or unreasonable, on the contrary has reasonable basis for its support, and therefore not a violation of the provisions of the Constitution prohibiting special legislation. Action in the district court for Otter Tail county to recover $2,437.10 for services rendered by the clerk of the district court of that county. From an order, Roeser, J., overruling defendant's demurrer to the complaint, it appealed. Affirmed. Anton Thompson, for appellant. N. F. Field, for respondent. BROWN, C. J. This action was brought to recover fees alleged to be due plaintiff as clerk of the district court of Otter Tail county for services rendered under the provisions of section 4, of chapter 250, p. 348, Laws 1911. A general demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and defendant appealed. 1 Reported in 144 N. W. 748. The sole question presented is the validity of the statute referred to, it being admitted by the demurrer that the services for which recovery is sought were rendered as alleged in the complaint, the compensation whereof is fixed by the statute. Defendant contends that the statute is unconstitutional and void for the reasons: (1) That it is an attempt by the legislature to enlarge and extend a special law by general enactment, in violation of the last clause of section 33, art. 4, of the Constitution; (2) that the title of the act is not in conformity with section 27, art. 4, of the Constitution, wherein it is provided that no law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in its title; and (3) that it violates sections 33 and 34 of article 4, in that it is special and not general in its application. We are unable to sustain either of these contentions. 1. The statute was intended to provide for the collection of vital statistics, and for the making and preservation of a permanent record of the same. It provides that such record be prepared by the state board of health, and also by the clerk of the district court. Section 4 imposes upon the clerk of the district court of each county the duty of indexing "all the records of births and deaths now in their offices and which have not been indexed," and for such service that the county shall pay the sum of five cents for each name so indexed. The title of the act is "An act regulating the collection, indexing, preservation and use as evidence, of vital statistics." The point made is that the duties imposed upon the clerk of the district court, and the compensation provided for, found in section 4, are not embraced within nor expressed by the title and, therefore, that this section of the statute must fall. We have no difficulty in sustaining the sufficiency of this title. It is comprehensive, and the several sections of the act are in complete harmony with the information thus conveyed. The provisions of section 4 are in no proper sense foreign to the general scope of the statute, on the contrary are entirely pertinent to the general subject-matter of the act. The title expresses the subject of the statute as one providing for the "collection, indexing and preservation" of vital statistics, and section 4 deals with the subject of indexing such statistics. It is clearly sufficient. 3 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. § 8906. 2. The second contention is that the statute, in so far as it may apply to Otter Tail county, is in effect an enlargement and extension of a special law, and therefore invalid under the last clause of section 33 of article 4 of the Constitution, wherein it is provided that "the legislature may repeal any existing special or local law, but shall not amend, extend or modify any of the same." This point is founded on the fact that by chapter 423, Sp. Laws 1891, the compensation of the clerk of the district court of Otter Tail county is fixed at the sum of $1,500 per year, and the contention is that the statute in question enlarges that compensation by providing for a fee of five cents for each name indexed by him as required by section 4, hence that it is a modification of the prior special law. The contention is not sustained. The statute imposes upon the clerk an additional duty, one temporary in its nature, namely, the indexing of vital statistics not theretofore indexed, for which the compensation is provided. In other words, it was the purpose of the legislature to provide a complete record of births and deaths, and that for the purpose of bringing the same up to date the clerk performing that duty should be paid. After the completion of this particular work, for the service of keeping the records from time to time, the clerk, reads the statute, shall receive no "other compensation than the clerk's salary, or such fees as is herein provided in counties where the clerk is not on a salary basis." We think, and so hold, that it was within the authority of the legislature to provide for this additional compensation for the extra labor imposed upon the clerk and that it cannot be held that the special salary act relating to Otter Tail county was thereby modified or extended. That act remains undisturbed, the compensation provided being for the additional temporary work imposed upon the officer. The situation might be different, had provision been made for the continuation of the indexing fee. But it does not continue, on the contrary ceases when the index is brought up to date by including therein names not theretofore recorded. 3. Section 5 of the act provides that section 4 shall not apply to counties having a population of over 100,000. It is contended that |