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PERSONAL PROPERTY. See POSSESSION; STATUTE, 14; TAXATION, 1-3. PETITION. See COURT (PROBATE) 5; INCOMPEIENT, 2; WILL, 6.

PHOTOGRAPH. See COSTS, 6; EVIDENCE, 11; TRIAL, 1.

PHYSICIAN AND SURGEON. See EVIDENCE, 17.

FEES OF STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS.

1. License fees received by the secretary and treasurer of the State Board of Medical Examiners under Laws 1905, c. 236, (G. S. 1913, §§ 4973, 4974), and R. L. 1905, §§ 2302, 2303, held properly retained by the board, notwithstanding R. L. 1905, § 66, requiring executive officers to pay into the state treasury all fees and charges received by them, except when otherwise expressly provided by law.

-State v. Fullerton, 151.

MEDICAL SOCIETY-TRIAL OF MEMBER.

2. The Hennepin County Medical Society, a voluntary association of physicians and surgeons, the by-laws of which provide for the trial of a member for a criminal offense or for misconduct, and provide a penalty by discipline or expulsion, may try a member for acts which were necessarily involved in a criminal charge, tried in the district court, and of which the member was acquitted.

-Miller v. Hennepin County Medical Society, 314.

MALPRACTICE.

See WITNESS, 3.

3. In this, an action for malpractice, it is held, there was evidence, sufficient to take the case to the jury, tending to show that certain operations performed by defendant ought not to have been performed at the time they were and under the conditions that then existed. -Swadner v. Schefcik, 269.

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See CORPORATION, 4; CRIMINAL LAW, 2; DAMAGES, 13; DRAIN, 6; EQUITY, 1; JUDGMENT, 1; MASTER AND SERVANT, 27.

PLEADING Continued.

1. The objection that a complaint does not state a cause of action against defendants may be raised prior to judgment.

-Milton Dairy Co. v. Great Northern Railway Co. 243.

ALLEGATION IN THE ALTERNATIVE.

2. In an action for conversion of personal property, an allegation in the alternative that one or the other of two defendants converted the goods, but which one plaintiff is unable to determine, states no cause of action against either defendant.

-Casey Pure Milk Co. v. Booth Fisheries Co. 117.

MOTION FOR MORE SPECIFIC ALLEGATION.

3. The proper practice, where a general allegation of permanent injury resulting from an assault and battery is deemed insufficient, is to move the court for more specific allegations.

-Evertson v. McKay, 260.

4. Where defendant permits the complaint to remain unchallenged when its allegations are not sufficiently specific, he must be deemed to have waived the objection that it does not definitely point out the nature of the injury for which damage is sought.

-Evertson v. McKay, 263.

PLEADING AND PROOF.

See BROKER, 3.
ANSWER.

See CORPORATION, 4; EJECTMENT; REPLEVIN, 1.

REPLY.

See SALE, 3.

5. Where the proceedings by which jurisdiction of a defendant was acquired are a part of the record in the case, it is not necessary to allege in the reply that these proceedings have been taken, to have the court take notice of them. As it was not necessary to allege that the proceedings had been taken, the point that the reply merely states a conclusion of law is not well taken.

-Bond v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 197, 198.

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.

See EJECTMENT.

POPULATION. See STATUTE, 1–3.

POSSESSION. See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 1, 2; BAILMENT, 2; Deed, 2; EJECT-

MENT.

When and under what circumstances, if at all, the owner using no more
force than is necessary, may forcibly repossess himself of personal
property which has been wrongfully and unlawfully taken from him
by a thief or other wrongdoer, quære? The question is not presented
by the facts of this case.

-Evertson v. McKay, 261.

POWER OF APPOINTMENT. See TAXATION, 16, 17.

PREFERENCE. See ATTACHMENT.

PRESUMPTION. See CONSTITUTION, 1; COURT (PROBATE) 2, 4; INCOMPETENT,
2; MASTER AND SERVANT, 4; NEW TRIAL, 2; RAILWAY, 8; WORK AND
LABOR, 1-3.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See BROKER, 1, 2.

UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL.

1. Plaintiff, being a party to the contract to sell a transfer business and not
to engage in the same business, had the right to maintain the suit for
an injunction against the sellers, though he made the purchase for an
undisclosed principal and had no interest in the transaction except
under a contract with his principal to employ him if he made the
purchase.

-Holliston v. Ernston, 49.

2. If an agent contracts in his own name without disclosing his principal,
the other contracting party is entitled to hold either, but not both.
If he sue both, however, the only remedy of defendants is by motion to
compel him to elect. They cannot move a dismissal as to either. The
option as to which shall be held rests with plaintiff, not with defendants.
-Stevens v. Wisconsin Farm Land Co. 421.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. See INJUNCTION, 2.

RELEASE OF SURETY.

See BILLS AND NOTES; GUARANTY, 1.

PROPERTY.

A membership in the Duluth Board of Trade is property.

-State v. McPhail, 398.

PROXIMATE CAUSE. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 8; MASTER AND SERVANT, 8, 9,
13; NEGLIGENCE, 2-4.

PUBLIC LAND. See EMINENT DOMAIN, 2-6.

SALE OF PUBLIC SCHOOL LAND.

The obvious purpose of the constitutional restriction (art. 8, § 2) that “no
portion of said lands shall be sold otherwise than at public sale" was
to prevent private sales, and effectually to preclude secret transactions
with speculators. In other words, the intention was to surround the
disposal of the lands with publicity, thus avoiding private or secret
dealings, which often result disastrously to the best interests of the
state. A reading of all the provisions of the section of the Constitu-
tion in which this restriction is found tends to the conclusion that it
was contemplated that title to such lands might be acquired otherwise
than at public outcry, for it is therein provided that the proceeds of
the sales or other disposition" shall become a perpetual fund for the
benefit of the schools of the state.

-Independent School District of Virginia v. State, 278.

PUBLIC POLICY. See ADOPTION, 3; CONSTITUTION, 2; INSURANCE, 6.

RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION. See Railway, 1, 2.

RAILWAY. See EVIDENCE, 21; MASTER AND SERVANT, 7, 8, 11; TRIAL, 2.

POWERS OF RAILROAD COMMISSION.

1. The Railroad and Warehouse Commission has authority in a proper case
to order defendant to remove its station building one-half mile from
its present location up to the village which it serves.

—Railroad and Warehouse Commission v. Great Northern Railway
Co. 533.

2. Where defendant has failed to stop its trains before passing a junction
not provided with an interlocking device, thereby violating the statute
(G. S. 1913, § 4406), the Railroad and Warehouse Commission has the
right to order such trains to be brought to a stop before the junction,
until some other sufficient provision has been made to avoid the danger
of collision.

-Railroad and Warehouse Commission v. Great Northern Railway
Co. 534.

WHEN A STREET RAILWAY IS A COMMERCIAL RAILWAY.

3. A railway company which carries no passengers from street to street

RAILWAY-Continued.

within a city, but, with the city as a termius, operates from place to
place, stopping and gathering business only at terminal or regular way
stations, is a commercial and not a street railway. The fact that its
motive power is electricity instead of steam is of no consequence.

-Minneapolis, St. Paul, Rochester & Dubuque Electric Traction Co.
v. City of Minneapolis, 353.

EXTENSION OF STREET.

4. The entire cost and expense of extending the new street across the right
of way, including necessary planking over the railroad tracks, was prop-
erly imposed upon the railroad company; following State v. St. Paul,
M. & M. Ry. Co. 98 Minn. 380, 108 N. W. 261, and Chicago, M. & St.
P. Ry. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 115 Minn. 460, 133 N. W. 169, and
overruling upon this point State v. District Court for Hennepin County,
42 Minn. 247, 44 N. W. 7.

-Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Village of Le Roy,
107.

STOPPING TRAIN AT JUNCTION.

See RAILWAY, 2.

CONTRACT WITH RAILWAY ULTRA VIRES.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 6, 7.

POWERLESS TO AID RAILWAY COMPANY.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 21.

LESSOR LIABLE FOR INJURY TO LESSEE'S SERVANT.

5. Defendant, over whose track the train was being operated by another
company, under a traffic arrangement, with the latter's own crew, could
not escape liability on the theory that the accident was due to the
neglect of one of plaintiff's fellow servants to keep a proper lookout;
the case thus presented being merely one in which the latter's negligence
concurred with that of defendant in producing the result complained
of.

-Campbell v. Canadian Northern Railway Co. 245.

DUTY TO PASSENGER'S COMPANION.

See CARRIER, 7-10.

ACCIDENT AT GRADE CROSSING.

6. A railway grade crossing is a place of danger, and the track itself a
warning. It must be approached circumspectly by persons purposing

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