Marefchal Vauban, or fuch a tax laid upon land in England, might originally have produced wonders. But the expedient would now come too late, at least in England: fuch profligacy have the poor-rates produced among the lower ranks, that to relieve them from taxes, would probably make them work lefs, but affuredly would not make them work cheaper. It is vain therefore to think of a remedy against idleness and high wages, while the poor-rates fubfist in their present form. Davenant pronounces, that the English poor-rates will in time be the bane of their manufactures. He computes, that the perfons receiving alms in England amount to one million and two hundred thoufand, the half of whom at least would have continued to work, had they not relied on parish-charity. But of this more at large in a separate sketch.

Were the poor-rates abolished, a general act of naturalization would not only augment the strength of Britain, by adding to the number of its people, but would compel the natives to work cheaper, and confequently to be more industrious.

If these expedients be not relifhed, the only one that remains for preferving our manufactures is, to encourage their exportation by a bounty, fuch as may enable us to cope with our rivals in foreign markets. But where is the fund for a bounty fo extenfive? It may be raised out of land, like the Athenian tax above mentioned, burdening great proprietors in a geometrical proportion, and freeing those who have not above L. 100 of land-rent. That tax would raise a great fum to the public, without any real lofs to those who are burdened; for comparative riches would remain the fame as formerly. Nay fuch a tax would in time prove highly beneficial to land-proprietors; for by promoting industry and commerce, it would raife the rent of land much above the contribution. Can money be laid out fo advantageously at common interest? And to reconcile land-holders to the tax, may it

not

not be thought fufficient, that, without a bounty, our foreign commerce must vanish, and land be reduced to its original low value? Can any man hesitate about paying a fhilling, when it enfures him against losing a pound?

I fhall close with a rule of deeper concern than all that have been mentioned, which is, To avoid taxes that require the oath of party. They are contra bonos mores, as being a temptation to per ́jury. Few there are fo wicked, as to hurt others by perjury: at the fame time, there are not many of the lower ranks fo upright, as to fcruple much at perjury, when it prevents hurt to themfelves. Confider the duty on candle. Those only who brew for fale, pay the duty on malt-liquor; and to avoid the brewer's oath, the quantity is afcertained by officers who attend the process. But the duty on candle is oppreffive, not only as comprehending poor people who make no candle for fale, but as fubjecting them to give oath on the quantity they make for their own use.. Figure a poor widow, burdened with five or fix children: fhe is not permitted to make ready a little food for her infants, by the light of a rag dipped in grease, without paying what she has not to pay, or being guilty of perjury. However upright originally, poverty and anxiety about her infants will tempt her to conceal the truth, and to deny upon oath :-a fad leffon to her poor children : ought they to be punished for copying after their mother, whom they love and revere? whatever fhe does appears right in their eyes. The manner of levying the falt-tax in France is indeed arbitrary; but it is not productive of immorality: an oath is avoided; and every master of a family pays for the quantity he is prefumed to confume. French wine is often imported into Britain as Spanish, which pays less duty. To check that fraud, the importer's oath is required; and if perjury be fufpected, a jury is set upon him in exchequer. This is horrid: the importer is tempted by a high duty on French wine to commit perjury; for

which he is profecuted in a fovereign court, open to all the world: he turns desperate, and lofes all fenfe of honour. Thus customhoufe oaths have become a proverb, as meriting no regard; and corruption creeping on, will become univerfal. Some goods imported pay a duty ad valorem; and to afcertain the value the importer's oath is required. In China, the books of the merchant are trusted, without an oath. Why not imitate fo laudable a practice? If our people be more corrupted, perjury may be avoided, by ordaining the merchant to deliver his goods to any who will demand them, at the rate ftated in his books; with the addition of ten per cent. as a fufficient profit to himself. Oaths have been greatly multiplied in Britain since the Revolution, without reserve, and contrary to found policy. New oaths have been contrived against those who are difaffected to the government; against fictitious titles in electing parliament-members; against defrauding the revenue, &c. &c. They have been fo hackney'd, and have become fo familiar, as to be held a matter of form merely. Perjury has dwindled into a venial tranfgreffion, and is fcarce held an imputation on any man's character. Lamentable indeed has been.the conduct of our legislature: instead of laws for reforming or improving morals, the imprudent multiplication of oaths has not only fpread corruption through every rank, but, by annihilating the authority of an oath over confcience, has rendered it entirely ufelefs.

VOL. I.

3 P

SECT.

SECT. VI.

EXAMINATION OF BRITISH TAXES.

THere is no political fubject of greater importance to Britain, than the present: a whole life might be profitably bestow'd on it, and a large volume. My part is only to fuggeft hints; which will occur in confidering taxes with regard to their effects. And in that view, they may be commodiously distinguished into five kinds. First, Taxes that encrease the public revenue, without producing any other effect, good or bad. Second, Taxes that encrease the public revenue; and are also beneficial to manufactures and commerce. Third, Taxes that encrease the public revenue; but are hurtful to manufactures and commerce. Fourth, Taxes that are hurtful to manufactures and commerce, without encreasing the public revenue. Fifth, Taxes that are hurtful to manufactures and commerce; and alfo leffen the public revenue. I proceed to inftances of each kind.

The land-tax is an illuftrious inftance of the first kind: it produces a revenue to the public, levied with very little expence : and it hurts no mortal; for a landholder who pays for having himself and his estate protected, cannot be faid to be hurt. The duty on coaches is of the fame kind. Both taxes at the fame time are agreeable to found principles. Men ought to contribute to the public revenue, according to the benefit that protection affords them: a rich man requires protection for his poffeffions, as well as for his perfon, and therefore ought to contribute largely a poor

poor man requires protection for his perfon only, and therefore ought to contribute very little.

A tax on foreign luxuries is an inftance of the fecond kind. It encreases the public revenue: and it greatly benefits individuals ; not only by restraining the confumption of foreign luxuries, but by encouraging our own manufactures of that kind. Britain enjoys a monopoly of coal exported to Holland; and the duty on exportation is agreeable to found policy, being paid by the Dutch. This duty is an instance of the second kind: it raises a confiderable revenue to the public; and it enables us to cope with the Dutch in every manufacture that employs coal, fuch as dying, diftilling, works of glass and of iron. And these manufactures in Britain, by the dearness of labour, are entitled to fome aid. A tax on horses, to prevent their increase, would be a tax of the fame kind. The incredible number of horses used in coaches and other wheel-carriages, has raised the price of labour, by doubling the the price of oat-meal, the food of the labouring poor in many parts of Britain. The price of wheat is also raised by the fame means; because the vast quantity of land employ'd in producing oats, leaves fo much the lefs for wheat. I would not exempt even plough-horses from the tax; because in every view it is more advantageous to use oxen *. So little regard is paid to thefe confide

rations,

*They are preferable for husbandry in several refpects. They are cheaper than horfes their food, their harness, their fhoes, the attendance on them, much lefs expenfive; and their dung much better for land. Horfes are more fubject to dif cafes, and when diseased or old are totally useless; upon which account, a stock of horfes for a farm, must be renewed at least every ten years; whereas a stock of oxen may be kept entire for ever without any new expence, as they will always draw a full price when fatted for food. Nor is a horfe more docile than an ox: a couple of oxen in a plough, require not a driver more than a couple of horses. The Dutch at the Cape of Good Hope plough with oxen; and exercife them early to a quick 3 P 2 pace,