without being in possession of the cause or principle, namely, a soul or spirit, through which alone matter can be the subject of rational volition?

And since this soul must, necessarily, according to the doctrine of analogous cause and effect, be of the same spiritual nature as the human soul, it follows that it must be endued with immortality, a separate and individual immortality. Thus the existence and the immortality of human and animal souls seems to hang or fall together. Each of them affords the same evidences here in the body, and must, in due consequence, experience the same results out of the body hereafter.

Archbishop Tillotson fully grants the possession of a soul to animals, and also an immortality, but not such an immortality as will be given to man. He says, and the passage is very striking, from the pen of such an acute and able

reasoner :

"That the most common and general philosophy of the world hath always acknowledged something in beasts beside their bodies, and that the faculty of sense and perception which is in them, is founded in a principle of a higher nature than matter. And as this was

always the common philosophy of the world, so we find it to be a supposition of Scripture, which frequently attributes souls to beasts as well as to men, though of a much inferior nature. And, therefore, those particular philosophers who have denied any immaterial principle, or a soul to beasts, have also denied thein to have sense, any more than a clock or watch, or any other engine, and have imagined them to be nothing else but a finer and more complicated kind of engines, which by reason of the curiosity and tenderness of their frame, are more easily susceptible of all kinds of motions and impressions from without,-which impressions are the cause of all those actions that resemble those sensations which we men find in ourselves: which is to say, that birds, and beasts, and fishes, are nothing else but a more curious kind of puppets, which by certain secret and hidden weights and springs do move up, and down, and counterfeit the actions of life and sense. This, I confess, seems to me an odd kind of philosophy: and it hath this vehement prejudice against it, that if this were true, every man would have great cause to question the reality of his own perceptions, for to all appearance the sensations of beasts are

as real as ours, and in many things their senses much more exquisite than ours: and, if nothing can be a sufficient argument to a man that he is really endowed with sense, besides his own consciousness of it, then every man hath reason to doubt whether all men in the world besides himself be not mere engines: for no man hath any other evidence that another man is really endowed with sense, than he hath that brute creatures are so: for they really appear to see, and hear, and feel, and smell, and taste things as truly and as exactly as any man in the world does."

You will see how this view is in cordial unison with the idea advanced by me, that there is the same evidence for a soul in animals, as for a soul in men.

The good Archbishop continues, “Immortality imports, that the soul remains after the body, and is not corrupted or dissolved together with it. And there is no inconvenience in attributing this sort of immortality to the brute creatures." But, according to his further belief, this is a kind of mortal immortality; for he argues, that we, who know so little of the ways and works of God, and of the secrets of nature, should not think it necessary to be able

to give a particular account of what becomes of the souls of brute creatures after death: "Whether they return into the soul and spirit of the world, if there be any such thing, as some fancy, (in allusion, perhaps, to the Manichean philosophy), or whether they pass into the bodies of other animals, which succeed in their rooms; I say, this is not necessary to be particularly determined: it is sufficient to lay down this in general as highly probable, that they are such a sort of spirits, which as to their operation and life, do necessarily depend upon matter, and require union with it, which union being dissolved, they lapse into an insensible condition, and a state of inactivity. And when this visible frame of the world shall be dissolved, and this scene of sensible things shall pass away, then it is not improbable that they shall be discharged out of being, and return to their first nothing for though in their own nature they would continue longer, yet having served the end of their being, and done their work, it is not unsuitable to the same wisdom that made them, and commanded them into being, to let them sink into their first state."

Now it evidently appears, that the learned Archbishop, in common with others, has some

serious objection to the immortality of the souls of animals, in such a way and infinite degree as mankind hope to enjoy an immortality of soul. What this objection can be, or in what manner it can be injurious to the idea of the immortality of the human soul, I cannot determine. I should rather infer, from some obvious reasons, that the hope of animals would very much tend to strengthen the hope of man. The Archbishop cannot, in sound philosophy, help allowing them a soul, and an immortal soul in some sense; but he denies them such an immortality as awaits the human soul, and in attempting to establish his theory, I cannot but think that he falls into some contradictions and contrarieties. In the first place, their souls cannot return into the soul or spirit of the world, which can be none other but God, for God would then have been engaged in a purposeless work in a great degree; and if the spiritual creation generally resolved itself into the Almighty again, God would finally reign alone, and souls virtually be annihilated, and all the Divine works of both matter and spirit be as though the Divine Being had done nothing. For I cannot see why a part of the spiritual creation should thus be absorbed, and not the whole of it-in other words, why man's