National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold WarCraig Eisendrath Temple University Press, 28 nov. 2000 - 240 sidor A drastic reform of intelligence activities is long overdue. The Cold War has been over for ten years. No country threatens this nation's existence. Yet we still spend billions of dollars on covert action and espionage. In National Insecurity ten prominent experts describe, from an insider perspective, what went wrong with U.S. intelligence and what will be necessary to fix it. Drawing on their experience in government administration, research, and the foreign service, they propose a radical rethinking of the United States' intelligence needs in the post-Cold War world. In addition, they offer a coherent and unified plan for reform that can simultaneously protect U. S. security and uphold the values of our democratic system. As we now know, even during the Cold War, when intelligence was seen as a matter of life and death, our system served us badly. It provided unreliable information, which led to a grossly inflated military budget, as it wreaked havoc around the world, supporting corrupt regimes, promoting the drug trade, and repeatedly violating foreign and domestic laws. Protected by a shroud of secrecy, it paid no price for its mistakes. Instead it grew larger and more insulated every year. Taking into consideration our strategic interests abroad as well as the price of covert operations in dollars, in reliability, and in good will, every American taxpayer can be informed by and will want to read this book. National Insecurity is essential for readers interested in contemporary political issues, international relations, U.S. history, public policy issues, foreign policy, intelligence reform, and political science. |
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Sida 18
... station in the embassy was to serve as a liaison and exchange intelligence information with the CIA's Singaporean counterpart , the Special Branch , which was headed by offi- cers on loan from Great Britain . But the local CIA officers ...
... station in the embassy was to serve as a liaison and exchange intelligence information with the CIA's Singaporean counterpart , the Special Branch , which was headed by offi- cers on loan from Great Britain . But the local CIA officers ...
Sida 22
... stations in American embassies abroad , except for those engaged in liaison with allies . Satellite observation continues to be extremely valuable and entails no political cost . The same is true of monitoring foreign broadcasts and of ...
... stations in American embassies abroad , except for those engaged in liaison with allies . Satellite observation continues to be extremely valuable and entails no political cost . The same is true of monitoring foreign broadcasts and of ...
Sida 24
... station in New Delhi , and the U.S. bombing of a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan in the same year raised serious questions about the methodology of clandestine collection of intel- ligence used to justify military force.3 This ...
... station in New Delhi , and the U.S. bombing of a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan in the same year raised serious questions about the methodology of clandestine collection of intel- ligence used to justify military force.3 This ...
Sida 28
... Station in Beijing , the CIA smuggled out stu- dents , dissidents , and intellectuals who formed the nucleus of the Chi- nese democracy movement in exile.13 In 1991 , during the Persian Gulf War , the CIA , in conjunction with Pol- ish ...
... Station in Beijing , the CIA smuggled out stu- dents , dissidents , and intellectuals who formed the nucleus of the Chi- nese democracy movement in exile.13 In 1991 , during the Persian Gulf War , the CIA , in conjunction with Pol- ish ...
Sida 32
... stations in Central America and Africa keeping sensitive infor- mation from the Congress and U.S. Ambassadors . We now know , moreover ( see Chapter 7 ) , that the CIA was aware of the efforts of the Nicaraguan Contras to traffic in ...
... stations in Central America and Africa keeping sensitive infor- mation from the Congress and U.S. Ambassadors . We now know , moreover ( see Chapter 7 ) , that the CIA was aware of the efforts of the Nicaraguan Contras to traffic in ...
Innehåll
1 | |
8 | |
23 | |
3 Too Many Spies Too Little Intelligence | 45 |
4 CIAForeign Service Relations | 61 |
The Blowback Problem | 76 |
US National Security and the New Openness Movement | 92 |
Narcotics as Fallout From the CIAs Covert Wars | 118 |
Priorities Managerial Changes and Funding | 172 |
10 Whos Watching the Store? ExecutiveBranch and Congressional Surveillance | 190 |
Conclusions | 212 |
Selected Bibliography | 223 |
About The Center for International Policy | 227 |
About the Contributors | 231 |
Index | 233 |
The NSA the NRO and NIMA | 149 |
Andra upplagor - Visa alla
National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War Craig Eisendrath Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2000 |
National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War Craig Eisendrath Ingen förhandsgranskning - 2000 |
National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War Craig Eisendrath Ingen förhandsgranskning - 1999 |
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activities Afghan Afghanistan Agency's alliances Ambassador American analysis assassination authority Bay of Pigs billion blowback bomb budget Central America Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency CIA operations CIA's clandestine collection classified Clinton cocaine Cold Cold War communist Congress congressional covert action covert operations Defense democratic Department diplomatic Director of Central documents economic effort El Salvador embassy espionage funds gence Guatemala heroin Honduras imagery intel intelligence agencies Intelligence Committee intelligence community intelligence system investigation Iran Iraq leaders ligence ment military missile mission Narcotics National Security national-security Nicaragua NRO's nuclear Office opium oversight Pakistan paramilitary political President presidential priorities problems Reagan reform Robert Dreyfuss Robert Gates role Salvador satellites secrecy secret Senate sources Soviet Union targets TECHINT terrorist threat tion U.S. foreign U.S. government U.S. intelligence U.S. policy United Washington weapons White House York