natural corruptions, shew, evidently, that he argued deceitfully from good principles.

Cunn. That way of talking, about the devil, is idle, and superstitious I hope the devil hath never argued with Mr. Templeton at all.

Shep. If you, sir, will not suffer us to ascribe vice and wickedness to the suggestions of the devil, we must either ascribe it to nature, notwithstanding your defence of all her dictates, or to some emissaries of the devil, that have been tampering with one of the fairest and most virtuous minds I ever had the happiness to be acquainted with.

Cunn. Your hint, sir, is most shockingly rude, but, at the same time, most contemptible, because it is perfectly insignificant.

Shep. I hope it is not altogether insignificant to him for whose use I intended it. If he makes a right application of it, I assure you, sir, I am in little pain how your conscience, or that of any body else, shall apply it.

Temp. Mr. Cunningham, you have yourself given occasion to this severe inuendo: however, I cannot help admiring and loving the zealous frankness of Mr. Shepherd, who is not hindered, by forms and decorums, from speaking his mind, when he thinks his duty, and the recovery of a poor soul from bad principles, and wicked courses, call upon him for openness and resolution.

Shep. I hope God will take me out of the world, before a false complaisance, or even stronger worldly considerations, shall render me deaf to such a call. But as you, sir, who know Mr. Cunningham better than I do, have thought my inuendo too severe; I beg his pardon for it, and hope he will not again provoke the too great warmth of my temper, by calling what I say idle and superstitious, at least till he hath first proved it to be so. Let him, moreover, consider, that he who is ready to apply a general reflection to himself, makes above one half of the censure.

Dech. And pray, doctor, remember, that he who, through a mistaken zeal, commits hostilities in the defence of God's cause, when milder methods would be both more becoming, and more effectual; does but give vent to his own pride and spleen, and betray the cause he pretends to serve.

Temp. Oh! Mr. Shepherd hath corrected himself; and

this unhandsome sort of chat only serves to suspend our useful inquiries.

PRAY, Mr. Shepherd, have you any farther objections to the deistical creed?

Shep. I have two very material objections to it, scarcely touched on yet.

Temp. What are those?

Shep. I think the Deists talk too boldly, and, if they do not know a great deal more of the Divine nature, than either the light of their own nature, or revelation, can inform us, very absurdly, concerning God, when they tell us he is obliged to obey the laws of nature, and that those laws are eternal and indispensable.

Dech. The law of nature is no other than the law of reason; and reason, truly such, always distinguishes right from wrong, and obliges all good and rational beings to choose that which is right. Now as God is the best, and most rational, of all beings, he must be more influenced, by reason, than any other being. He does that which is right, because it is right; and, were it not right, antecedently to his will, it could not be the object of his choice. The right or wrong of actions and things does not depend on mere will and arbitrariness, I mean, does not depend on even the will of God, but on the nature and fitness of circumstances and things, which is certainly eternal, and unalterable; so that which is good, could never have been evil; and what is evil, could never have been good. It is a contradiction to God's own nature, either to do that which is evil, or to turn evil into good, or good into evil. To do good, and avoid evil, must have been the divine rule of action from all eternity; and, consequently, as that rule must have been eternal, so must it, also, have been indispensable: he who says the contrary, speaks blasphemy. For nothing, surely, can be more derogatory to Almighty God, than either to say he can do wrong, or that he can change the nature of right and wrong, and destroy the distinction between them. If, then, the rule of right reason is that which God himself acts by, in all things, it must, of consequence, be the rule of action to all his rational creatures unless we may suppose, that God would, on any occasion, make it the duty of a rational crea

VOL. IV.

ture to do that which is wrong; that is, to act by a rule contrary to his own. Why do we say God is infinitely wise, good, and just; but because he always does that which is most wise, most good, and most just? And why do we call him a most wise and equitable ruler, but because he requires no other rule of action to be observed by his rational creatures, than that which he always observes himself? God will never do that which is wrong, nor will he ever desire any of his creatures to do that which he himself would not do, were he in the place and circumstances of that

creature.

Shep. You say, sir, I think, that God, and all other rational beings, are, on all occasions, obliged to do that which is right, and abstain from that which is wrong?

Dech. I do.

Shep. And do the right and wrong of actions depend on the nature and fitness of things?

Dech. They do.

Shep. You mean, I suppose, by things, when you speak of the fitnesses of things, such things as have been fitted to one another; and not such things as are no way relative.

Dech. Yes, sir.

Shep. Had not all relative beings once a beginning?
Dech. No doubt, they had.

Shep. Their fitnesses, therefore, must have been older than themselves; or, otherwise, the law, or rule of action, resulting from those fitnesses, could not have been eternal.

Dech. The fit and unfit of things existed in the Divine mind from all eternity, and therefore are eternal.

Shep. The law, then, does not result from the things, or their nature and fitness; but the things, and their fitness, from the law.

Dech. How is that?

Shep. Why, you say the law of fitness is eternal, and the nature of things, temporary; therefore the law was before the things; and consequently, could not have resulted from

them.

Dech. It is true, I do say so; but I mean, in saying this, that God framed all things according to the plan or archetype of things existing in his own mind from all eternity: so that the eternal law of reason gave birth to all the forms

and relations of things. This, however, does not hinder the law of human duty to result from the fitnesses of things.

Shep. If things, then, had been made otherwise than they are, other duties, than those which at present bind us, must have resulted from thence; and this would make the nature of right and wrong interchangeable.

Dech. Things are wisely made, and God could not have made them otherwise.

Shep. Was God necessarily determined to the work of creation? Or was that work matter of choice and free-will? Dech. It was matter of choice.

Shep. Was he tied down to the present forms or relations of things? Or could he have given other forms and relations to things, if he had pleased?

Dech. He could have produced things in no other forms, nor with any other relations, than such as were wise, good, and fit.

Shep. But as he is under no necessities of any kind, nor compulsions, he could have found out, and bestowed on the materials of this world, other forms and relations; and all of them as wise, as good, and as fit, as the present. You speak of a plan and archetype of things existing in his mind from all eternity; did he contrive that plan himself? Or waş it a necessarily existing part of the Divine nature coeval with his being and attributes?

Dech. It existed for ever in his foreknowledge.

Shep. He could not, then, have chosen to abstain from the work of creation, or to have created any other thing, or otherwise than as it is.

Dech. This would make him a necessary agent, both as to the substances and forms of all things.

Shep. So I think. The truth is, sir, when you speak of God, if you do not confine yourself to such assertions, in relation to him, as are necessary to your own occasions, and, consequently, capable of being known, and cleared up, by reason; but give into bold speculations, above the capacity of man; you cannot help running into the most unfathomable mysteries, to call them by no harder name. God, Mr. Dechaine, made all things as he pleased: he ordered and constituted, according to his own will and pleasure, the whole frame of things, immaterial and corporeal; and it is

therefore we say, he shewed infinite wisdom and goodness in the creation. For how can we call him wise, or good, for making any thing which he could not have abstained from making, or made otherwise than he did? The nature and fitness, the forms and relations of things, which were not yet in being, did not determine the will of God, but resulted entirely from thence; and out of those, again, resulted a fitness and unfitness in actions.

Dech. But the wisdom of God determined his will; for something there must have been, to determine it; or else it acted by mere accident and chance. God must have had some reason and design in making things as they are.

Shep. Let us not, when we speak of God, presume to say, this attribute is prior in its operation to, and determines that: to talk after this manner, is to talk like vain and ignorant men. We only know, that the works of God are wise and good; but to assert, with assurance, that he made them by an eternal plan and archetype, or that one power in God dictated what another executed, is to speak presumptuously, if not absurdly. God raised the whole spiritual and material world out of nothing; what plan could there have been for the creating of something out of nothing, or for the giving being to matter by a single act of the divine will? Who can explain this inconceivable mystery, or tell us how spirit could produce matter? If God made every thing as he pleased, and fitted the several constituent parts of each system to one another, so as to render the whole of his works both beautiful and good; and if the various species of things, with all their qualities and relations, were dictated to him by no necessities of the things themselves, nor of fate, nor of his own nature; it will follow, that wisdom and choice presided over all the works of creation, and that God gave this sort of being, and manner of being, to one thing, and that sort to another, when he could, instead of that, have left the whole present system of created being uncreated, and raised another, wholly different, out of nothing; or for ever abstained, if he pleased, from the work of creation. But having once, by his free-will and choice, made all things, and fitted them wisely to one another; a natural law did necessarily result from the nature and fitness of things; and it became the duty of every intelligent being,