Shep. Have you any doubts about the truth of what is told us by the historians concerning that memorable transaction?

Dech. Not the least.

Shep. Pray, is it either self-evident or demonstrable to you, at this time and place, that there is any such city as Constantinople, or that there ever was such a man as Cæsar?

Dech. By no means.

Shep. And you have all you know, concerning the being of either the city, or the man, merely from the report of others, who had it from others, and so on, through many links of tradition?

Dech. I have.

Shep. You see then, that there are certain cases, in which the evidence of things not seen,' nor neither sensibly or demonstrably perceived, can justly challenge so entire an assent, that he who should pretend to refuse it in the fullest measure of acquiescence, would be deservedly esteemed the most stupid or perverse of mankind.

Dech. Suppose I should, to shorten our work, grant you all this; are you so weak as to imagine you can put facts related in the four Gospels, or any of them, for instance the resurrection of Jesus, on the same footing of authority and evidence, with the assassination of Cæsar?

Shep. If I cannot put it on a higher and firmer foundation, I ill deserve the pay and livery of my Master. Let us, however, for the present, keep close to the method prescribed to us by the three propositions, cited from my discourse. And, as to the first, with the observation you just now introduced under it, tending to shew, that the evidence of the Christian religion is of the weakest kind, although I think I have said enough to prove that kind of evidence capable of certainty, yet I am far from being satisfied with your granting it merely to shorten our work; and shall therefore beg leave to observe to you, that the most important affairs of life are founded and transacted upon this sort of evidence. A merchant trusts all his fortune to advices from foreign countries, such as that there are cities, commodities, traders, in Turkey or China, none of which he ever saw, and

often relies on factors, with whom he is not in the least acquainted. On this bottom is built all foreign commerce, and even the greater part of our domestic trade. The civil and military lists are paid by it, and every thing you, or his lordship, or his majesty enjoys, that is better than acorns and water, are derived from it. The judge determines property, and liberty, and life, by oaths, which are only the evidence of things not seen by him; and neither he nor all the lawyers on earth can find out any other evidence, more to be depended on, for the execution of law and justice; nay, the nature of those important matters mentioned doth not, in one case among ten thousand, admit of any other evidence. The king is represented, and his power exercised, by sheriffs, justices, constables, &c. whom he never saw, and in places vastly remote; and subjects obey them so far as to surrender their goods, liberties, lives, without ever having seen either his majesty, or his commission; nay, his majesty himself never saw one among a thousand of the commissions by which his authority is delegated. From hence it may appear, that wealth, liberty, property, life, peace, and society, depend almost wholly on faith; and that kings, judges, merchants, the wisest of men, as well as the weakest, are obliged to see with other people's eyes, to hear with other people's ears, to judge by other people's reason, and to act by other people's hands, over the face of the whole earth, and in matters of the last consequence.

Dech. And are they not often deceived by trusting to imperfect lights, by confiding in other people's eyes and judgments?

Shep. They are indeed; but I think not oftener than by trusting too confidently to their own. The purblind man must see for himself; the half-witted wretch must judge for himself; those who can see very well, must take upon them to distinguish objects that lie beyond the verge of sight; and they who can judge well enough in some things, will take upon them to canvass and decide such others as are above human comprehension and reason. This proceeds from pride; and what is the consequence? Why, an infinity of errors in matters of sense, and of strict and undeniable demonstrations that are really false.

Temp. The doctor hath struck out a beautiful field for thought, entirely new to me.

Shep. And yet, sir, one would think there is scarcely a day in which the common affairs of life might not suggest it

to one.

Temp. It is very true, and I now wonder how it could escape me. So it fares with the proofs for the being of a God. The world is full of them; every atom of matter carries an evidence for that great truth; and yet I know not but an ordinary eye might gaze for a long time on the sun, an animal, or a tree, without tracing the connexion between those works of wisdom and their author, if nobody hinted it to him.

Shep. Your observation is good, and those who had the care of your education, ought, I should think, to have taught you the strength of moral evidence long ago. They might have led you through great part of this field, as you call it, the hither side of it being open time out of mind.

Cunn. Reflections thrown upon his education, now that he is full five-and-twenty, and can think for himself, turn to flouts upon him, rather than his tutor.

Temp. If there was a flout intended, I believe it was not for me; however, I wish the appearance of it had been avoided.

Shep. All I intended, sir, was to shew you by that instance, that, notwithstanding all the boasts I have heard of the open and candid education you have got, certain notices of the greatest consequence may have been industriously kept out of your sight, and, with the same intention, others, as prejudicial, thrown in your way. This hint, which, for ought I can see to the contrary, may be very necessary to you, neither Mr. Dechaine's two great estates, nor Mr. Cunningham's two fat parishes, high as they set them above me, can hinder me from repeating to you, because I have some reason to think it concerns your happiness in this world and the next.

Dech. We are obliged to believe your duty forces you to be rude, and so must bear with you the best we can. But let us return to your second proposition; which was this, 'That he who denies such possible facts as are said to have

been done in ages long since past, can found his dissent on nothing else but faith.'

Shep. I hope that point will not detain us long, because I think it seems to be almost evident in itself.

Dech. To me I am sure it appears exceedingly strange. I thought faith had been the very reverse of disbelieving; that it had consisted in actually and positively believing; and that he who hath not faith, is called in Scripture, and by all the world, an unbeliever.

Shep. That is but playing with words. Are there not four kinds of evidence; and corresponding with them, four kinds or degrees of assent?

Dech. There are; namely, self-evidence, demonstration, probability, and credibility: and the assent given to the first, is intuition; to the second, knowledge; to the third, opinion; and to the fourth, belief.

Shep. Do you intuitively perceive, that possible facts, said to have been done in former ages, were not done? Dech. No.

Shep. Can you demonstrate, that such facts were not done?

Dech. Not unless there were other facts to render those impracticable and impossible.

Shep. But you cannot demonstrate, that there ever were such other facts.

Dech. It is very true.

Shep. It follows then, that you can only believe such facts were never done; for as you cannot demonstrate, so neither can you render it probable, that such facts never happened.

Dech. Not so fast, sir. The third head of your discourse was to this effect: In consequence of what hath been laid down in the two former propositions, he who denies the historical part of the Christian religion, the facts of which are all possible, cannot be sure it is false, can only believe it so to be.' Let me observe to you, sir, that no degree of testimony can ever prove an impossible fact to have been done; and that if the highest degree of testimony is opposed by as high a degree of improbability, the opinion founded on the one will destroy, or at least suspend, the belief that may be claimed by the other.

Shep. This I readily acknowledge.

Dech. In consequence of this, I must insist, that if some of the facts delivered in the gospel history, be impossible, or extremely improbable, this will demonstrate that history to be false, or at least put the negative faith of a Deist, if faith you will call it, on a very firm foundation.

Shep. I own it will.

Dech. To avoid prolixity then, let us fix on a single fact, among several of the same kind, and consider a little whether it be not impossible, or extremely unfeasible. If I mistake not, Jesus himself put the truth and reality of his Messiahship on his rising again from the dead; so that if he did not actually die, and rise again, he could not have been that Son and Messenger of God, he gave himself out for. Shep. He did.

Dech. Pray now, in sober and good earnest, was that a very possible fact?

Shep. I think it was. If our Saviour had not thought so, and been sure he could perform it, he had sense enough to have put the truth of his mission on somewhat more within his power, or to avoid the leaving it to any farther trials.

Dech. For my part, that which is against nature, I shall always think impossible. The laws of the creation are stated and invariable things, and, as long as the world lasts, make such a reunion of soul and body, such a reviviscence of a dead carcase, as impossible as it is for water to burn, or fire

to wet us.

Shep. They certainly do, unless the power of God, who made all things, and can alter them as he pleases, should suspend those laws, and, by a force superior to them, should compel matter to produce effects contrary to theirs. To restore a dead body to life, is at least as easy as it was to give it life at first.

Dech. But before you fly to the power of God, in order to account for such an amazing fact, you would do well to consider, whether it is consistent with the majesty of an Al-. mighty Being, who can bring about all his purposes in a natural way, whose works do not, like those of men, need to be taken in pieces, in order to be mended, to break in upon his own scheme of creation by an act of violence, that must