itself, or the express one contained in the tenth amendment, mean any thing, it is that this power is untouched. In September, 1789, the judiciary act became a law. That act, among other things, gives to the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction from the final judgment or decree of the highest court of law or equity of a state, having jurisdiction over the suit, "in all cases" where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their validity, or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute or authority exercised under any state, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity. This grant, by means of the very general expression "in all cases," is wide enough to convey all powers which it was possible for Congress to convey, and we freely admit, that under this expression, if we do not look beyond the clause of the constitution we have last quoted, the Supreme Court could obtain appellate jurisdiction over the case in question if it is enumerated in that clause, though we shall endeavor to show presently, that when we look a little further in the constitution, a different result is arrived at. But we have seen that the case of a controversy between a state and its own citizens is not within the grants of this clause, and that, therefore, no conveyance by Congress could vest any jurisdiction over it in the Supreme Court, for there is no power in Congress to give to any other department of government what the constitution does not authorize that department to receive. Whether or no, it was the duty of the Supreme Court to decide this grant to be void, so far as it went beyond those of the constitution, we shall not say; it was a matter for the judgments, perhaps for the consciences, of the federal judiciary, and on it they have decided; but we do say that, if the unfortunate generality of expression used by the law in question is not to be limited, the law is, in our opinion, void and unconstitutional-even under the clause we have been considering. But let us look at the next clause of the constitution, and see how that will affect the matter. If we grant, for the sake of argument, that the constitution has vested in the Supreme Court the right to interfere in the internal relations of a state and its citizens, we may be allowed to examine how it has been granted, under what restrictions, and on what conditions. Such a case, it is almost needless to say, is one in which a state is a party. In article third, section second, clause third, we find these words: "In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make." Here we see, that if the Supreme Court has any jurisdiction over such a case, it must, at least, be original; and that the appellate jurisdiction of that court only extends to "other cases" than "those in which a state shall be a party;" yet the judiciary act, if it extends to this case at all, gives to the Supreme Court, not original, but appellate jurisdiction over it. The court, instead of condemning this most flagrant error, go beyond it, and declare that it is competent in Congress to create a right of appeal in such a case, from the highest court of a state, not only to the highest court of the central government, but to the lowest, and to require that an independent sovereignty shall creep, "with baited breath and whispering humbleness," from court to court, and from tribunal to tribunal, praying the grace and mercy of its masters, the judges. Truly “ Ο' ταν δε Δαιμων ανδρι προσυνη κακα Is it to be wondered at, that when such doctrines as these are advocated in high places, secession is sometimes more than whispered? ANSWERS FOR A COMPANY AT CONVERSATION CARDS. THE LADY. SEEK'ST thou to woman's heart the clew, In the great world and her own? Her's the flower latest blown; Yet far more valued is the TRUE, That ever with fresh fruits and flowers, THE YOUNG GENTLEMAN. Young Paris joyed in groves and bowers, Three heavenly forms Jove to him sent; THE EXPERIENCED. Who soft and loving woman woos, Will, perhaps, still better speed; THE CONTENTED MAN. The human lot with ills is rife, THE MERRY COUNSELOR. Who others' faults and follies viewing, S. E. B. NATURAL HISTORY OF MAN. * THE work at the head of this article, has been many years before the public, and has been, so far as we know, universally commended. It appears, however, from Dr. Prichard's own showing, that his labors have been more highly esteemed by the Germans, than by his own "utilitarian countrymen," —a fact which should have made him suspect its value, and examine it with severe scrutiny. We fancy that no people judge more correctly of the substantial merit of literary or scientific labor, than the English; and most certainly none are more abundantly gifted with the desire, or the means, to patronize home genius, as none are more exclusively national. The whole work, too, was evidently constructed— moulded, to harmonize with popular opinion; and the second section, on the "Bearings of the Question," is an artful appeal to public sympathy for support. But, although he might complain of the patronage of the English public, he had reason to rejoice in the liberality of the press and learned bodies, which strove to confer upon him praise and honor. It is no pleasant task to arraign at the public bar a work so extensively known, and received as a standard authority. Nor would we attempt it for anything less than a capital error, in which the public has a very deep interest. We do not regard the numerous judgments he has received from courts of concurrent jurisdictions, as a bar to our proceedings; for nothing is more common and notorious, than for judges in this court, contemporary with authors, to discharge their high functions under influences not very creditable to the ermine. Many of them are, no doubt, very honest, and most of them flippant on the subjects that come before them; but it is, unquestionably, a matter of first importance to suitors in these courts, to bring with them, in general, as many other recommendations as they can procure, especially if the work to be judged is the first appearance of the author before these august tribunals. Happy is he, who, by reason of merit or influence, should obtain a favorable judgment from a Jerrold or a Macaulay, as the whole pack will give consentaneous tongue, as though the scent of the game actually reached their own noses; and unfortunate is he, whatever may be his merit, whose time has passed in obscurity, and encounters the severity of the judges in defenceless nakedness. Poor soul! he shrinks back to his obscurity and his books, and appeals to another generation for justice, when he and his successful contemporaries will be weighed with a just balance. We have now in our eye several authors moving among us in "all the pride and circumstance" of factitious glory and wealth, whose fee-simple of reputation in the next generation would be dear at half an hour's purchase. We do not say that Dr. Prichard's reputation is of this character, because he has something more to depend on than his "Natural History of Man." Besides, it appears to be necessary in every science, that a season of speculation * The Natural History of Man; comprising inquiries into the modifying influences of physical and moral agencies on the different tribes of the human family. By James Cowles Prichard, M.D., F.R.S., M.R.L.A., &c. should precede the appearance of truth, just as the dawn precedes the coming of "the glorious orb of day;" and although the dawn is forgotten in the splendor of the day, and the season of speculation is lost in the blaze of truth, by people generally, yet there are a few who retain the knowledge of the necessary progress of events. The very lively interest which has succeeded to a hitherto profound apathy in the public mind, in regard to the natural history of man, cannot all be attributed to the higher perfection of the science. Political agitations have produced much of it; and although it is unquestionably true that a scientific natural history of man cannot become a partisan for or against slavery, yet it must present most of the natural facts upon which the arguments of both parties must be based; and we think it must divest the subject of much of the passion with which it has been conducted. But if the public interest were principally founded on these political agitations, and not on real progress made in the science, we should have no hope of any permanent advantage to be gained by it. On the contrary, the science has progressed; has been taken from the custody and control of mere anatomists, who exhibited only its skeleton, and has been given to the public clothed with its flesh, and endowed with its vitality. We do not pretend to say that it is perfect in all its parts, and exhibits the beauty of maturity. Time is required for these developments, as it is for others. But one man and one woman came into the world as adults; all others have been infants, requiring constant attention to raise and improve them. It is instructing to follow the progress of some of the most important sciences from their first rude beginnings to their present advanced conditions. It will teach us the important lesson, that the human mind accomplishes nothing when it abandons observation and induction, and attempts to rely on speculation for advance in knowledge. It will teach us, that, after proceeding a certain length by observation and induction, there is a constant tendency of the human mind to rely on speculations to assume premises, and to make them the foundations of systems. It will inform us, that the human mind has a greater tendency to error than to truth; and that in every science, but mathematics, such speculations have prevailed, and postponed progress, until the mind is again brought back to the point of departure,-observation and induction. It will tell us that there are two great principles of the human mind concerned in the formation of science-genius and reason—which are so seldom combined in one individual, that but few Aristotles and Bacons are found dotted among the generations of men; while men with genius without a proper proportion of reason, and the reverse, are not rare. It will teach us, that the departure from the only true process of scientific discovery is always first made by one whose genius predominates, and that it is continued and maintained by those in whom reason predominates, almost to the exclusion of intuitive perception. It will tell us, that the whole time is not lost during which genius has usurped the throne of observation and induction; for although systematic science is not advanced, and many errors are propagated, yet a number of useful facts are often collected, and the errors became pointers, to a well-balanced mind, for the discovery of truth. These, and many other valuable lessons, will be taught to him who closely follows the progress of the sciences from their beginnings to their present conditions. We might easily illlustrate the above remarks by the example of chemistry, astronomy, medicine, &c.; but as our special subject, the natural history of man, will be sufficient for our purpose, we propose to follow it as closely as our limits will permit. Unlike most other branches, the natural history of man has been emphatically a creature of pure speculation from the earliest period until very recently. Other branches have their origins in the necessities and wants of mankind, which begat the arts, and which supplied the numerous facts and induced the observations from which the principles of science can only be inferred. From the first rude conceptions of the Greeks, to the last labored and artificial system of the Blumenbachian school of philosophers, the natural history of man has only been a series of speculations, unaccompanied by any of those sound logical arguments which we most generally find in the supporters of speculations in other branches of science. Nor is it very surprising that such has been the case; for although the natural history of other animals had its origin from observation of, and induction from, the great store of facts gathered during ages, no such store had been collected in respect to man. Civil, political and religious histories, together with the arts, sciences and polite literature of the world, contain innumerable facts illustrating the nature of man, as perfectly as the facts relating to the honey-bee, or the economy and regulations of a community of any other social animals, illustrate the nature of the animal described. But, unfortunately, the condition of man has never been regarded as the product of his nature, but as an artificial state; as if he had the power, by art, something extrinsic and superior to nature, to rise superior to the condition to which the Creator destined him, by other aids than his natural endowments. Under such circumstances, what facts were left upon which to found observation, and to make the necessary inductions preparatory to the formation of a science? None. The beaver, the bee, the ant, the spider, and many other animals, exhibit powers as strange in comparison with many other animals, as the extraordinary powers of man are strange in comparison with the whole organic kingdom; but these animals are exterior and inferior to us, and we can observe their natures without prejudice or passion. Besides, our capacities, without being severely taxed, enable us to comprehend the whole monotonous routine of the powers of such animals, however intricate, and we readily and justly ascribe them to natural operations; just as a race of beings equally superior in capacity to man would comprehend and describe human powers; "and show a Newton as we show an ape." But man, investigating himself, is another and a very different affair. He encounters not only his pride, his prejudices, his passions and the accumulated errors of ages, but, if he should entertain a correct view of his subject, it is equal to, if not beyond his highest intellectual capacity, whatever may be his estimate of it. It embraces all his relations, sexual, social, political and religious, just as, when describing the ant, we tell of the arrangements and economy of the hill; or the honey-bee, we speak of the regulations and economy of the hive. It embraces his poetry, his literature, his science, his eloquence, for the same reason that, in describing the mocking-bird, we must not omit his inimitable powers of song; nor in describing the preacher-monkey, must we forget his long and noisy harangues to his congregations, which are, no doubt, very ed ifying. |