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(Gen. Laws, 1864, Civ. Code, ch. 8, § 771.) And if the lessee keeps a house of ill fame, brothel or bawdy house upon the demised premises, the lessor may declare the lease void ; although the evidence must be a conviction of the offense by the lessee. (Gen. Laws, 1864, Crim. Code, ch. 48, $ 636.)

It will be observed that there is a degree of similarity in some of the provisions of the statutes of the Middle and Western states in respect to landlords and tenants; and it has been the design to give only, and so much of the laws of such states as may substantially comprehend the entire subject.




By the statutes of the state of Delaware it is declared that any contract or consent pursuant to which a tenant shall enter into, or continue in possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments, under an agreement to pay rent, shall be a demise; and where no term is expressly limited, a demise is construed to be a fee for a year, except of houses and lots usually let for a less time. No demise, except it be by deed, is effectual for a longer term than one year. If there be a demise for a term of one or more years, and three months or upward before the end of the term, either the landlord do not give notice in writing to the tenant in possession to remove, or the tenant do not give notice to the landlord of his intention to remove from the demised premises, the term will be extended for another year. If the tenant hold over the demised premises after the end of the term, and after the notice mentioned, the possession of such demised premises may be recovered by the landlord. (Rev. Code, 1852, ch. 120, SS 1-6.)

It has been held that if the defendant be a tenant of the plaintiff by any compact or assent amounting to a leasing or an occupation subject to rent, the plaintiff cannot bring ejectment without giving the tenant notice to quit; but any disclaimer of the relation of landlord and tenant made prior to the demise, dispenses with the notice; a disclaimer subsequent to the demise may be considered evidence to dispense with the tenancy. (Horsey': Lessee v. Horsey, 4 Harring. R. 517.)

If the tenant, after giving three months' notice in writing of his intention to deliver up the demised premises to his landlord at the end of the year, continue in possession without the consent of the landlord, he may be proceeded against by action of ejectment. (Morris v. Burton, 1 Houston's R. 213.)

In Maryland no estate in lands for above seven years, can pass or take effect except by deed executed, acknowledged and recorded. (1 Md. Code, art. 24, $ 1.)

§ Tenancies at will, and for one or more years, are terminated in Maryland by a notice in writing one month before the tenancy expires, to the tenant in possession, to remove from and quit the premises demised; but tenancies from year to year can only be terminated by a notice of six months, in writing, given by the landlord or his agent or representative, to the tenant, before the expiration of the current year. (1 Md. Code, art. 53, $ 6.)

The tenant in fee of a lot bounding on the basin of the city of Baltimore, leased the same for a term of years, reserving a right to distrain and re-enter; and granted his lessee “the exclusive right of extending, not exceeding, etc., into the water, any and every part of said lot which fronted the basin, provided he could obtain permission for the purpose from the mayor, etc., of Baltimore, or the legislature of the state. The reversion of the lot was rented to a party who recovered the leased premises by ejectment for non-payment of rent, and applied to the corporation of Baltimore for liberty to extend the lot into the basin, according to the original lease, which was granted, and the extension made; it was held that by the forfeiture of the lease, consequent upon the recovery in ejectment, no right reverted to the first tenant; and further, that if the lessee had made the improvement under the permission granted by his lease, the lessor and his assigns could have distrained or re-entered upon it, as upon the original lot. (The City of Baltimore v. White, 2 Gill's R. 444.)

In the state of Virginia, a grantee or assignee of any land held to lease, or of the reversion thereof, and his personal representatives or assigns, enjoy against the lessee, his heirs, personal representatives or assigns, the like advantage by action or entry, for any

forfeiture, which the grantor, assignor or lessor, or his heirs, might have enjoyed.

It is also provided by statute, that a tenancy from year to year may be terininated, by either party giving notice in writing, prior to the end of any year, for three months, if it be of land within, and for six months, if of land without a town, of his intention to terminate the same. Where such notice is to the tenant, it may be served upon him, or upon any one holding under him the leased premises, or any part thereof. Where it is by the tenant, it may be served upon any one who, at the time, owns the premises in whole or in part, or the agent of such owner, or according to the common law. But this provision does not apply where, by special agreement, no notice is. to be given; and no notice is necessary from or to a tenant whose term is to end at a certain time.

If any tenant, from whom rent is in arrear and unpaid, shall desert the demised premises, and leave the same uncultivated or unoccupied, without goods thereon subject to distress sufficient to satisfy the rent, the lessor or his agent may post a notice in writing upon a conspicuous part of the premises, requiring the tenant to pay the rent within one month. If the rent be not paid within that time, the lessor is entitled to possession of the premises, and may enter thereon, and the right of such tenant thereto is thenceforth at an end. (Code of 1860, tit. 41, ch. 138, SS 1, 5, 6.)

And the statute further provides, that any person who shall have a right of re-entry into lands by reason of any rent, issuing thereout, being in arrear, or by reason of the breach of any covenant or

, condition, may serve a declaration in ejectment on the tenant in possession, where there shall be such tenant, or, if the possession be vacant, by affixing the declaration upon the chief door of any messuage, or at any other notorious place on the premises, which service is in lieu of a demand and re-entry; and, upon proof to the court by affidavit, in case of judgment by default, or upon proof on the trial, that the rent claimed was due, and no sufficient distress was upon the premises, or that the covenant or condition was broken before the service of the declaration, and that the plaintiff liad power thereupon to re-enter, he can recover judgment and have execution for such lands. (Code of 1860, tit. 41, ch. 138, $ 16.)

The statute then provides a way for the defendant to redeem the land from the forfeiture; and also a way to prevent the judg

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ment of forfeiture in the first instance, which is similar to the practice under the Revised Statutes of New York. Indeed, it would seem that the provisions of the Virginia statute in this regard were taken from the Revised Statutes of New York, volume 2, page 505, article 2, sections 30 to 38 inclusive, and are given in the statement herein of the laws of New York respecting landlord and tenant. (Ante, ch. 16.) The laws of Virginia on the subject are found in the Code of 1860, title 41, chapter 138, sections 16 to 25.

In case the time for re-entering be specified in the instrument creating the rent, covenant or condition, the proceedings in ejectment must not be begun until such time shall have elapsed. (Code of 1860, tit. 41. ch. 178, § 21.)

It has been held, that if a tenant claims to hold the premises in dispute adversely to his landlord, he is not entitled to notice to quit. (Harrison v. Middleton, 11 Gratton's R. 527.)

If a grant be made, reserving a yearly rent, with the condition that the grantor may re-enter if the rent be not paid, after demand made upon the premises, if no property is found on the land whereof distress can be made, the grantor, upon demand made, and failure to pay, no property to distrain being found on the land, may re-enter, and grant over to another. (Warterby v. Moran, 3 Call's R. 424.)

In the state of North Carolina, a lease for three years or less is good without being in writing; but a lease for a term exceeding three years must be in writing and recorded, in order to be effectual against subsequent purchasers without notice, or creditors. (Rev. Code, ch. 37, S 26.) And in that state a tenancy from year to year is terminated by the service of a notice to quit at least six months before the expiration of the year, and the same must expire at the end of the year. As there is no statute upon the subject in North Carolina, the common law rule is held to apply the same as is the rule in England and several others of the states; and a tenancy at will is terininated in the same way. (Vide Den v. McIntosh, 4 Iredell's R. 291.)

In the state of South Carolina, leases for more than three years must be in writing and signed by the parties, or their agents lawfully authorized, the same as in North Carolina. (Brevard's Digest, title 84. Vide Wallace v. McCollough, 1 Rich. Eq. R. 417.)

Leases for a longer term than twelve months in South Carolina are not valid in law against the rights of third persons, unless recorded in the office of mesne conveyances within three months after being executed. Parol leases give no right of possession for a longer period than twelve months after entered into between the parties; and all parol leases are understood as for one year, unless a shorter term be stipulated for. (Laws of 1817, p. 36.)

In the state of Georgia, contracts creating the relation of landlord and tenant for any time not exceeding one year, may be by parol, and if made for a greater time will have the effect of a tenancy at will. When no time is specified for the termination of the tenancy, the law construes it to be for the calendar year, but if it is expressly a tenancy at will, then either party may terminate it at will. Two months' notice is necessary from the landlord to terminate a tenancy at will; but one month’s notice only is necessary from the tenant. The tenant must deliver

possession at the expiration of his term, and if he fails to do so, a summary remedy is given to the landlord. (Code of 1862, SS 2254, 2256, 2264, 2265.)

In Florida, if any person leasing or re-renting any land or house, shall fail to pay the rent at the time it becomes due, the statute provides that it shall be lawful for the lessor immediately thereafter to enter and take possession of the property so by him rented or leased. (Thompson's Dig. p. 397.) There does not seem to be any provision of the statute for terminating a tenancy at will, or for years, and, therefore, the common law rule in such cases is probably recognized in that state. The statute prescribes a summary method for getting possession of the demised premises on default of the tenant to pay the rent as agreed, in which case the landlord must give three days' notice to the tenant requiring payment of the rent before he can institute proceedings; and this seems to be the only provision of the statute in respect to the notice in cases of landlord and tenant.

In the state of Alabama, a lease for lands for more than one year must be in writing, and no leasehold estate can be created for a longer time than twenty years. (Rev. Code of 1867, SS 1581, 1862.) In the action to recover lands or the possession thereof, brought against the tenant, the landlord must, on his own motion, be made defendant. (Rev. Code, $ 2606.)

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