right to enter, or any entry for other purposes than those connected with a right to enter, will not be sufficient to break the continuity of exclusive possession in another. But real property cannot be acquired by an adverse possession, except the owner is ousted, and that ouster shall be uninterruptedly continued for the whole statutory period; and the adverse possession must be open, visible and exclusive in the disseisor. The law designs that the owner shall have ample knowledge on the subject, and a full opportunity to assert his claim; but if he sleeps upon his rights for the period prescribed by the statute of limitations, he is presumed to have acquiesced in the claims of another. (School District No. 8 of Thompson v. Lynch, 33 Conn. R. 330. Vide Pray v. Pierce, 7 Mass. R. 383.) It is but fair to require that the adverse occupancy shall be continually open, visible and exclusive, in order that the owner of the true title be barred of his remedy for his land; and it has been held that the occasional cutting of timber upon the land, during a part of the statutory period, does not amount to such a continued occupancy as will prevent the true owner from recovering his land. (Vide Braxdale v. Speed, 1 Marsh. R. 106. Smith v. Mitchell, Ib. 207. Trotter v. Cassady, 3 ib. 366.) Said Buchanan, J., in delivering the opinion of the court in a case involving the question: "Even if the defendant's possession by inclosure commenced first- which is not stated to be the case—that, and his cutting timber exterior to the fences, could not have prevented the constructive possession vesting by operation of law, in Jordon, of all the uninclosed parts of the number of two, on the actual entry and inclosure made by him, and those claiming under him, upon a part of that tract of land, within twenty years from the date of the grant, claiming title to the whole.” (Cheney v. Ringgold, 2 Harr. & Johns. R. 87, 95.)

But in a case in the state of Maine, it was said that the premises "being wild and uncultivated, the jury were not to expect the same evidence of occupancy which a cultivated farm would present to them; but that facts and conduct on the part of a person exercising acts of ownership, and claiming adversely title and possession, would amount in law to possession of the land and disseisin, if known and acquiesced in by him who has the right; when, if unknown and not acquiesced in by such party, they would not amount to such possession and disseisin, but only to successive trespasses." (Robinson v. Sweet, 3 Greenleaf's R. 315, 319.)

In a case in Pennsylvania, Tilghman, Ch. J., delivering the opinion of the court, observed: "Let us consider, then, the force of the other reason urged by the plaintiff, that, the possession having been delivered to the plaintiff by virtue of a recovery in a court of justice, the act of limitations was thereby avoided, because the continuity of the defendant's possession was broken. If the continuity of possession had been broken before the expiration of twenty-one years, the period required to give effect to an act of limitations, the argument would have been good. An entry within the twenty-one years destroys the efficacy of all prior possession, so that, to gain a title under the act of limitations, a new adverse possession for twenty-one years must be had." (Pedrick v. Searle, 5 Serg. & Rawle's R. 240.) This is the true doctrine. If the adverse possession be broken but for a day, its effect is entirely destroyed, and, so far as that possession is concerned, it is at an end. The possession which will ripen into a title, or bar an entry by the true owner of the land, must be notorious and continued; and, in some cases, the interruptions of simple trespassers, when quite decided and indicative of claim, have been declared to be sufficient to break the continuity and defeat the adverse possession. (Vide Andrews v. Mulford, 1 Hayw. R. 320. Park v. Cochran, Ib. 180. Holdfast v. Shepard, 6 Ired. R. 361. Hood v. Hood, 2 Grant's Cases, 229. Wicklife v. Eusor, 9 B. Mon. R. 253. Taylor v. Burnsides, 1 Gratt. R. 165. Doe v. Eslana, 11 Ala. R. 1028. Cornelius v. Giberson, 1 Dutch. R. 1.)

It has been declared by the courts of North Carolina that, in order to gain title to land by possession under the act of limitations of that state, the party "must take possession with a belief that the land possessed is his own, as under a patent or deed under some patentee; he must take possession with such circumstances as are capable in their nature of notifying to mankind that he is upon the land, claiming it as his own, as in person or by his tenant; this notorious possession must be a continued possession; a secret-taking possession, and not continuing it, as it cannot answer the purpose of notoriety to adverse claimants, cannot extinguish their claim for having not been put in in due time. * * A single act of taking possession, and then leaving the land, will not do. The possession that is capable of ripening into title must be notorious, and continued for seven years without entry, claim or action on the other side." (Den v. Mulford,

*

1 Hayw. R. 320, 321. And vide Den v. Cochran, Ib. 180. Den v. Smith, Ib. 249. Borrets v. Turner, 2 ib. 114. Den v. Leggat, 3 Murph. R. 539.) And, again, Taylor, Ch. J., delivering the opinion of the court in another case in North Carolina, said: "But a possession for this period can only meet the spirit and design of the law when it is unknown and uninterrupted; for, as it is founded on the supposition that the possessor really believes he has title, this idea is weakened rather than confirmed by his occasionally withdrawing from the possession and leaving the land without cultivation, without occupancy, and without a tenant." (Den v. Ridley, 2 N. C. Law Rep. 400. And vide Denham v. Holeman, 26 Ga. R. 191. Morrison v. Kelly, 22 Ill. R. 623. Nixon v. Porter, 38 Miss. R. 415.)

But the authorities all agree that, to make an adverse possession effective, there must be a continuity of the possession for the whole period prescribed by the statute of limitations; so that the question recurs as to what is a continuity of possession in the eye of the law. This may depend upon the fact, to some extent, whether the adverse possession claimed be actual or constructive. If the possession is under claim of title, simply, without a conveyance, or other written instrument, then the adverse possession must not only continue, but it must continue the same in point of locality during the prescribed period of time sufficient to count it a bar; that is to say, a roving possession from one part of a tract of land to another cannot bar the right of entry of the owner upon any part of the land which had not been held adversely for the statutory time, although the different periods of possession of the separate parcels should amount in the whole to that number of years. If the possession is under color of title then an actual possession and occupation of a part of the parcel claimed, and a constructive possession of the residue, must continue uninterruptedly for the whole period prescribed. But, as before stated, it is not necessary that the possession be held during the whole period by the same person and under the same right; but where the possession is held by different persons, as a general rule, a privity must have existed between them. (Wheeler v. Moody, 9 Texas R. 397. Schrack v. Zubler, 34 Penn. R. 38. Doswell v. De La Lanza, 20 How. U. S. R. 32.)

Judge Washington, once charging a jury in the circuit court of the United States for the third circuit, said: "The court is per

fectly clear, that, where different persons enter upon land in succession, each retaining the possession for a period short of twenty-one years, the last possessor, who may be the defendant, cannot tack the possession of his predecessors to his own, so as to make out one entire continuing possession of twenty-one years, to bar the entry of the owner. The possession of A., the first occupant, cannot be the possession of B., the next occupant, because, the moment A. quits the actual possession, the legal possession of the real owner is restored, and the entry of B. constitutes him a new disseisor, and if he seeks to bar the entry of the owner, he must show an actual adverse possession continuing in himself for twenty-one years. There is in truth no privity between A. and B." (Lessee of Potts v. Gilbert, 1 Hall's Jour. of Jurisprudence, 252, 256.) But so far as the proposition is general, that the adverse possession of one party cannot pass to another in such a way as that the aggregate possessions of the two can be made available to the last possessor under the statute of limitations, the same is a mistake. Adverse possession to bar an entry must be confined to the particular parcel occupied, and it must appear that the continuity of possession during the whole period is applicable to such parcel; but the chain of possession may continue unbroken by a succession of tenants; and where this appears, the adverse possession may be just as effectual as though the premises were held during the whole period by the same person. All that is requisite in order to make an adverse possession effectual for the statutory period by successive persons is, that such possession be continued by an unbroken chain of privity between the adverse possessors. Where one entered, and then another claimed adversely to him, and took possession under such claim by consent of the first possessor, pursuant to a compromise between them, it was held, that this was not a continuity of the first possession within the rule, which requires privity between the successive possessors. (Jackson v. Leonard, 9 Cow. R. 653.)

There must be privity and continuity of possession, under claim of title, during the whole statutory period, in order to make an adverse possession effective to bar an entry, or to ripen the possession into title to the premises enjoyed. (Brandt v. Ogden, 1 Johns. R. 159. Doe v. Campbell, 10 ib. 477.) And it is held that privity of contract, blood or estate must exist between the consecutive possessors of land to establish a continuity of a construct

ive adverse possession. A deed from one possessor to another, void on its face, will not preserve the continuity of such possession. And it may be affirmed as a general rule that, when an adverse possession in several persons successively is necessary to complete the term of limitation, an unbroken transinission of the possession must be shown, from one to the other, during a sufficient number of years to satisfy the statute of limitations. There must be an adverse possession by the party, or by those under whom he holds, or both, for the term of limitation. And it cannot be said that one holds an adverse possession under another, in any case, without privity either of contract, blood or estate. (Simpson v. Downing, 23 Wend. R. 316.) As has been observed in another place, every adverse possession is a wrong amounting to an inchoate right. In the latter sense, it is transferable by sale or gift; but when constructive, there is no corporeal seisin which can be transferred by livery. It is in the nature of an incorporeal right. It must be predicated upon a color of title to begin with, and then the claim of each successor of the party in possession must be identified by such conveyances from one to another as, supposing a good title to exist, would transfer that title. As between the parties who stand along the line of succession, the title is looked upon as rightful, but the original title of the first adverse possessor must pass to the party in possession at the termination of the statutory period, so as that there shall be a continuity of the estate, in order that the adverse possession be effectual and availing. It has been held by the supreme court of the United States, that a purchaser without notice has a right to join his adversary's possession to the ostensible possession of his vendor, so as to give him the benefit of the statute of limitations. (Alexander v. Pendleton, 8 Cranch's R. 462.) And the same court held that an adverse possession, under a survey, previous to the patent, may be connected with the possession after the patent, so as to come within the statute of limitations of Kentucky. (Walden v. Heirs of Gratz, 1 Wheat. R. 292.) And in a case in the state courts of Kentucky, where it appeared that the party who first took the possession of the land in controversy surrendered the possession, before the statute had fully run, to the defendants or those under whom they claimed, in pursuance of a decree of court, and the aggregate of the possessions made up the statutory limit, the court held that the adverse possession was effective to bar a recovery by