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the owner of the true title, declaring that, “in the reason and nature of the thing,” it could make no difference whether the pas session be held uniformly under one title, or at different times under different titles, provided the claim of title “be always adverse to that of the plaintiff, or whether the possession be held by the same or a succession of individuals, provided the possession be a continued and uninterrupted one." (Shannon v. Kenney, 1 Marsh. R. 4. And vide Hood v. Walton, 2 ib. 620. Pleake v. Chambers, 7 B. Mon. R. 565.) But this, upon the face of it, would seem to be contrary to the general rule, and the same court beld, at a later date, that when an adverse possession is held by different persons a privity must have existed between them. (Winn v. Wilbite, 5 Marsh. R. N. S. 524.) And in a case herein before cited from the New York reports, the court said: “But the decisive objection to this defense is, that no regular deduction of title or privity and continnity of possession was shown, and dedaced down from Smith to Elliot, or to any of the other defendants. Adverse possession must be marked by definite boundaries, and be regularly continued down to render it availing." (Brandt v. Ogden, 1 Johns. R. 156.)

In a late case before the supreme court of errors of the state of Connecticut, it was held that, to make an adverse possessory title by the possession of successive occupants, the possession must be connected and continuous, but that such connection and continuity may be effected by any conveyance, agreement or understanding that has for its object a transfer of the possession and is accompanied by a transfer in fact. And evidence, therefore, that an agreement for the sale of certain premises by an adverse pos. sessor to one who succeeded him in the possession embraced the land in question, but that it was omitted by mistake in the drafting of the deed, was held admissible for the purpose of showing the relation of the possession taken to that relinquished. Butler, J., said: “Doubtless the possessions must be connected and continuous, so that the possession of the true owner shall not constructively intervene between them; but such continuity and connection may be effected by any conveyance, agreement or understanding which has for its object a transfer of the rights of the possessor, or of his possession, and is accompanied by a transfer of possession in fact.” (Smith v. Chapin, 31 Conn. R. 530. And vide Fanning v. Will cox, 3 Day's R. 258.)

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The general rules of law respecting successive disseisins are well settled. To make a disseisin effectual to give title under it to a second disseisor, it must appear that the latter holds the estate under the first disseisor, so that the disseisin of one may be connected with that of the other. Separate successive disseisins do not aid one another when several persons successively enter on land as disseisors without any conveyance from one to another, or any privity of estate between them, other than that derived from the mere possession of the estate; their several consecutive possessions cannot be tacked so as to make a continuity of disseisin of sufficient length of time to bar the true owner of his right of entry. To sustain separate successive disseisins as constituting a continuous possession, and conferring a title upon the last disseisor, there must have been a privity of estate between the successive disseisors. To create such privity, there must have existed, as between the different disseisors, in regard to the estate of which a title by disseisin is claimed, some such relation as that of ancestor and heir, grantor and grantee, or devisor and devisee. In such cases the title acquired by disseisin passes by descent, deed or devise. But, if there is no such privity upon the determination of the possession of each disseisor, the seisin of the true owner revives and is revested, and a new distinct disseisin is made by each successive disseisor. This is the doctrine as gathered from the authorities by Bigelow, J., in a case before the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, wherein it was decided that a wife has no such privity of estate with her husband in land of which he died in an adverse possession to the real owner, that her continued adverse possession after his decease can be tacked to his, to give a complete title by disseisin. It was declared that the husband occupied the land during his life, not by right of his wife, but by virtue of his own act of disseisin. His wife could commit no act of disseisin till her coverture ceased by his death. Upon his death, the seisin was in his heir at law, or the seisin of the true owner revived, and the subsequent disseisin by the wife was her own separate act, unconnected with the previous disseisin of her husband. It was urged by counsel that the right of the wife to dower in land of which her husband died seised would create sufficient privity of estate between them in regard to the land in question, to enable her to connect his possession of it with her own. But the answer to this suggestion was stated to be, that the right of dower confers no

title to any part of the husband's land after his death until assignment of dower is made. Until then the wife has no seisin or right of entry in any part of her husband's land, and the heir can well maintain his writ of entry against her, to which her claim of dower would constitute no defense, citing Park on Dower, 334, and Hildreth v. Thompson, 16 Mass. R. 191. It is a mere right, which does not ripen into a title until some specific portion is set out and assigned as dower. If, therefore, such assignment would create a privity of estate, it was thought to be very clear that none such exists before assignment made, and hence, as to the parcel of land in dispute, there was no privity between the wife and the husband, and she could not connect her own disseisin with that of her husband. (Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. R. 241. And vide Ward v. Bartholomew, 6 Pick. R. 409. Allen v. Holton, 20 ib. 458, 465. Melvin v. Proprietors of Locks and Canals, 5 Metc. R. 15, 32. Wade v. Lindsey, 6 ib. 407.) It was subsequently held, however, by the same distinguished court, that the husband might avail himself of his wife's adverse possession in defense to a writ of entry brought against him by one to whom, within the statutory limit, he had released the property. (Stone v. Johnson, 4 Allen's R. 425. And vide Holton v. Whitney, 30 Vt. B. 405. Smith v. Garza, 15 Tex. R. 150.)

It has been held in the state of Texas, both in the state courts and in the courts of the United States, that, when several persons enter on land in succession, in order to make their possessions availing under the statute of limitations, the successive tenants must hold regularly through their predecessors; and if they hold independently, the continuity is broken. (Johnson v. Nash, 15 Texas R. 419. Christy v. Alford, 17 How. U. S. R. 601. Doswell v. De La Lanza, 20 ib. 29.) And the same doctrine is expressly recognized in the states of Mississippi, Tennessee and Vermont. (Holton v. Whitney, 30 Vt. R. 405. Clark v. Chase, 5 Sneed's R. 636. Murkins v. Blumenthal, 27 Miss. R. 198. Shaw v. Nicholay, 30 ib. 99.) While in the state of South Carolina it has been held that a defendant cannot unite his possession with that of a previous occupant, from whom he purchased, for the purpose of completing the requisite statutory term, on the ground that any transmission or mutation of land breaks the continuity of the possession; although it was decided that the possession of a tenant would be regarded as the possession of his landlord, within the spirit of the

statute of limitations. (Vide King v. Smith, 1 Rice's R. 10. Mazyck v. Wight, 3 Brevård's R. 151.

Williams v. McAliby, Cheeves' R. 200.)

In some cases it has been held that a purchaser of land sold on execution may tack his possession to that of the defendant in the execution, and thus make out an adverse possessory title under the statute of limitations; and this would seem to be in harmony with the general doctrine. (Schutz v. Fitzwater, 5 Barr’s R. 126.). And in Tennessee it has been held that the possession of an administrator may be tacked to that of his intestate, in order to perfect his title by adverse possession (Moffit v. McDonald, 11 Humph. R. 457); although a contrary doctrine has been held in the state of Maine. (Bullen v. Arnold, 31 Maine R. 583.)

In the states of Connecticut, Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Tennessee, there are decisions to the effect that the adverse possions of different occupants, though not proved to be connected, if such possessions added together make up the entire term of limitation, will bar an entry in an action by the person having the true title. (Fanning v. Wilcox, 3 Day's R. 269. McCery v. Dickenson College, 5 Serg. & Rawle's R. 254. And vide Overfield v. Christie, 7 ib. 177. Candler v. Lunsford, 4 Dev. & Batt. R. 409. Scales v. Cockrill, 3 Head's R. 435.) Mr. Washburn lays down the rule, which is in accordance with the general tenor of the authorities, that, “in the case of successive holders of land, after a disseisin committed by the first of them, the seisin thereby acquired by him will not inure to the benefit of the others who come into possession after him, nnless there is a privity of estate between them and him by purchase or descent. (3 Washb. on Real Prop. 130.)




Some cases in which it was declared that the possession of the land could not be adverse, by reason of the recognition of the true title by the party holding the possession, have already been referred to, but the subject must be more distinctly considered. It is not always an easy matter to determine the exact nature of the claim under which the possession of land is taken, which may be considered such a recognition of the title of the real owner, as will preclude the occupant from setting up his possession 23 adverse; and the question should, therefore, be carefully examined, and the doctrine of the authorities upon the subject properly understood. It has been heretofore shown, at considerable length, that a possession, in order to be adverse, must be hostile in its inception; and much that is there said has more or less application to the point under discussion here; but it nevertheless remains to consider, very briefly, the cases in which the true title cannot be controverted by the party in possession, because of his recognition of that title at the time of his entry.

In the first place, it is perfectly well settled that a tenant can never set up his possession as adverse to his landlord, so long as the relation of landlord and tenant continues to exist. This proposition is too well understood to require argument or citation of authorities, and, where the relation of landlord and tenant exists, a conveyance by the tenant of the demised premises cannot operate as the basis of an adverse possession so as to bar the landlord of his ejectment, whether the grantee know of the demise or not. The law seems to be well settled that, where the relation of landlord and tenant is established, it attaches to all who may sacceed to the possession, through or under the tenant, either imme diately or remotely. This doctrine is supported in numerous

And where a tenancy exists, a purchaser who enters under an absolute conveyance in fee, from the tenant, is considered as entering as the tenant of the lessor ; although he may not hare known that his grantor held or derived his possession from the lessor. (Jackson v. Davis, 5 Cow. R. 123, 129.) It has been beld, however, that this rule means the conventional relation of landlord and tenant, where some rent or return is in fact reserved to the former; and not a relation arising from mere operation of law, as when one makes a grant; and by the omission of the technical word “ heirs," an estate for life only passes. (Jackson v. Harsen, 7 Cow. R. 323.) Where a tenancy from year to year is shown to have subsisted, and to be terminated by notice to quit, the possession, however long, accompanied with a claim of ownership as being entitled



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