by the statute, unless there is a saving clause in their favor. And where the statute does not in terms embrace a particular case, the court will not extend its provisions to meet it, however clearly the reason of the statute may comprehend it. That is to say, every case must be brought within the letter or the spirit of the statute of limitations, or it is not affected by it. (Vide Bodell v. Janney, 4 Gilm. R. 193. Grimes v. Robbins, 11 Ala. R. 356. Beardsley v. Southmayd, 3 Green's N. J. R. 171. Taberrer v. Brintnall, 3 Harr. R. 262.)

Generally, where the action is commenced, or entry made, before the statute of limitations has fully run, and for any cause, other than upon the merits, the plaintiff in the action becomes nonsuit, or a judgment in his favor is reversed, the statute provides that a new action may be commenced, unaffected by the running of the statute during the pendency of the former action; but this rule never prevails, except in pursuance of express enactment; and the provisions of the statute in this respect are given in previous chapters in which the statute of limitations is considered, and may be found by reference to those chapters. So, also, as a general rule, the statute of limitations does not run against persons laboring under certain specified disabilities; but this matter is likewise regulated by express enactment, and the provisions of the statute upon this subject, also, are given in the chapters relating to the statute of limitations in the several states, and can be ascertained by consulting those chapters. Some general observations, however, may be made in respect to disabilities in connection with the statute of limitations relating to real property, in this place; at the same time impressing upon the student, and the practitioner, the necessity of examining the previous chapters where the subject is treated more at length.

According to the construction which is generally given to statutes of limitation in respect to exceptions on account of disabilities, a party can only avail himself of the disabilities existing when the right of action first accrued; and, if several disabilities exist together at the time the right of action accrues, the statute does not begin to run until the party has survived them all. And again, where the statute bar once begins to run against a party, no subsequent disability will suspend or stop it; that is to say, when the statute has begun to run, successive or cumulative disabilities are of no effect. This doctrine is in harmony with the policy of

the statute of limitations, and is within the reason and spirit of the decisions of the courts. It is well settled that, if an adverse possession commence in the life-time of the ancestor, it will continue to run against the heir, notwithstanding any existing disability on the part of the latter, when the right accrues to him or her. (Fleming v. Griswold, 3 Hill's R. 85. Jackson v. Schoonmaker, 4 Johns. R. 401, 402. Becker v. Van Valkenburgh, 29 Barb. R. 319.) Indeed, it has been repeatedly held that, when the statute begins to run, no subsequent disability, except in those cases provided for in the statute itself, will prevent or delay its duration, even when the courts are shut, and there is no forum in which to .commence an action. (Vide Bucklin v. Ford, 5 Barb. R. 393, 396.) And in fact it seems doubtful whether an injunction will prevent the running of the statute, after it has commenced. At least there seems to be no cases holding that an injunction out of chancery would suspend the running of the statute; while the contrary doctrine is strongly implied in many cases. The party to a suit in chancery has often applied to that court to restrain the defendant from setting up the statute in an action at law. If the pendency of the injunction would be a good answer to a plea of the statute of limitations, such an application would not have been necessary. (Vide Anonymous, 1 Vern. R. 74. Gilbert v. Emer son, 2 ib. 503. Anonymous, 2 Atkyn's R. 1. Barker v. Millard, 16 Wend. R. 572.)

But Mr. Angell says that, "according to the opinion of a learned English writer, if the right first accrue to a person who is at the time under a disability, the statute will not begin to run against him till he shall be free from disability; and successive disabilities, without any intermission, will continue to him a protection against being barred by nonclaim. That is, if the successive disabilities are in the same person on whom the right first descended, he may enter within the time given by the statute after the removal of the last disability." (Angell on Lim. 479, referring to Preston on Abst. of Tit. 340.) This construction of the statute, however, is not generally adopted, but the contrary doctrine is usually held by the courts both of this country and of England. In an early case before the English court of king's bench, the disseisin happened when the right owner was an infant, and he died in infancy, leaving his infant sister his heir; and the court held that she was bound, notwithstanding her infancy, to

bring her ejectment within ten years after the death of her brother, as more than twenty years had, in the whole, elapsed since the death of the person last seised. Lord Ellenborough, Ch. J., intimated that the time allowed by the statute for making an entry might be indefinitely extended if any other construction were to be admitted, and said: "There is no calculating how far it might be carried by parents and children dying under age, or continuing under other disabilities in succession." (Doe v. Jesson, 6 East's R. 80.) And, in another celebrated case in which it is said that the discussion was aided by illustrations drawn from reason, convenience, policy, precedents, and the principles of the common law-in short, it was adorned by all the learning and eloquence" of Westminster Hall-the same rule was declared. The argument and decision of the case established the doctrine that the circumstance of the demandant being an infant when his ancestor died was of no avail, because the exception in the statute gave the excuse of infancy to those only to whom a right first accrued, or who had a right at the time of the fine levied, and therefore the plea of infancy did not apply to the case; that no new right accrued after the fine was levied, as the demandant's title was as heir to his ancestor, in whom the right attached when the fine was levied; that public tranquillity was more to be favored than the nonage of an infant, and that, if infancy closing on infancy was to be allowed in succession, "the matter might possibly be delayed many hundred years;" that, if a disability terminates, and a party, within one month thereafter, becomes disabled by a new disability, as imprisonment, unsound mind, or in other degree, and so continues all the five years, or, if at the end of the first month of the five years he dies, leaving an infant heir, the statute continues to run notwithstanding the subsequent disability. (Stowel v. Zouch, Plowden's R. 353.) And the great principle of this case in Plowden, that the disability within the proviso must exist when the right of entry accrues, and that a subsequent disability is of no account, has been recognized and confirmed in several other English cases, and seems to be firmly established in the English courts. (Vide Doe v. Jones, 4 Term R. 300. Doe v. Shane, Ib. 306, note. Dupliex v. De Roven, 2 Vern. R. 540.)

The principles of these cases have often been recognized by the American courts. In an early case before the late court of chancery of the state of New York, Chancellor Kent observed: "If

disability could be added to disability, claims might be protracted to an indefinite extent of time, and to the great injury and oppres sion of the country, according to an expression of Lord Eldon: 'A right might travel through sinuosities for two centuries.' It would be impolitic, as well as contrary to established rule, to depart from the plain meaning and literal expression of the proviso in the statute of limitations." And one of the head notes of the case is to the effect that the disability that entitles the party to the benefit of the proviso in the statute of limitations must be existing at the time the right first accrues; so that, if during the ten years allowed to an infant a subsequent disability, as coverture, arises, the time continues to run notwithstanding such second disability. Successive or cumulative disabilities are not within the policy or settled and sound construction of the statute. (Demarest v. Wyncoop, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 129. And vide Willson v. Betts, 4 Denio's R. 201. Smith v. Burtis, 3 Johns. R. 129.)

An early case in the supreme court of Massachusetts is another and very weighty decision on the same point. The plaintiff was an infant, and before the termination of her infancy the disability of coverture occurred, but the court held that the latter disability, not existing when the right first accrued, was not within the proviso, and that the party was bound to have brought her writ within the given time after the first disability had ceased. (Eager v. The Commonwealth, 4 Mass. R. 182. And vide Allis v. Moore, 2 Allen's R. 306.) And similar decisions have been pronounced by the supreme court of Connecticut. (Vide Bush v. Bradley, 4 Day's R. 298. Sanford v. Button, Ib. 310. Bunce v. Wolcott, 2 Conn. R. 27. Griswold v. Butler, 3 ib. 227.) Although it seems that a different doctrine is held in the states of North Carolina and Tennessee. (Wilson v. Kilcannon, 4 Hayw. [Tenn.] R. 182. Davis v. Cooke, 3 Hawkes' R. 608.)

A distinction, says Mr. Angell, was once attempted between voluntary and involuntary disabilities in this respect, and it was maintained that an involuntary disability, as insanity, occurring after the statute had begun to run, would suspend its progress. But Lord Kenyon, Ch. J., said he never heard it before doubted whether, when any of the statutes began to run, a subsequent disability would stop their running. If the disability, he said, would have such an operation on the construction of one of those statutes, it would also on the others. And he was very clearly of opinion,

on the words of the statute of fines, on the uniform construction of all the statutes of limitation down to that time, and on the generally received opinion of the profession upon the subject, that this question ought not to be disturbed. It would be mischievous, he thought, to refine and make nice distinctions between the cases of voluntary and involuntary disabilities; but, in both cases, when the disability is once removed, the time begins to run. (Angell on Lim. 478. And vide Frewell v. Collins, 3 Brev. R. 286.)

11.

When lands are held adversely against tenants in common, one of whom is within the saving clause of the statute, on account of disability, the decisions are not unanimous, as to whether the rights of the others are thereby saved; but the better opinion is, that they are not. (Jackson v. Bradt, 2 Caines' R. 169. Carpenter v. Schermerhorn, 2 Barb. Ch. R. 314. Marsteller v. McClean, 7 Cranch's R. 156. Lewis v. Barksdale, 2 Brock. R. 192. Riggs v. Dooley, 7 B. Mon. R. 236. Dickey v. Armstrong, 1 Marsh. R. 39. Turner v. Schell, 2 ib. 384. Simpson v. Shannon, 3 ib. 362. Moore v. Armstrong, 10 Ohio R. Bronson v. Adams, Ib. 135. Wade v. Johnson, 5 Humph. R. 117. Johnson v. Harris, 3 Hayw. [Tenn.] R. 113. Woodward v. Clarke, 4 Strob. Eq. R. 167. Wells v. Rayland, 1 Swan's R. 501. Jordan v. Thornton, 7 Ga. R. 517. Pendergrast v. Gullatt, 10 ib. 218. Doolittle v. Blakeslee, 4 Day's R. 265. Sanford v. Button, Ib. 310. Riden v. Frien, 2 Murph. R. 577.) But in two cases, at least, in Ohio, a different doctrine has been held. (Mure v. Keefe, 10 Ohio R. 362. Lockwood v. Wildman, 13 ib. 430.) And in the state of South Carolina, the general doctrine is modified to the extent, that, when the disability of one of the joint owners of land is infancy, the disability will protect the others who are of full age. But Nott, J., said: "The correctness of the rule may be questionable; but this court does not feel at liberty to innovate on a rule of law which has so long been regarded as settled, and has been acted upon for a great + length of time. I do not know that our courts have permitted the rights of co-tenants to be saved by any other disability than that of infancy. The question in relation to other cases is still open for consideration." (Lahiffe v. Smart, 1 Bailey's R. 192. And vide Thompson v. Gaillard, 3 Rich. R. 418.) And the rule in South Carolina seems also to be recognized in Kentucky. (Harlan v. Seaton, 18 B. Mon. R. 312.) But the question as to when parties are to be deemed within the saving clause of the statute of limita