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(ἀποῤῥίψωμεν ἑαυτούς) into the greatness of Christ, in whom the glory of God was manifested, in order to obtain to some extent (aμnyéπn) the knowledge of God (ie. in a practical and religious manner, not by speculation); for even then we learn only what God is not, not what He is (that is to say, if we speak of absolute knowledge). Comp. also the 12th and 13th chapters of the 5th book, from p. 692; in particular, p. 695, and c. i. p. 647: Δῆλον γὰρ μηδένα δύνασθαι παρὰ τὸν τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον τὸν θεὸν ἐναργῶς καταλαβέσθαι; he therefore gives the advice, ibid. p. 651: Tò dè apa yηteîv περὶ θεοῦ ἂν μὴ εἰς ἔριν, ἀγγὰ εἰς εὕρεσιν τείνῃ, σωτήριόν OT. (Compare on this, Baur, Trinitätslehre, s. 191 ff., who remarks that what is abstract in the idea of God is not declared by any of the older teachers of the Church, Origen himself not excepted, more strongly and definitely than by Clement. But he by no means confined himself to the abstract.) Origen, Contra Cels. vi. 65, Opp. i. p. 681 sq., shows that what is individual cannot be described; for who in words could tell the difference between the sweetness of figs and the sweetness of dates? And De Princip. i. 1, 5, p. 50 (Redepenning, p. 90), he says: Dicimus secundum veritatem, Deum incomprehensibilem esse atque inestimabilem. Si quid enim illud est, quod sentire vel intelligere de Deo potuerimus, multis longe modis eum meliorem esse ab eo quod sensimus necesse est credere. "As the brightness of the sun exceeds the dim light of a lantern, so the glory of God surpasses our idea of it." Likewise Novatian says, De Trinit. c. 2: De hoc ergo ac de eis, quæ sunt ipsius et in eo sunt, nec mens hominis quæ sint, quanta sint et qualia sint, digne concipere potest, nec eloquentia sermonis humani æquabilem majestati ejus virtutem sermonis expromit. Ad cogitandam enim et ad eloquendam illius majestatem et eloquentia omnis merito muta est et mens omnis exigua est: major est enim mente ipsa, nec cogitari possit quantus sit: ne si potuerit cogitari, mente humana minor sit, qua concipi possit. Major est quoque omni sermone, nec edici possit: ne si potuerit edici, humano sermone minor sit, quo quum edicitur, et circumiri et colligi possit. Quidquid enim de illo cogitatum fuerit, minus ipso erit, et quidquid enuntiatum fuerit, minus illo comparatum circum ipsum erit. Sentire enim illum taciti aliqua

tenus possumus; ut autem ipse est, sermone explicare non possumus. Sive enim illum dixeris lucem, creaturam ipsius magis quam ipsum dixeris, etc. . . . Quidquid omnino de illo retuleris, rem aliquam ipsius magis et virtutem quam ipsum explicaveris. Quid enim de eo condigne aut dicas aut sentias, qui omnibus et sermonibus major est? etc. Nevertheless, the Fathers also admit an actual knowledge of God, by faith, which is now mediated by Christ, but will one day be an immediate vision from face to face. Comp. infra, on Eschatology.

§ 38.

Idealism and Anthropomorphism.-Corporeity of God.

The educated mind desires to abstract from the nature of God everything that reminds it of the finite or composite; sometimes it has even taken offence at the idea of the substantiality of God, out of a refined fear of reducing Him to the level of created beings; but thus it runs into danger of dissipating the Deity into a mere abstract negation. In opposition to this idealizing tendency, the necessities of religion demand a real God for the world, for man, and for the human heart; and the bold and figurative language of pious emotion, as well as popular symbolical and anthropomorphite expressions, compensated for what the idea of God lost in the way of negation. Both these tendencies, which have always advanced equal claims in the sphere of religious thought (1), have their respective representatives in the first period of the History of Doctrines. On the one hand, the Alexandrian school, and Origen in particular, endeavoured to remove from God everything that seemed to draw Him within the atmosphere of the earthly, or in any way to make Him like men (2). On the other hand, Tertullian insisted so much on the idea of the substantiality of God, that he confounded it with His corporeity (though he by no means ascribed to Him a gross, material body, like that of man) (3).

(1) On this subject even the ancient philosophers entertained differing opinions. The popular, polytheistic form of religion was founded (as is every religion) on anthropomorphism. Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the Eleatic school, endeavoured to combat anthropomorphism as well as polytheism. Comp. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 14, p. 714 (Sylb. 601 C):

Εἰς θεὸς ἔν τε θειοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρωποῖσι μέγιστος,
Οὔ τι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίϊος οὐδὲ νόημα κ.τ.λ.,

and Strom. vii. 4, p. 841; other passages in Preller, Hist. Phil. Græco-Rom., Hamb. 1838, p. 84 ss. Ritter, i. s. 450. [English translat. by Morrison, i. p. 430.] Schleiermacher, s. 60.—The Epicureans (though it is doubtful whether Epicurus himself seriously meant to teach this doctrine) imagined that the gods possessed a quasi-human form, but without the wants of men, and unconcerned about human sufferings and pleasures. Thus they retained only what is negative in (the ghost of) anthropomorphism, and lost sight of its more profound significance (the human relation of God to man). Comp. Cic. de Natura Deorum, i. 8-12. Reinhold, i. s. 404, note. Ritter, iii. 490. [Engl. transl. iii. 442.]—Different views were adopted by the Stoics, who represented God as the vital force and reason which govern the universe; but though they avoided anthropomorphitic notions, they regarded Him as clothed in an ethereal robe. Cic. de Natura Deorum, ii. 24. Ritter, iii. s. 576. [English translation, iii. p. 520 ff.]

(2) Clement opposes anthropomorphism in different places: "Most men talk and judge of God from their own limited point of view, and measure Him by themselves, as if cockles and oysters were to reason out of their narrow shells, and the hedgehog out of his rolled up self." Strom. v. 11, p. 687; comp. vii. 5, p. 845; c. 7, p. 852, 53: Ολος ἀκοὴ καὶ ὅλος ὀφθαλμὸς, ἵνα τις τούτοις χρήσηται τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὁ θεός. Καθ ̓ ὅλου τοίνυν οὐδεμίαν σώζει θεοσέβειαν, οὔτε ἐν ὕμνοις οὔτε ἐν λόγοις, ἀλλ ̓ οὐδὲ ἐν γραφαῖς ἢ δόγμασιν ἡ μὴ πρέπουσα περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπόληψις, ἀλλ ̓ εἰς ταπεινὰς καὶ ἀσχήμονας ἐκτρεπομένη ἐννοίας τε καὶ ὑπονοίας· ὅθεν ἡ τῶν πολλῶν εὐφημία δυσφημίας οὐδὲν διαφέρει διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ἄγνοιαν κ.τ.λ. åλnocías ǎyvolav K.т.λ. (on prayer). Origen begins his work,

HAGENB. HIST. DOCT. I.

K

They

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Teρì áрxwv, inmediately after the Procem. with objections to anthropomorphite or material ideas of God: "I know that many appeal even to Scripture to prove that God is a corporeal being; because they read in Moses that He is a consuming fire, and in John, that He is a Spirit (Tveûμa). cannot think of fire and spirit but as something corporeal. should like to ask them what they say of the passage in 1 John i. 5: "God is light"? He is a light to enlighten those who seek the truth (Ps. xxxvi. 9); for "the light of God" is nothing other than divine power, by means of which he who is enlightened perceives truth in all things, and apprehends God Himself as the truth. In this sense it is also said: "In Thy light we shall see light," i.e. in the Word, in the Wisdom, which is Thy Son, we see Thee, the Father. Is it necessary to suppose that God resembles the sunlight, because He is called Light? Can any sensible meaning be attached to the idea, that knowledge and wisdom have their source in "the corporeal light"? (Schnitzer's translation, s. 13, 14 ff.) But the spiritualizing tendency of Origen led him frequently so to explain even the more profound sayings of Scripture, as to leave only an abstract idea; this appears in what follows the above extract, where, in order to exclude all conceptions of a divisibility of the Spirit (of God), he compares a participation in the Holy Spirit to "a participation in the medicinal art," although further on he grants that the comparison is inadequate. Here manifestly "the understanding prevails altogether too much over the imagination" (comp. the judgment of Mosheim, cited § 26, note 11). Novatian also expresses himself in very strong and decided terms against anthropomorphism, De Trin. c. 6: Non intra hæc nostri corporis lineamenta modum aut figuram divinæ majestatis includimus. . . . Ipse totus oculus, quia totus videt, totus auris, quia totus audit, etc.-Even the definition, that God is a Spirit, has, according to him, only a relative validity: Illud quod dicit Dominus (John iv.) spiritum Deum, puto ego sic locutum Christum de patre, ut adhuc aliquid plus intelligi velit quam spiritum Deum. He thinks that this is only figurative language, as it is said elsewhere, God is light, etc., omnis enim spiritus creatura est.

(3) The first Christian writer who is said to have ascribed

a body to the Deity is Melito of Sardis, in his treatise πepì évσwμáтov leoû, which is no longer extant; comp. Orig. Comment. in Genes. (Opp. t. ii. p. 25); Euseb. iv. 26, and Heinichen on the passage; Gennadius, De Dogm. Eccles. c. 4; and Piper, über Melito, in the Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 1838, i. s. 71 ff, where a similar view is cited from the Clementine Homilies. [Cureton, in his Spicilegium Syriacum, Lond. 1855, published an apology under the name of Melito, which is free from anthropomorphism; but it is the work of a later author.] It is more certain that Tertullian ascribed to God (as also to the soul) a body, which he did not, however, represent as a human body, but as the necessary form of all existence (comp. Schleiermacher, Geschichte der Philosophie, s. 165, and Schwegler's Montanism. s. 171, note), De Carne Christi, c. 11: Ne esse quidem potest, nisi habens per quod sit. Cum autem (anima) sit, habeat necesse est aliquid per quod sit. Si habet aliquid per quod est, hoc erit corpus ejus. Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis. Nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est. Advers. Praxeam, c. 7: Quis enim negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie. Sed et invisibilia illa quæcunque sunt, habent apud Deum et suum corpus et suam formam, per quæ soli Deo visibilia sunt; quanto magis quod ex ipsius substantia missum est, sine substantia non erit! Comp. Neander, Antignost. s. 451, and Dogmengesch. s. 109. But Tertullian himself draws a definite distinction, which excludes all grosser forms of anthropomorphism, between the divine and the human corpus, Advers. Marc. ii. 16: Discerne substantias et suos eis distribue sensus, tam diversos, quam substantiæ exigunt, licet vocabulis communicare videantur. Nam et dexteram et oculos et pedes Dei legimus, nec ideo tamen humanis comparabuntur, quia de appellatione sociantur. Quanta erit diversitas divini corporis et humani, sub eisdem nominibus membrorum, tanta erit et animi divini et humani differentia, sub eisdem licet vocabulis sensuum, quos tam corruptorios efficit in homine corruptibilitas substantiæ humanæ, quam incorruptorios in Deo efficit incorruptibilitas substantiæ divinæ.1 On the anthropomorphism of

1 Münscher, von Cölln, i. s. 134, wrongly adduces this passage to show that Tertullian is justly chargeable with real anthropomorphism. It proves rather

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