opposition to traducianism and creationism, in relation to original sin, etc. Thus it can be explained why Tatian, on religious grounds, opposes the common definition, according to which man is a wov Xoyikóv, Contra Græcos, c. 15: Ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ὥσπερ κορακόφωνοι δογματίζουσιν, ζῶον λογικὸν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν· δειχθήσεται γὰρ κατ ̓ αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἄλογα νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικά. Μόνος δὲ ἄνθρωπος εἰκὼν καὶ ὁμοίωσις τοῦ θεοῦ, λέγω δὲ ἄνθρωπον οὐχὶ τὸν ὅμοια τοῖς ζώοις πράττοντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πόῤῥω μὲν ἀνθρωπότητος, πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν θεὸν κεχωρηκότα.

$ 54.

Division of Human Nature and Practical Psychology.

Keil, Opusc. Academ. p. 618-647. Duncker, Apologetarum secundi Sæculi de Essentialibus Naturæ humanæ Partibus Placita. P. I. 11, Gött. 1844-50, 4to. [Olshausen, in Opuscula, 1834. Franz Delitzsch, System der biblischen Psychologie, Leipz. 1855, 2d ed. 1862. J. T. Beck, Umriss d. biblischen Seelenlehre, Stuttg. 1843, 2d ed. 1871, 3d ed. 1877. Both translated into Eng., Edin.]

That man is made up of body and soul, is a fact which we know by experience previous to all speculation, and before we express it in precise scientific terms. But it is more difficult to define the relation between body and soul, and to assign to each its boundaries. Some regarded the vxn as the medium by which the purely spiritual in man, the higher and ideal life of reason, is connected with the purely animal, the grosser and sensuous principle of the natural life. They also suppose that this human triad was supported by the language of Scripture (1). Some of the earlier Fathers (2), those of the Alexandrian school in particular (3), adopted this trichotomistic division, while others, like Tertullian, adhered to the opinion that man consists only of body and soul (4). Some Gnostic sects, e.g. the Valentinians, so perverted the trichotomistic division, as to divide men themselves into three classes, χοϊκοί, ψυχικοί, and πνευματικοί, according as one or the other of the three constituents preponderated, to the

apparent exclusion of the others. Thus they again sundered

the bond of union with which Christ had encircled men as brethren (5).

(1) α, 3, 1; σάρξ, ψυχή, πνεῦμα. Comp. the works on Bibl. Theol., and the commentaries on 1 Thess. v. 23; Heb. iv. 12, etc.; also Ackermann, Studien und Kritiken, 1839, part 4. Olshausen, Beck, and Delitzsch, 1.c. The Platonists also hold this trichotomy.

(2) Justin M. fragm. de Resurr. § 10: Oikos Tо σŵμа ψυχῆς, πνεύματος δὲ ψυχὴ οἶκος. Τὰ τρία ταῦτα τοῖς ἐλπίδα εἰλικρινῆ καὶ πίστιν ἀδιάκριτον ἐν τῷ θεῷ ἔχουσι σωθήσεται. Comp. Dial. cum Tryph. § 4. Tatian (Contra Græc. Or. c. 7, 12, 15) knows two different TVеúμата, the one of which he calls ux, while the other is of divine nature, but in consequence of sin does not belong to all men. Irenæus, v. 9, 1: Tria sunt, ex quibus perfectus homo constat, carne, anima et spiritu, et altero quidem salvante et figurante, qui est spiritus, altero, quod unitur et formatur, quod est caro; id vero quod inter hæc est duo, quod est anima, quæ aliquando quidem subsequens spiritum elevatur ab eo, aliquando autem consentiens carni decidit in terrenas concupiscentias. Comp. v. 6, 1. 298: Anima autem et spiritus pars hominum esse possunt, homo autem nequaquam: perfectus autem homo commixtio et adunitio est animæ assumentis spiritum Patris et admixta ei carni, quæ est plasma secundum imaginem Dei. Accordingly, not every man is by nature made up of three parts, but he only who has received the gift of the Holy Spirit, as the third. Concerning the distinction between Pnoë and Pnuema, comp. § 44, and Duncker, s. 97, 98.

(3) Clement (Strom. vii. 12, p. 880) makes a distinction. between the ψυχή λογική and the ψυχή σωματική; he also mentions a tenfold division of man (analogous to the decalogue), ibid. vi. 16, p. 808: Ἔστι δὲ καὶ δεκάς τις περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτόν· τά τε αἰσθητήρια πέντε καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ σπερματικόν, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ὄγδοον τὸ κατὰ τὴν πλάσιν πνευματικόν, ἔννατον δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ δέκατον τὸ διὰ τῆς πίστεως προσγινόμενον ἁγίου πνεύματος χαρακτηριστικὸν ἰδίωμα κ.τ.λ.; the more general division into body, soul, and spirit forms, however, the basis of this. Clement, HAGENB. HIST. DOCT. I.

after the example of Plato (comp. Justin M. Coh. ad Gr. 6), divides the soul itself into these three faculties: τὸ λογιστικόν (νοερόν), τὸ θυμικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, Pad. iii. 1, ab init. p. 250. The knowing faculty he subdivides into four functions: αἴσθησις, νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, ὑπόληψις, Strom. ii. 4, p. 445. Clement regards body and soul as διάφορα, but not as ἐναντία, so that neither is the soul as such good, nor is the body as such evil. Comp. Strom. iv. 26, p. 639. For the psychology of Origen, see De Princip. iii. 3 (Opp. i. 145, Redep. p. 296306). On the question whether Origen believed in the existence of two souls in man, see Schnitzer, s. 219 ff.; Thomasius, s. 190, 193-195; Redep. ii. s. 369, Anm. 3. In the view of Origen, the yvyn as such, which he derives from úxeola, is intermediate between body and spirit; "a defective, not fully developed power" (Redep. ii. s. 368). He affirms that he has found no passage in the sacred Scriptures in which the soul, as such, is spoken of with honour; while, on the contrary, it is frequently blamed, De Princip. ii. 8, 3-5 (Opp. i. p. 95 ff., Redep. p. 211 ss.). But this does not prevent him from comparing the soul to the Son, when he draws a comparison between the human and the divine triad, ibid. § 5. For the trichotomistic division, comp. also Comment. in Matt. t. xiii. 2 (Opp. iii. p. 570), and other passages in Münscher (Von Cölln), i. s. 319, 320. Origen sometimes employs the simple term "man" to designate man's nobler spiritual part, so that man appears not so much to consist of body and soul, as to be the soul itself, which governs the body as a mere instrument; Contra Cels. vii. 38: "Ανθρωπος, τουτέστι ψυχὴ Xρwμévη σwμATI (comp. Photius, Cod. 234; Epiph. Hær. 64, 17). Consequently he calls the soul homo, homo homo interior, in Num. xxiv.; comp. Thomasius and Redepenning, Lc.

(4) De Anima, c. 10, 11, 20, 21, 22: Definimus animam Dei flatu natam, immortalem, corporalem, effigiatam, substantia simplicem, de suo patientem varie procedentem, [sapientem] liberam arbitrii, accidentiis obnoxiam, per ingenia mutabilem, rationalem, dominatricem, divinatricem, ex una redundantem (c. 22); Adv. Hermog. c. 11, and Neander, Antignostikus, s. 457. Concerning the value which, from his strong realistic position, he attached to the senses (the key to his theological opinions), comp. ibid. s. 452 ff. The soul is to Tertullian

something corporeal, as its form (effigies), analogous to the body, proves it has corporeal outlines (corporales lineas). In support of this view he appeals to the parable of Dives and Lazarus, and to visions. Cf. De Anima, c. 7-10.

(5) Iren. i. 5, 5 (Münscher, Von Cölln, i. s. 316, 317); comp. also Neander, Gnostische Systeme, s. 127 ff. Baur, Gnosis, s. 158 ff., 168 ff., 489 ff., 679 ff.; and Dg. s. 565 ff.

$ 55.

Origin of the Soul.

J. F. Bruch, Die Lehre von der Präexistenz, Strasb. 1859. [Julius Müller, Lehre von der Sünde, 1te Ausg. 1844, 6te 1877. J. Frohschammer, Ueber den Ursprung d. menschlichen Seele, München 1854. Joh. Marcus, Lehrmeinungen über d. Ursprung menschl. Seele, in d. ersten Jahrh. d. Kirche, 1854.]

The inquiry into the origin of the human soul, and the mode of its union with the body, seems to be purely metaphysical, and to have no bearing upon religion (1). But, in a religious point of view, it is always of importance that the soul should be considered as a creature of God. This doctrine was maintained by the Catholic Church in opposition to the Gnostic and heretical theory of emanations (2). Origen's hypothesis of the pre-existence of the soul is allied with Platonic views (3). On the other hand, Tertullian maintained the propagation of the soul per traducem in connection with his realistic and materializing conceptions of its corporeity (Traducianism) (4).

(1) Thus, Origen says, De Princip. procm. 5 (Opp. i. p. 48) De anima vero utrum ex seminis traduce ducatur, ita ut ratio ipsius vel substantia inserta ipsis seminibus corporalibus habeatur, an vero aliud habeat initium, et hoc ipsum initium si genitum est aut non genitum, vel certe si extrinsecus corpori inditur, necne: non satis manifesta prædicatione distinguitur.

(2) Traces of the theory of emanation are found in the

writings of some of the earlier Fathers. Justin M. fragm. de Resurr. 11: 'Η μὲν ψυχή ἐστιν ἄφθαρτος, μέρος οὖσα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐμφύσημα. (Whether this is Justin's own opinion, or a thesis of the Gnostics, which he combats, see Semisch, Just. Mart. s. 364.) Comp. the Clementine Homilies, Hom. xvi. 12. On the other hand, Clement of Alex. adheres to the idea of creation in Coh. p. 78: Μόνος ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸς ὁ ἀριστοτέχνας πατὴρ τοιοῦτον ἄγαλμα ἔμψυχον ἡμᾶς, τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔπλασεν; and Strom. ii. 16, p. 467, 468, where he rejects the phrase μέρος θεοῦ, which some employed, in accordance with the principle: Θεὸς οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς φυσικὴν σχέσιν. Comp. Orig. in Joh. t. xiii. 25 (Opp. t. iv. μ. 235): Σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἀσεβὲς ὁμοούσιον τῇ ἀγεννήτῳ φύσει καὶ παμμακαρίᾳ εἶναι λέγειν τοὺς προσκυνοῦντας ἐν πνεύματι τῷ θεῷ. Comp. De Princip. i. 7, 1.

(3) Clement, Coh. p. 6: Πρὸ δὲ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου καταβολῆς ἡμεῖς οἱ τῷ δεῖν ἔσεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ πρότερον γεγεννημένοι τῷ θεῷ· τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου τὰ λογικὰ πλάσματα ἡμεῖς· δι ̓ ὃν ἀρχαΐζομεν, ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἦν; this perhaps should rather be understood in an ideal sense. [Clement rejects the view that the soul is generated, in Strom. lib. vi. c. 16 : . . . οὐ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σπέρματος καταβολὴν γενώμενον, ὡς συνάγεσθαι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου τὸν δεκατὸν ἀριθμὸν, δι ̓ ὧν ἡ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτελεῖται. So, too, Athenagoras, De mort. Resur. c. 17.] But Origen, following the Pythagoræan and Platonic schools, as well as the later Jewish theology, first spoke of the pre-existence of the soul as something real (comp. Epiph. Hær. 64, 4: Τὴν ψυχὴν γὰρ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν λέγει προϋπάρχειν). He brought his doctrine into connection with that of human liberty and divine justice, by maintaining that the soul comes into the body as a punishment for former sins: comp. De Princip. i. 7, 4 (Opp. i. p. 27, Redep. p. 151; Schnitzer, s. 72).—“ If the soul of man is formed only with the body, how could Jacob supplant his brother in the womb, and John leap in the womb at the salutation of Mary?" Comp. also t. xv. in Matth. c. 34, 35, in Matt. xx. 6, 7 (Opp. t. iii. p. 703), and Comment. in Joh. t. ii. 25 (Opp. iv. p. 85, Redep. ii. 20 f.). [Origen says his view is not directly contained in Scripture : De Princip. i. c. 7 : Nam per conjecturam facilis assertio esse videbitur; scripturarum autem testimoniis