the Father was considered as the only efficient principle (uía ȧpxn) to whom all other things owe their existence, of whom the Son is begotten, and from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds, who works all things through the Son, and in the Holy Spirit. The phrase, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, was maintained especially against the Pneumatomachi. It was asserted, in opposition to them, "that the Holy Spirit does not derive His essence from the Son in a dependent manner, but that He stands in an equally direct relation to the Father, as the common first cause; that, as the Son is begotten of the Father, so the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father," Neander, Kg. ii. s. 897.

(2) Epiphan. Ancor. § 9, after having proved the Godhead of the Spirit (among other passages) from Acts v. 3, says: ἄρα θεὸς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα, without expressly stating that He extTopeveral en toi voi. Comp. Ancor. 8: Πνεῦμα γὰρ θεοῦ καὶ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ πνεῦμα υἱοῦ, οὐ κατά τινα σύνθεσιν, καθάπερ ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, ἀλλ ̓ ἐν μέσῳ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ, ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, τρίτον τῇ ὀνομασία. Marcellus inferred, from the position that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, the sameness of the last two in the Sabellian sense. Eusebius, De Eccles. Theol. iii. 4, p. 168 (quoted by Klose, über Marcell. s. 47). Concerning the views of Photinus, see Klose, 1.c. s. 83.

(3) Theodore of Mopsuestia, in his confession of faith (quoted by Walch, Bibl. Symb. p. 204), combated the opinion which represents the Spirit as διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν ὕπαρξιν εἰληφός. On the opinion of Theodoret, comp. the IX. Anathematisma of Cyril, Opp. v. p. 47.

(4) Cyril condemned all who denied that the Holy Spirit was a proprium of Christ. Theodoret, in reply, observed that this expression was not objectionable, if nothing more were understood by it than that the Holy Spirit is of the same essence (oμooúotos) with the Son, and proceeds from the Father; but that it ought to be rejected if it were meant to imply that He derives His existence from the Son, or through the Son, either of which would be contrary to what is said, John xv. 26; 1 Cor. ii. 12. Comp. Neander, 1.c. s. 900.

(5) Augustine, Tract. 99, in Evang. Joh.: A quo autem

habet filius, ut sit Deus (est enim de Deo Deus), ab illo habet utique, ut etiam de illo procedat Spir, S. Et per hoc Spir. S. ut etiam de filio procedat, sicut procedit de patre, ab ipso habet patre. Ibid.: Spir. S. non de patre procedit in filium, et de filio procedit ad sanctificandam creaturam, sed simul de utroque procedit, quamvis hoc filio Pater dederit, ut quemadmodum de se, ita de illo quoque procedat. De Trin. 4, 20: Nec possumus dicere, quod Spir. S. et a filio non procedat, neque frustra idem Spir. et Patris et Filii Spir. dicitur. 5, 14... Sicut Pater et Filius unus Deus et ad creaturam relative unus Creator et unus Deus, sic relative ad Spiritum S. unum principium. (Comp. the whole section, c. 11 and 15.)

(6) This additional clause made its appearance at the time when Recared, king of the Visigoths, passed over from the Arian to the Catholic doctrine. This synod of Toledo pronounced an anathema against all who did not believe that the Spirit proceeded from both the Father and the Son. Comp. Mansi, ix. p. 981.

$95.

Final Statement of the Doctrine of the Trinity.

The more accurately the Godhead both of the Holy Spirit and of the Son was defined, the more important it became to determine exactly the relation in which the different persons stood to each other, and to the divine essence itself, and then to settle the ecclesiastical terminology. Athanasius, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa, in the Greek, Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine, and Leo the Great in the Latin Church, exerted the greatest influence upon the formation of the said terminology. According to this usage, the word ovoía (essentia, substantia) denotes what is common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; the word vπóσTaσis (persona) what is individual, distinguishing the one from the other (1). Each person possesses some peculiarity (idióτns), by which it is distinguished from the other persons,

notwithstanding the sameness of essence. Thus, underived existence (ȧyevvnola) belongs to the Father, generation (yévvnois) to the Son, and procession (exπóρevois, exteμ↓is) to the Holy' Spirit (2). When Augustine rejected all the distinctions which had been formally made between the different persons, and referred to the triune Godhead what had been before predicated of the separate persons (particularly creation), he completely purified the dogma from the older vestiges of subordinationism (3); but, as he reduced the persons to the general idea of divine relations, he could not entirely avoid the appearance of Sabellianism (4). (Pseudo-)Boëthius and others adopted his views on this point (5).

(1) The writers of this period avoided the use of the term πрóσwπоv, which would have corresponded more exactly with the Latin word persona, while TóσTaσis means literally substantia, lest it might lead to Sabellian inferences; but they sometimes confounded ὑπίστασις with οὐσία, and occasionally used púois instead of the latter. This was done, e.g., by Gregory of Nazianzus, Orat. xxiii. 11, p. 431, xxxiii. 16, p. 614, xiii. 11, p. 431; Ep. 1, ad Cledonium, p. 739, ed. Lips. (quoted by Ullmann, s. 355, Anm. 1, and s. 356, Anm. 1). Gregory also sometimes attaches the same meaning to úróσTaois and to πρóσwоv, though he prefers the use of the former; Orat. xx. 6, p. 379. Ullmann, s. 356, Anm. 3. This distinction is more accurately defined by Basil, Ep. 236, 6 (quoted by Münscher, von Cölln, s. 242, 243): Ovoía Sè kai vπóσTaois ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν, ἣν ἔχει τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ καθ ̓ ἕκαστον· οἷον ὡς ἔχει τὸ ζῶον πρὸς τὸν δεῖνα ἄνθρωπον. Διὰ τοῦτο οὐσίαν μὲν μίαν ἐπὶ τῆς θεότητος ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὥστε τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον μὴ διαφόρως ἀποδιδόναι· ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἰδιάζουσαν, ἵν ̓ ἀσύγχυτος ἡμῖν καὶ τετρανωμένη ἡ περὶ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἔννοια ἐνυπάρχη κ.τ.λ. Comp. Greg. Naz. Orat. xxix. 11, p. 530 (in Ullmann, s. 355, Anm. 3), and Orat. xlii. 16, p. 759 (quoted by Ullmann, s. 356, Anm. 3), where the distinction between ovoia and vπÓσTaσis is prominently brought forward. Jerome, moreover, had objections to the statement that there were three hypostases, because it seemed to lead to Arianism; but he submitted on

this point to the judgment of the Roman See; comp. Ep. xv. and xvi. ad Damasum.

(2) Greg. Naz. Orat. xli. 9 : Πάντα ὅσα ὁ πατὴρ, τοῦ υἱοῦ, πλὴν τῆς ἀγεννησίας· πάντα ὅσα ὁ υἱὸς, τοῦ πνεύματος, πλὴν τῆς γεννήσεως κ.τ.λ. Orat. xxv. 16: Ιδιον δὲ πατρὸς μὲν ἡ ἀγεννησία, υἱοῦ δὲ ἡ γέννησις, πνεύματος δὲ ἡ ἔκπεμψις; but the terms ιδιότης and ὑπόστασις were sometimes used synonymously, e.g. Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxiii. 16, p. 614. Ullmann, s. 357.

(3) Such vestiges are unquestionably to be found even in the most orthodox Fathers, not only in the East, but also in the West. Thus, for instance, in Hilary, De Trin. iii. 12, and iv. 16. He designates the Father as the jubentem Deum, the Son as facientem. And when even Athanasius says that the Son is at once greater than the Holy Spirit and equal to Him (μeilwv xaì loos), and that the Holy Spirit, too, is related to the Son as is the Son to the Father (Cont. Arian. Orat. ii.), "the idea of a subordination lies at the basis of such statements," Gieseler, Dogmengesch. s. 315.

(4) Augustine, Contra Serm. Arian. c. 2, n. 4 (Opp. t. viii.): Unus quippe Deus est ipsa trinitas, et sic unus Deus, quomodo unus creator. He also referred the theophanies, which were formerly ascribed to the Logos alone, to the whole Trinity. In support of this view, he appeals to the three men who appeared to Abraham, De Trin. ii. 18. He also thinks that the sending of the Son is not only a work of the Father, but of the whole Trinity. The Father alone is not sent, because He is unbegotten (comp. the passages quoted by Meier, i. s. 206 ff.). [Nec pater sine filio, nec filius sine patre misit Spirit. S., sed eum pariter ambo miserunt. Inseparabilis quippe sunt opera trinitatis. Solus pater non legitur missus, quia solus non habet auctorem, a quo genitus sit, vel a quo procedat. Contra Serm. Arian. c. 2, n. 4. Opp. tom. viii.] The distinctions between the persons are, in his opinion, not distinctions of nature, but of relation. But he is aware that we have no appropriate language to denote those distinctions, De Trinit. v. 10: Quum quæritur, quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personæ, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur. The persons are not to be regarded as species, for we

do not say, tres equi are unum animal, but tria animalia. Better would be the comparison with three statues from one mass of gold; but this too halts, since we do not necessarily connect the conception of gold with that of statues, and the converse; l.c. vii. 11. He brings his views concerning the Trinity into connection with anthropology; but by comparing the three persons with the memoria, intellectus, and voluntas (caritas) of man (1.c. ix. 11, x. 10, 18, xv. 7), he evidently borders upon Sabellianism; it has the appearance of mere relations, without personal shape. [Conf. 13, cap. 11: Vellem ut hæc tria cogitarent homines in seipsis. Longe alia sunt ista tria quam illa Trinitas: sed dico ubi se exerceant et ibi probent, et sentiunt quam longe sunt. Dico autem hæc tria; esse, nosse, velle. Sum enim, et novi, et volo; sum sciens et volens; et scio esse me, et velle; et volo esse, et scire. In his igitur tribus quam sit inseparabilis vita, et una vita, et una mens, et una essentia, quam denique inseparabilis distinctio, et tamen distinctio, videat qui potest.] On the other hand, the practical and religious importance of the doctrine of the Trinity appears most worthily where he reminds us that it is of the very nature of disinterested (unenvious) love to impart itself, De Trin. ix. 2: Cum aliquid amo, tria sunt; ego, et quod amo, et ipse amor. Non enim amo amorem, nisi amantem amem: nam non est amor, ubi nihil amatur. Tria ergo sunt: amans, et quod amatur, et (mutuus) amor. Quid si non amem nisi meipsum, nonne duo erunt, quod amo et amor? Amans enim et quod amatur, hoc idem est, quando se ipse amat. Sicut amare et amari eodem modo id ipsum est, cum se quisque amat. Eadem quippe res bis dicitur, cum dicitur: amat se et amatur a se. Tunc enim non est aliud atque aliud amare et amari, sicut non est alius atque alius amans et amatus. At vero amor et quod amatur etiam sic duo sunt. Non enim cum quisque se amat, amor est, nisi cum amatur ipse amor. Aliud est autem amare se, aliud est amare amorem suum. Non enim amatur amor, nisi jam aliquid amans, quia ubi nihil amatur, nullus est amor. Duo ergo sunt, cum se quisque amat, amor et quod amatur. Tunc enim amans et quod amatur unum est. . . . Amans quippe ad amorem refertur et amor ad amantem. Amans enim aliquo amore amat, et amor alicujus