24. Et in hac Trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil majus aut minus, sed totæ tres personæ coæternæ sibi sunt et coæquales. 25. Ita ut per omnia, sicut jam supra dictum est, et unitas in Trinitate et Trinitas in unitate veneranda sit. 26. Qui vult ergo salvus esse, ita de Trinitate sentiat. (Opp. Athanasii, t. iii. p. 719.—Walch, Bibl. Symb. Vet. p. 136 ss.; it is also contained in the collections of the symbolical books published by Tittmann, Hase, and others.1)

It was no less difficult to determine the relation of the divine to the human nature of Christ, than to define the

1 While salvation at this extreme point in the development of the doctrine appears to be made dependent on the most refined points of dialectics, it is pleasing to hear other men, such as Gregory of Nazianzus (see Ullmann, s. 159, 170; Neander, Chrysost. ii. 19), raising their voices during this period, who did not attach such unqualified value to the mere orthodoxy of the understanding, and who were fully convinced of the limits of human knowledge and the insufficiency of such dogmatic definitions, Greg. Orat. 31, 33, p. 577 (Ullmann, s. 336, comp., however, s. 334, 335). Rufinus also says, Expos. p. 18 (in the sense of an Irenæus): Quomodo autem Deus pater genuerit filium, nolo discutias, nec te curiosius ingeras in profundi hujus arcanum (al. profundo hujus arcani), ne forte, dum inaccessæ lucis fulgorem pertinacius perscrutaris, exiguum ipsum, qui mortalibus divino munere concessus est, perdas aspectum. Aut si putas in hoc omni indagationis genere nitendum, prius tibi propone quæ nostra sunt: quæ si consequenter valueris expedire, tunc a terrestribus ad cœlestia et a visibilibus ad invisibilia properato.-Moreover, in the midst of this dialectic elaboration of the materials of the faith, we cannot mistake the presence of a yet higher aim-that, viz., of bringing to distinct consciousness, not only the unity of the divine nature, but also the living longing of divine love to impart itself; in other words, the effort to maintain both the transcendent nature of God and His immanence in His works-the former in opposition to polytheism and pantheism, and the latter to an abstract deism. So far such formulas have also their edifying side, as giving witness to the struggle of the Christian mind after a satisfactory expression of what has its full reality only in the depths of the Christian heart.

relation between the three persons and the one nature of God. For the more decidedly the Godhead of the Son was asserted in the ecclesiastical or Catholic sense, the more the doctrine of the incarnation of the Son had to be guarded, so as not to abridge either the true Godhead or the true manhood of Christ. In opposition to Docetism, the doctrine of the human nature of Christ had indeed been so firmly established, that no one was likely to deny that He possessed a human body; and when Hilary, orthodox on all other points, seems to border upon Docetism, by maintaining that the body of Jesus could not undergo any real sufferings (1), he only means that the sufferings of Christ are to be understood as a free act of His love. But two other questions arose, which were beset with still greater difficulties. In the first place, it was asked whether a human soul formed a necessary part of the humanity of Christ; and if so (as the orthodox maintained, in opposition to the Arians) (2), it was still asked whether this soul meant only the animal soul, or also included the rational human spirit (in distinction from the divine).

(1) Hilary wishes to preserve the most intimate union between the divine and human natures of Christ, so that it may be said: totus hominis Filius est Dei Filius, and vice versa; for the same reason he says concerning the God-man, De Trin. x. 23: Habens ad patiendum quidem corpus et passus est, sed non habuit naturam ad dolendum. (He compares it to an arrow which passes through the water without wounding it.)-Comment. in Ps. cxxxviii. 3: Suscepit ergo infirmitates, quia homo nascitur; et putatur dolere, quia patitur: caret vero doloribus ipse, quia Deus est (the usage of the Latin word pati allowed such a distinction to be made).De Trin. xi. 48: In forma Dei manens servi formam assumsit, non demutatus, sed se ipsum exinaniens et intra se latens et intra suam ipse vacuefactus potestatem; dum se usque ad formam temperat habitus humani, ne potentem immensamque naturam assumptæ humanitatis non ferret infirmitas, sed in tantum se virtus incircumscripta moderaretur, in quantum oporteret eam usque ad patientiam connexi sibi corporis

obedire. He opposes the purely docetic interpretation of the Impassibilitas, De Synodis 49 (Dorner, ii. 2, 1055): Pati potuit, et passibile esse non potuit, quia passibilitas naturæ infirmis significatio est, passio autem est eorum, quæ sunt illata perpessio. He makes a distinction between passionis materia et passibilitatis infirmitas. Hilary, moreover, ascribes a human soul to Christ, but says that He received neither that soul nor His body from Mary; on the contrary, the Godman has His origin in Himself; comp. Dorner, s. 1040 ff., and the whole section. Cf. also Hilar. Com. in Matt. xxvi. 37; Zöckler, s. 213, 436.

(2) Athan. Contra Apollin. ii. 3: "Apeios dè σáρка μóvηv πρὸς ἀποκρυφὴν τῆς θεότητος ὁμολογεῖ· ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔσωθεν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπου, τουτέστι τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸν Λόγον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ λέγει γεγονέναι, τὴν τοῦ πάθους νόησιν καὶ τὴν ἐξ ᾅδου ἀνάσ τασιν τῇ θεότητι προσάγειν τολμῶν. Comp. Εpiph. Hær. 69, 19, and other passages quoted by Münscher, von Cölln, s. 268. This notion was very prominently brought forward by the Arians, Eudoxius and Eunomius; respecting the former, see Cave, Historia Script. Eccles. i. p. 219; concerning the latter, comp. Mansi, Conc. t. iii. p. 648, and Neander, Dg. s. 330. [The doctrines of Arius were expressed still more definitely by Eunomius. The Son cannot even be said to be like God, since likeness and unlikeness can only be predicated of created things. Generation from the divine essence is inconceivable; an eternal generation is unimaginable. The will is the mediating principle between the divine essence and agency. The Son of God was created according to God's will; He was eternally with God only as predestinated. Ibid. s. 336. In the confession of faith of Eunomius, it is stated that the Logos assumed man, both body and soul; but doubtless an où has dropped out-"not a man consisting of body and soul;" this appears from a citation of Gregory of Nyssa, from Eunomius, and also from a fragment lately published by Mansi.-Baur, Dogmengesch. s. 161, says that Eunomius widely diverged from the original standpoint of Arius, in maintaining that the essence of God could be completely conceived-particularly in reference to the point that God must be unbegotten. Thus Arianism logically leads to putting the infinite and the finite into an abstract opposition to each other. HAGENB. HIST. DOCT. 1.

2 B

It presents the contrast of the Aristotelian with the Platonic mode of thought.] Another party of the Arians, however, rejected the notion that the Logos had been changed into the soul of Christ, and supposed a human soul along with the Logos. Comp. Dorner, ii. 2, s. 1038. But even some orthodox theologians of this period used indefinite language on this point previously to the rise of the Apollinarian controversy. Comp. Münscher, von Cölln, s. 269. Dorner, lc. s. 1071 ff. Baur, Dg. i. 2, s. 212.

$99.

The Doctrine of Apollinaris.

Apollinaris, Bishop of Laodicea, who in other respects had a high reputation among orthodox theologians, conceived that that higher life of reason, which elevates man above the rest of creation, was not needed by Jesus, in whom there is a personal indwelling of Deity; or rather, that this human reason was absolutely set aside, the Logos, as vous Ocîos, being substituted (1). His intention seems to have been to honour Christ, not to detract from His dignity. He was opposed by Athanasius, and still more by Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, whose efforts led to the adoption of the doctrine that Christ had a perfect human nature, consisting of a body and a rational soul, together with the divine nature (2). The Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381) condemned Apollinarianism as heretical.

(1) Apollinaris was led by his dialectic culture1 to suppose that he might establish his argument with mathematical precision (γεωμετρικαῖς ἀποδείξεσι καὶ ἀνάγκαις). Of the writings in which he explained his views, only fragments are extant in the works of Gregory of Nyssa, Theodoret, and Leontius Byzantinus (who lived about the year 590); they were the following: περὶ σαρκώσεως λογίδιον (ἀπόδειξις περὶ τῆς θείας

1 Baumgarten-Crusius, ii. 160, sees here a twofold Platonism; not only the distinction between vous and yox, but also that in place of the vous comes a higher potence, but of the same nature.

ἐνσαρκώσεως)—τὸ κατὰ κεφάλαιον βιβλίον—περὶ ἀναστάσεως—περὶ πίστεως λογίδιον—and some letters (in Gallandii Bibl. PP. t. xii. p. 706 ss. Angelo Maio, Class. Auct. t. ix. p. 495 ss.). Comp. Dorner, ii. 2, s. 976, and Neander, Dg. 334 ff. Apollinaris objected to the union of the Logos with a rational human soul, that the human being thus united to the Logos must either preserve his own will, in which case there would be no true interpenetration of the divine and the human, or that the human soul must lose its liberty by becoming united to the Logos, either of which would be absurd. "He chiefly opposed the TрETTÓν, or the liberty of choice in Christology."Dorner, lc. s. 987. In his opinion, Christ is not merely ἄνθρωπος ἔνθεος, but God become man. According to the threefold division of man (the trichotomistic anthropology), Apollinaris was willing to ascribe a soul to the Redeemer, since he thought that was only something intermediate between body and spirit, and the yeμovikov of the body. But that which itself determines the soul (Tò avтOKívηTOV), and constitutes the higher dignity of man, the voûs (the ux Xoyun) of Christ, could not be of human origin, but must be purely divine; for His incarnation did not consist in the Logos becoming vous, but in becoming σáp. (Whether and how far Christ brought the aáp§ itself from heaven, or received it from Mary, see Baur, 595, Anm., and Dorner, 1007 ff. [Dorner says that Apollinaris held that the Logos was always potentially, or had the destination to be, man, since He was the type of humanity; but yet, that the assumption of the form (flesh) of man occurred only at His birth.]) But as the divine reason supplies the place of the human, there exists a specific difference between Christ and other men. In their case everything has to undergo a process of gradual development, which cannot be without conflicts and sin (öπov yàp τέλειος ἄνθρωπος, ἐκεῖ καὶ ἁμαρτία, apud Athan. i. 2, p. 923. Comp. c. 21, p. 939: åμapтía évvπóσтаTOS). But this could not take place in the case of Christ: οὐδεμία ἄσκησις ἐν Χριστῷ· οὐκ ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ἀνθρώπινος. Comp. Gregory of Nyssa, Antirrhet. adv. Apollin. iv. c. 221. At the same time, Apollinaris supposed the body and soul of Christ to be so completely filled and animated with the higher life of God, that he took no offence at such expressions as "God died, God