Eccles. Gr. t. ii. p. 54, in Münscher, von Cölln, i. s. 332): Tò μὲν σῶμα ἐκ τῆς γυναικείας γῆς (Thiersch conjectures γονῆς, see the review in Zeitschrift f. d. luth. Theol. 1841, s. 184) Kai αἵματος συνίσταται· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ διὰ τῆς σπορᾶς, ὥσπερ διά τινος ἐμφυσήματος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀῤῥήτως μεταδίδοται. According to Jerome, Ep. 78, ad Marcellin. (Opp. t. iv. p. 642, ap. Erasm. ii. p. 318), even maxima pars occidentalium (probably of earlier times?) held the opinion, ut quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic anima nascatur ex anima et simili cum brutis animantibus conditione subsistat. But Jerome himself rejects all other systems, and designates Creatianism as the orthodox doctrine; Epist. ad Pammach. (Opp. t. iv. p. 318, ap. Erasm. ii. p. 170): Quotidie Deus fabricatur animas, cujus velle fecisse est et conditor esse non cessat. . . . Noli despicere bonitatem figuli tui, qui te plasmavit et fecit ut voluit. Ipse est Dei virtus et Dei sapientia, qui in utero virginis ædificavit sibi domum. The advocates of Creatianism saw in the birth of every human being something analogous to the miracle of Christ's incarnation on its physical side, without putting the one on a level with the other (which Jerome would have been the last to do); those who adopted Traducianism were compelled to consider Christ's birth as an exception to the rule; and even this exception seemed to require some limitation of the position, that Christ's human nature is consubstantial with ours. Many theologians, therefore, preferred obviating these difficulties, following Augustine's example, by directing attention to the impossibility of comprehending the origin and processes of existence. Thus Gregory the Great, Ep. vii. 59, ad Secundinum (Opp. ii. p. 970), says: Sed de hac re dulcissima mihi tua caritas sciat, quia de origine animæ inter sanctos Patres requisitio non parva versata est; sed utrum ipsa ab Adam descenderit, an certe singulis detur, incertum remansit, eamque in hac vita insolubilem fassi sunt esse quæstionem. Gravis enim est quæstio, nec valet ab homine comprehendi, quia si de Adam substantia cum carne nascitur, cur non etiam cum carne moritur? Si vero cum carne non nascitur, cur in ea carne,

'Leo the Great likewise declares it to be the doctrine of the Church (Ep. 15, ad Turrib. Opp. Quesnel, p. 229), quoted in Münscher, von Cölln, s. 331, note 11: Catholica fides. . . omnem hominem in corporis et animæ substantiam formari intra materna viscera confitetur.

quæ de Adam prolata est, obligata peccatis tenetur? (he thus deduces Traducianism from the doctrine of original sin, the correctness of which he assumes; while the latter, on the contrary, was generally inferred from the former). Cf. Leo, s. 391 ff.

(4) Athanasius adopted the bipartite division. He distinguishes simply body and soul; the former is to him o čowev aveρwπos, the latter o eweev (Contra Apoll. i. 13-15). The soul is to him not merely the blossom of the life of the body, but a principle distinct from the body, coming from above. See Voigt, s. 104.

(5) Hilary of Poitiers asserts (in Matth. Can. v. § 8) that the soul, whether in the body or out of the body, must always preserve its corporeal substance, because everything that is created must exist in some form or other (in aliquo sit necesse est); reminding us of the views of Tertullian. Yet elsewhere he views the soul as a spiritual, incorporeal being; comp. in Ps. lii. § 7, in Ps. cxxix. § 6 (nihil in se habens corporale, nihil terrenum, nihil grave, nihil caducum).—Augustine frankly acknowledges the difficulty of defining the relation in which the soul stands to the body, De Morib. Eccles. Cath. c. 4: Difficile est istam controversiam dijudicare, aut si ratione facile, oratione longum est. Quem laborem ac moram suscipere ac subire non opus est. Sive enim utrumque sive anima sola nomen hominis teneat, non est hominis optimum quod optimum est corporis, sed quod aut corpori simul et animæ aut soli animæ optimum est, id est optimum hominis.-On the psychological views of Augustine, comp. Schleiermacher, Geschichte der Philosophie, s. 169 ff., and Heinichen, De Augustini doctrinæ anthropologicæ origine (Histor.-theolog. Studien, 1 Hft. 1862); on those of Claudius Mamertus and Boëthius, Schleierm. s. 174.— According to Gregory the Great, man is composed of body and soul (Mor. xiv. c. 15). The principal properties of the soul are, mens, anima, et virtus; comp. Lau, s. 370.

(6) Greg. Nyss. in verba: “Faciamus hominem," Orat. 1 (Opp. i. p. 143): Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν· τουτέστι δώσομεν αὐτῷ λόγου περιουσίαν . . . Οὐ γὰρ τὰ πάθη εἰς τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκόνα παρελήφθη, ἀλλ' ὁ λογισμὸς τῶν παθῶν SEOTÓTηS. Athanasius speaks in the same manner, Orat. δεσπότης. contra Gent. § 2, Cyrill. Hier. Cat. xiv. 10. The dominion over the animals was included. Gregory, l.c., says: πOU TOû

ἄρχειν δύναμις, ἐκεῖ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκών. Comp. Theodoret in Genes. Quæst. 20. Chrys. Hom. viii. in Genes. (Opp. ii. p. 65 s.). August. De Catechizandis Rudib. xvii. 20; De Genesi contra Manich. c. 17; De Trin. xii. 2; Sermo xlviii. (De Cura Anima): Quæ est imago Dei in nobis, nisi id quod melius reperitur nobis, nisi ratio, intellectus, memoria, voluntas. -The Semi-Pelagians, Gennadius and Faustus, made a distinction between imago and similitudo, see Wiggers, ii. s. 356. -Gregory the Great regards the image of God, in which man was created, as soliditas ingenita (Mor. ix. c. 33), which was lost by sin (Mor. xxix. c. 10), see Iau, s. 371. On the other traits of the first man as to body anl soul, ibid. s. 372 ff. Whether there is here a hint of the doctrine of donum superadditum, afterwards fully developed, ibid. s. 376.

(7) Audæus (Udo), who lived at the beginning of the fourth century in Mesopotamia, a rigid and zealous ascetic, seems to have fallen into these notions through his essentially practical tendency; comp. Epiph. Hær. 70, who speaks very mildly of Audæus and his followers: οὔ τι ἔχων παρηλλαγμένον τῆς πίστεως, ἀλλ ̓ ὀρθότατα μὲν πιστεύων αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἅμα αὐτῷ. Theodoret takes the opposite view, Hist. Eccles. iv. 10 (kawŵv EvρETÈS Soyμáτwv), comp. Fab. Hær. iv. 10. Schröder, Diss. de Hæresi Audianor. Marb. 1716, 4to. Neander, Kirchengeschichte, ii. 3, s, 1465.

(8) Augustine, Sermo xlviii.: Anima enim non moritur, nec succumbit per mortem, cum omnino sit immortalis, nec corporis materia, cum sit una numero.

(9) Lact. Instit. Div. vii. 5 (in Münscher, von Cölln, s. 336, comp. s. 338). Nemesius likewise (cap. i. p. 15) accedes in this point to the opinion of the earlier Greek theologians: Ἑβραῖοι δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε θνητὸν ὁμολογουμένως, οὔτε ἀθάνατον γεγενῆσθαί φασιν, ἀλλ ̓ ἐν μεθορίοις ἑκατέρας φύσεως, ἵνα ἂν μὲν τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἀκολουθήσῃ πάθεσιν, περιπέσῃ καὶ ταῖς σωματικαῖς μεταβολαῖς· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς προτιμήσῃ καλὰ, τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀξιωθῇ κ.τ.λ. On the other hand, Gregory the Great teaches that, even if the soul lose the blessed life, it cannot lose the essentialiter vivere (Dial. iv. c. 45). The body of man, too, was originally immortal (potuit non mori), and became mortal through sin; comp. Moral. iv. c. 28 s. Lau, ubi supra, s. 371 f.

§ 107.

On the Doctrine of Sin in general.

Concerning the nature of sin, the generally received opinion was, that it has its seat in the will of man, and stands in the most intimate connection with his moral freedom. Augustine himself defended this doctrine (at least in his earlier writings) (1), which was opposed to the Manichæan notion, that evil is inherent in matter. Lactantius, on the contrary, manifested a strong leaning towards Manichæism by designating the body as the seat and organ of sin (2). The ascetic practices then so common sufficiently indicate that the Church tacitly approved of this view. Athanasius regarded sin as something negative, and believed it to consist in the blindness and indolence of man, which prevent him from elevating himself to God. Similar (negative) definitions were given by Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa (3). But sin was most frequently looked upon as opposition to the law of God, and rebellion against His holy will (4), analogous to the sin of Adam, which was now generally viewed as an historical fact (in contradiction of the allegorical interpretation of Origen) (5).

(1) Aug. De Duab. Animab. contra Manich. § 12: Colligo nusquam nisi in voluntate esse peccatum; De Lib. Arb. iii. 49: Ipsa voluntas est prima causa peccandi.-In many other passages he regards sin from the negative point of view as a conversio a majori bono ad minus bonum, defectio ab eo, quod summe est, ad id, quod minus est, perversitas voluntatis a summa substantia detortæ in infimum. See the passages in Julius Müller, 1.c. s. 69.

(2) Lact. Inst. Div. ii. 12, vi. 13; De Ira Dei, 15: Nemo esse sine delicto potest, quamdiu indumento carnis oneratus est. Cujus infirmitas triplici modo subjacet dominio peccati : factis, dictis, cogitationibus.

(3) Athan. Contra Gent. c. 4 (Opp. i. p. 4): "Ovтa Sé ÉσTI τὰ καλὰ, οὐκ ὄντα δὲ τὰ φαῦλα· ὄντα δέ φημι τὰ καλὰ, καθότι

ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος θεοῦ τὰ παραδείγματα ἔχει· οὐκ ὄντα δὲ τὰ κακὰ λέγω, καθότι ἐπινοίαις ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ὄντα ἀναπέπλασ‐ ται. Ibid. c. 7, p. 7 : Οτι τὸ κακὸν οὐ παρὰ θεοῦ οὐδὲ ἐν θεῷ, οὔτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς γέγονεν, οὔτε οὐσία τίς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωποι κατὰ στέρησιν τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασίας ἑαυτοῖς ἐπινοεῖν ἤρξαντο καὶ ἀναπλάττειν τὰ οὐκ ὄντα καὶ ἅπερ βούλονται. Comp. that which follows. Athanasius traces the sinful propensity of man to indolence, c. 3, p. 3: Oi dè ἄνθρωποι κατολιγωρήσαντες τῶν κρειττόνων, καὶ ὀκνήσαντες περὶ τὴν τούτων κατάληψιν, τὰ ἐγγυτέρω μᾶλλον ἑαυτῶν ἐζήτησαν. Sensuality is allied with indolence, because this clings to what is nearest, viz. the bodily and the visible. Comp. the subsequent part of the chapter. In the same manner Basil M., Hexaëmeron Hom. ii. p. 19 (Paris edit. 1638), says: Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ παρὰ θεοῦ τὸ κακὸν τὴν γένεσιν ἔχειν εὐσεβές ἐστι λέγειν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων παρὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου γίνεσθαι, οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ θάνατον γεννᾷ, οὔτε ὁ σκότος φωτός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ, οὔτε ἡ νόσος ὑγείας δημιουργός. Τί οὖν φαμεν ; "Οτι κακόν ἐστιν οὐχὶ οὐσία ζῶσα καὶ ἔμψυχος, ἀλλὰ διάθεσις ἐν ψυχῇ ἐναντίως ἔχουσα πρὸς ἀρε‐ τὴν διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀπόπτωσιν τοῖς ῥᾳθύμοις ἐγγινομένη.—Greg. Nyss. Orat. Catechet. c. 5 (Opp. iii. p. 53) : Καθάπερ γὰρ ἡ ὅρασις φύσεών ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ πήρωσις στέρησίς ἐστι τῆς φυσικῆς ἐνέργειας, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κακίαν ἀνθέστηκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλην κακίας γένεσιν ἐννοῆσαι, ἢ ἀρετῆς ἀπουσίαν. Comp. c. 6, c. 22, c. 28, and the Dial. de Anima et Resurrectione. J. Müller, 1.c. s. 132. (4) That sin was in contradiction with God's purposes, was the practically weighty position held fast by the Church in all its different definitions of sin. Augustine, too, everywhere remains true to this denial of the divine origination of sin. Though the opposite opinion has been often imposed upon him in past and present times, on account of his doctrines of the moral incapacity of human nature and of divine predestination, yet this belongs to those groundless inferences which have been so freely drawn, especially with reference to this great teacher of the Church," Julius Müller, 1c. s. 308. A more precise definition is given by the theologians after the time of Augustine. Thus Gregory 1. makes a distinction between peccatum and delictum : Peccatum est mala facere, delictum