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also Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, ii. 64: Nulli Deus infert necessitatem, imperiosa formidine nullum tenet... 65: Quid est enim tam injustum, quam repugnantibus, quam invitis extorquere in contrarium voluntates, inculcare quod nolint et quod refugiant animis.

(4) De Gen. contra Manich. ii. 43 (c. 29): Nos dicimus nulli naturæ nocere peccata nisi sua; nos dicimus, nullum malum esse naturale, sed omnes naturas bonas esse. - De lib. Arb. iii. 50 (c. 17): Aut enim et ipsa voluntas est et a radice ista voluntatis non receditur, aut non est voluntas, et peccatum nullum habet. Aut igitur ipsa voluntas est prima causa peccandi. Non est cui recte imputetur peccatum, nisi peccanti. Non est ergo, cui recte imputetur, nisi volenti... Quæcunque ista causa est voluntatis : si non ei potest resisti, sine peccato ei ceditur; si autem potest, non ei cedatur, et non peccabitur. An forte fallit incautum ? Ergo caveat, ne fallatur. An tanta fallacia est, ut caveri omnino non possit ? Si ita est, nulla peccata sunt: quis enim peccat in eo, quod nullo modo caveri potest? Peccatur autem; caveri igitur potest. Comp. de Duab. Animab. contra Manich. 12; and, on the other hand, the Retractationes on the different passages; also de nat. et grat: 80 (c. 67). On the relation between the earlier and the later views of Augustine on the nature of sin, comp. also Baur, Dg. i. 2, s. 294 ff.

§ 110.

The Pelagian Controversy.

*G. F. Wiggers, Versuch einer pragmatischen Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus, Berlin 1821, Hamburg 1833, ii. 8. +J. A. Lentzen, de Pelagianorum doctrinæ principiis, Colon. ad Rhen. 1833. J. L. Jacobi, die Lehre des Pelagius, Lpz. 1842. [Theod. Gangauf, Metaph. Psychologie des heil. Augustinus, Augsb. 1852. Jul. Müller, Der Pelagianismus, in Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1855. Hampden's Bampton Lectures, Lect. iv.] W. Möller, Pelagius und die pelagianischen Streitigkeiten, in Herzog's Realencykl. xi. s. 268 ff.

Towards the commencement of the fifth century Calestius and Pelagius (Briton, Morgan ?) made their appearance in the

West (1). The views which they held were partly in accordance with the opinions hitherto entertained by the theologians of the Greek Church, but in part carried to a much greater length in the denial of natural depravity. Some of the propositions, on the ground of which the presbyter Paulinus accused Celestius at the Synod of Carthage (A.D. 412), had been previously defended by orthodox theologians; others were directly opposed both to the doctrine of Scripture (and especially that of Paul) and to the general belief of the Church, and thus threatened the fundamental doctrines of the gospel (2). It is, however, difficult to decide how far Pelagius accorded with all these assertions, since he expressed himself very cautiously (3). But it is certain that what is commonly called Pelagianism does not so much represent the single notions of a single individual as a complete moral and religious system, which formed a decided contrast to Augustinianism. In this conflict the former system was vanquished so far as this, that, in consequence of the turn which the controversy took, and of the great authority of Augustine in the West, his doctrine gained the victory over that of Pelagius (4). The followers of Pelagius did not form a sect properly so called. But Pelagianism, though condemned, retained its advocates, especially as but few could fully enter into all the consequences of the Augustinian system, and find in them real inward satisfaction. It will be necessary, in order to examine more fully the antagonistic elements, to divide the subjectmatter of controversy into three leading sections, viz.: 1. Sin; 2. Grace and Liberty; and 3. Predestination.

(1) On the personal character and history of Celestius and Pelagius, see Wiggers, s. 33 ff., and Neander, Dg. s. 361.

(2) The 6 or 7 Capitula (the numbers vary according as several propositions are separated or joined together) are preserved in Augustine, De Gestis Pelagii, cap. 11 (comp. De Peccato Originali, 2, 3, 4, 11, c. 2-10), as well as in the two commonitoria of Marius Mercator [comp. Gieseler, § 87, note 4] They are the following (comp. Wiggers, i. s. 60) :—

1. Adam was created mortal, so that he would have died whether he had sinned or not.

2. Adam's sin injured only himself, and not the human

race.

3. New-born infants are in the same condition in which Adam was previous to the fall (ante prævaricationem). 4. Neither does the whole human race die in consequence of Adam's death or transgression; nor does it rise from the dead in consequence of Christ's resurrection. 5. Infants obtain eternal life, though they be not baptized. 6. The law is as good a means of salvation (lex sic mittit ad regnum cœlorum) as the gospel.

7. There were some men, even before the appearance of Christ, who were without sin.

If we compare these propositions with the doctrines of the earlier theologians, we find that the third was held by some of the Greek Fathers (e.g. Theophilus of Antioch and Clement of Alexandria, see above, § 62, note 1); that the fifth, in a modified form, was substantially defended by Gregory of Nazianzus and others, viz. that unbaptized children are at least not condemned on that account (comp. § 72 on baptism); and even as to the seventh, bold as it may appear, something like it, though in a different connection, was maintained by the father of orthodoxy himself (§ 108, note 3). On the other hand, the isolated way in which the sin of Adam is viewed in the first two and the fourth propositions, all connection between this sin and that of his posterity, even in relation to the mortality of the body, being denied, would have been condemned as heresy before the tribunal of the earlier theologians. But none appears so heretical, so much opposed to the doctrine of Paul and the gospel, as the sixth. And, lastly, the denial of the connection subsisting between the resurrection of Christ and ours (in the fourth proposition) must have offended the common feelings and consciousness of Christians. Yet it may still be a question, how much here is to be ascribed to inferences, made for them by their opponents. See Neander, Kg. ii. 3, s. 1219, and Dg. s. 360 ff.

(3) Augustine perceives no other difference between Pelagius and Colestius (De Pecc. Orig. c. 12) than that the latter was more open, the former more guarded; the latter more obstinate,

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the former more deceitful,—or, to say the least, that the latter was more straightforward (liberior), the former more cunning (astutior). Prosper of Aquitaine calls him, therefore, coluber Britannus (in his poem De Ingratis, append. 67; comp. Wiggers, s. 40). Neander (Chrysostomus, Bd. ii. s. 134) judges more mildly of him: "Pelagius is deserving of all esteem on account of his honest zeal; his object was to combat the same perverse anti-Christian tendency which Augustine opposed. But he was wrong in the manner in which he sought to attain his object," etc. Comp. Kg. ii. 3, s. 1195 ff., Dg. s. 365. "As far as we know him through his writings, he was a clear-headed, intelligent man, who possessed rather a serious and moral turn of mind, than that disposition which feels itself compelled to dive into the depths of the soul and spirit, and to bring to light hidden things," s. 1199.

(4) THE PRINCIPAL POINTS IN THE EXTERNAL HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY ARE: The condemnation of the doctrine of Pelagius at Carthage, A.D. 412. He repairs to Palestine, where Jerome becomes one of his most zealous opponents, and, conjointly with Paulus Orosius, a disciple of Augustine, accuses him at a synod held at Jerusalem (A.D. 415), under John, Bishop of Jerusalem. John, however, did not pronounce his condemnation, but reported the whole matter to Innocent, Bishop of Rome. - Synod at Diospolis (Lydda), under Eulogius of Cæsarea. The accusers were Heros of Arles, and Lazarus of Aix. Acquittal of Pelagius. Dissatisfaction of Jerome with the decisions of this synod (Synodus miserabilis ! Ep. 81).Under Zosimus, the successor of Innocent, Pelagius and Colestius entertain new hopes. - Synod of the North African bishops at Carthage, A.D. 418, and condemnation of Pelagius. -The Emperor Honorius decides the controversy. - Zosimus is induced to change his view, and publishes his Epistola Tractoria, in which also the Pelagian doctrine is condemned. Julian, Bishop of Eclanum in Apulia, undertakes to defend Pelagianism (respecting him, see Wiggers, i. s. 43 ff.). — He was anathematized at the Synod of Ephesus (A.D. 431), in (accidental?) connection with Nestorius. Still the opposite system of Augustine was not accepted in the East. [See the Pelagian controversy in St. Augustine-The Fathers for English readers. Lond. S. P. C. K.]

§ 111.

First Point of Controversy.

Sin.-Original Sin and its Consequences.

[J. Nirschl, Ursprung und Wesen der Sünde nach d. Lehre des heiligen Augustinus, Regensb. 1854. Julius Müller, Lehre von d. Sünde, ii. 417-494. Voigt, De Theoria Aug. Pelag., Götting. 1829. Lentzen, De Pelag. Doctr. Principiis, Colon. 1833.]

was.

Pelagius, starting from the standpoint of mere reflection, or of the understanding in distinction from the reason, with a tendency preponderating to the ethical view of man's nature, looked upon every human individual as a moral personality, complete in and bounded by himself, and sharply separated from all others. Hence sin would necessarily appear to him as the free act of the individual, so that in his view there could be no other connection between the sin of the one (Adam) and the sin of the many (his posterity), than that which exists between an example on the one hand, and a voluntary imitation of it on the other. Every man at his birth is accordingly in the same condition in which Adam Neither sin nor virtue is inborn, but the one as well as the other developes itself in the use of freedom, and is to be put to the account only of him who exercises this freedom (1). Augustine, on the contrary, with more profound conceptions, which, however, might easily prevent a clear insight into the personal and moral relations of man, considered the human race as a compact mass, a collective body, responsible in its unity and solidarity. With a predominant bias towards religion, he directed his attention more to the inner and permanent state of the soul and its absolute relation to God, than to the passing and external actions of the individual. This tendency, proceeding from the experience of his own heart and life, led him to conjecture a mysterious connection subsisting between the transgression of Adam and the

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