: dilectionis, and considers this as the source of everything. Nolentem prævenit, ut velit; volentem subsequitur, ne frustra velit (Enchir. c. 32).—He understands by freedom the being free from sin, that state of mind in which it is no longer necessary to choose between good and evil. The same view is expressed in his treatise De Civit. Dei, xiv. 11, which was not written against the Pelagians: Arbitrium igitur voluntatis tunc est vere liberum, cum vitiis peccatisque non servit. Tale datum est a Deo: quod amissum proprio vitio, nisi a quo dari potuit, reddi non potest. Unde Veritas dicit: Si vos Filius liberavit, tunc vere liberi eritis. Idque ipsum est autem, ac si diceret si vos Filius salvos fecerit, tunc vere salvi eritis. Inde quippe liberator, unde salvator. Comp. contra duas Epp. Pel. i. 2. The freedom of the will is greater in proportion as the will itself is in a state of health; its state of health depends on its subjection to the divine mercy and grace.Contra Jul. ii. c. 8, he calls the human will servum propriæ voluntatis arbitrium.-Such expressions were so much misused by the monks of Adrumetum (about the year 426), that Augustine himself was compelled to oppose them (especially in his treatise De Correptione et Gratia); in general, he himself frequently appealed from a practical point of view to the will of man (see the next section). [For a more detailed statement of Augustine's views respecting grace and the freedom of the will, see Münscher, von Cölln, i. § 93, and s. 388-398, where further passages are quoted.] At any rate, it was not the view of Augustine that man is like a stone or stick, upon whom grace works externally; he could conceive of grace as working only in the sphere of freedom. Comp. Contra Julianum, iv. 15: Neque enim gratia Dei lapidibus aut lignis pecoribusve præstatur, sed quia imago Dei est (homo), meretur hanc gratiam. De Peccat. Merit. et Remiss. ii. § 6: Non sicut in lapidibus insensatis aut sicut in iis, in quorum natura rationem voluntatemque non condidit salutem nostram Deus operatur in nobis. [Julius Müller in his work on Sin, i. 458 ff., shows that Augustine spoke of freedom under three aspects: (1) As spontaneity, in contrast with external force. This always exists in all men. (2) Power of choice, liberum arbitrium,-as in Adam before the fall,-an equal power of deciding between the alternatives of good and evil. But this is a low, weak state of the will. (3) The freedom with which the Son makes us free-the determination of the soul to what is good and holy-the non posse peccarethe felix necessitas boni-the union of freedom and necessity.] [Baur, Dogmengesch. s. 179 ff. In the system of Pelagius everything depends upon the principle of the freedom of the will; this is the determining and fundamental conception in his doctrine of sin and of grace. Freedom, as the absolute capacity of choice (liberum arbitrium), to determine equally for good or evil, appeared to him in such a degree to be the substantial good of human nature, that he even reckoned the capacity for evil as a bonum naturæ, since we cannot choose good without in like manner being able to choose evil (Epist. ad Demetr. c. 2, 3).] § 113. Third Point of Controversy. Predestination. [J. B. Mozley, Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, Lond. 1855.] Augustine held the doctrine of hereditary depravity, the guilt of which man has himself incurred, and from which no human power or human determination can deliver; from which only the grace of God can save those to whom it is imparted. From these premisses it would necessarily follow that God, in consequence of an eternal decree, and without any reference to the future conduct of man, has elected (1) some out of the corrupt mass to become vessels of His mercy (vasa misericordiæ), and left the rest as vessels of His wrath (vasa iræ) to a just condemnation. Augustine called the former predestinatio, the latter reprobatio, and thus evaded the necessity of directly asserting the doctrine of a predestination to evil (predestinatio duplex) (2). On the whole, he endeavoured to soften the harshness of his theory by practical cautions (3). But the doctrine in question became to many a stone of stumbling, which orthodox theologians themselves (especially those of the Greek Church) endeavoured by every possible means to remove (4). This prepared the way for those practically well-meant but theoretically vague and unfounded schemes, which Semi-Pelagianism (see the following section) brought to light. (1) De Præd. Sanctorum, 37 (c. 18): Elegit nos Deus in Christo ante mundi constitutionem, prædestinans nos in adoptionem filiorum: non quia per nos sancti et immaculati futuri eramus, sed elegit prædestinavitque, ut essemus. Fecit autem hoc secundum placitum voluntatis suæ, ut nemo de sua, sed de illius erga se voluntate glorietur, etc. In support of his views he appealed to Eph. i. 4, 11, and Rom. ix.: he spoke, too, of a certus numerus electorum, neque augendus, neque minuendus, De Corrept. et Gr. 39 (c. 13). [De Dono Perseverantiæ, c. 14: Hæc est prædestinatio sanctorum, nihil aliud; præscientia scilicet et præparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur, quicunque liberantur. Cæteri autem ubi nisi in massa perditionis justo divino judicio relinquuntur? De Corrept. et Gratia, c. 13: Hi ergo, qui non pertinent ad istum certissimum et felicissimum numerum (prædestinatorum) pro meritis justissime judicantur. De Præd. Sanc. c. 19: Dicet (apostolus) ideo nos electos in Christo et prædestinatos ante mundi constitutionem, ut essemus sancti et immaculati ... non quia futuros tales nos esse præscivit, sed ut essemus tales per electionem gratiæ suæ. . . c. 10: Si quæratur, unde quisque sit dignus, non desunt, qui dicunt, voluntate humana; nos autem dicimus, gratia vel prædestinatione divina. Schmid, Dogmengesch. s. 59. Baur, in his Dogmengesch. s. 184, cites the following passage from De Corrept. et Gratia, c. 9, as bringing together the series of divine acts in respect to the elect: Quicunque in Dei providentissima dispositione præsciti, prædestinati, vocati, justificati, glorificati sunt, non dico etiam nondum renati, sed etiam nondum nati, jam filii Dei sunt et omnino perire non possunt. This, says Baur, exhibits what is hardest and most incomprehensible in the doctrine of Augustine.] He refutes the objections of the understanding by quoting Rom. ix. 20, and adducing examples from sacred history. Even in this life, worldly goods, health, beauty, physical and intellectual powers, are distributed unequally, and not always in accordance with human views of merit, ibid. 19, c. 8. Christ Himself was predestinated to be the Son of God, De Pred. 31 (c. 15). De Corr. et Grat. § 30. He even calls Christ the præclarissimum lumen prædestinationis et gratiæ. Neander, Dg. s. 394. (2) Augustine teaches a predestination to punishment and condemnation, but not a direct predestination to sin; comp. Enchiridion, c. 100. The passage 1 Tim. ii. 4, brought to prove the universality of grace, he explains as meaning that no age, condition, sex, etc., is excluded from grace, and adduces in illustration Luke xi. 42, where "omne olus" means every kind of herbs; comp. Enchiridion, c. 103, and Epist. 107 (Ad Vitalem): comp. A. Schweizer, Centraldogmen. i. s. 45. [De Dono Perseverantiæ, c. 8: Cur gratia non secundum merita hominum datur? Respondeo, quoniam Deus misericors est. Cur ergo, inquit, non omnibus ? Et hic respondeo, quoniam Deus judex est.] (3) De Dono Persev. 57 (c. 22): Prædestinatio non ita populis prædicanda est, ut apud imperitam vel tardioris intelligentiæ multitudinem redargui quodammodo ipsa sua prædicatione videatur; sicut redargui videtur et præscientia Dei (quam certe negare non possunt) si dicatur hominibus: "Sive curratis, sive dormiatis, quod vos præscivit qui falli non potest, hoc eritis." Dolosi autem vel imperiti medici est, etiam utile medicamentum sic alligare, ut aut non prosit, aut obsit. Sed dicendum est: "Sic currite, ut comprehendatis, atque ut ipso cursu vestro ita vos esse præcognitos noveritis, ut legitime curreretis," et si quo alio modo Dei præscientia prædicari potest, ut hominis segnitia repellatur, 59... de ipso autem cursu vestro bono rectoque condiscite vos ad prædestinationem divinæ gratiæ pertinere. (4) Notwithstanding the condemnation of Pelagius at the Synod of Ephesus, the system of Augustine did not exert any influence upon the theology of the Eastern Church. Theodore of Mopsuestia wrote (against the advocates of Augustinianism): πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας φύσει καὶ οὐ γνώμῃ TтαίEI TOÙS ȧvěpáπovs, 5 books (Photii Bibl. Cod. 177, some Latin fragments of which are preserved by Mar. Mercator, cd. Baluze; Fritzsche, p. 107 ss.). On the question whether it was directed against Jerome or against Augustine, see Fritzsche, 1.c. p. 109 ss., and Neander, Kg. ii. s. 1360 ff., Dg. s. § 114. Semi-Pelagianism and the later Teachers of the Church. J. Geffcken, Historia Semi-Pelagianismi Antiquissima, Gött. 1826, 4to. Wiggers, In opposition both to the extreme Augustinians (Predesti- |