people, fear not, ye have done all this wickedness, yet turn not aside from following the Lord, but serve the Lord with all your heart, and turn ye not aside after vain things which cannot profit or deliver, for they are vain: for the Lord will not forsake his people for his great namesake, because it hath pleased the Lord to make you his people; moreover, as for me, God forbid that I should sin against the Lord, in ceasing to pray for you, but I will teach you the good and right way, only fear the Lord your God, and serve him in truth with all your heart, for consider what great things he hath done for you; but if ye shall still do wickedly, ye shall be consumed, both ye and your king."

Now let me ask, how can this transaction be explained on the predestinarian scheme? If the conduct of this chosen nation, or of the individuals who composed it, was so pre-ordained as to exclude all change or contingency, why this anxiety of the prophet, that they should know and consider all that God had done for them? Why this terror lest they should turn from their God? Thus also, if the doom of the people collectively and individually, was fixed by a divine decree, unconditional, and therefore unalterable, by any thing in their power, why this demand of their serving God in truth, and with all their heart, as a condition indispensable for his continuing to them his favour and protection? Why this awful warning, that if they did wickedly, (but not otherwise,) they should be consumed, both they and their king? Finally, if repentance and a consequent change of conduct could not change the divine measures, or if prayer could not influence them, why this entreaty of the people for the intercession of the prophet? Why does the prophet promise it as his duty, and so earnestly warn the people, though they had done all this wickedness, yet still not to forsake their God? In a word, on the supposition of unchangeable, unconditional decrees, how can we discover any meaning, or almost any truth in all this narrative? I confess I cannot see how this, and the numerous cases of the same nature, which constantly occur in Scripture, can be reconciled with the doctrine of absolute predestination.

The entire subsequent history of the Jewish monarchy is a verification of this prophetic warning. As the conduct of

the king and the people vary from good to evil, and evil to good, so the divine power depresses them from prosperity to adversity, or restores them from depression and captivity to liberty and happiness—in every instance exemplifying the freedom of human actions, and the conditionality of the divine dispensations.

Perhaps, however, this conditionality of the divine dispensations, perpetually adapted to the moral government of intelligent and free agents, is most distinctly exhibited in particular cases, where a certain sentence is pronounced, or a certain punishment is inflicted, but accompanied by an express declaration, that if man had acted in a different manner, a correspondent difference of result would have been produced by Divine Providence.

Thus, when Saul, having been appointed king, presumptuously violated the divine law, by usurping the peculiar office of the priesthood, by offering with his own hands a burnt sacrifice unto the Lord, the prophet declares to him, "thou hast done foolishly; thou hast not kept the commandment of the Lord thy God, which he commanded, for now would the Lord have established thy kingdom upon Israel for ever, but now thy kingdom shall not continue. The Lord hath sought him a man after his own heart, and the Lord hath commanded him to be a captain over his people, because thou hast not kept that which the Lord appointed thee."*

Here it should be remarked, that the change which is thus attributed to the disobedience of Saul, relates to the most important circumstance in the divine economy, even the establishment of the kingdom of the house of David, from whom it was afterwards appointed, "as concerning the flesh, Christ should come, who is over all, God blessed for ever." Now if as to a circumstance of such a nature, it is yet affirmed, that it would not have taken place, had a particular individual acted in a manner different from that in which he did act, who shall presume to say from his ideas of prescience and prophecy, that their connexion with human conduct is such as produces a fixed necessity in human actions, or implies an immutable and unconditional character in the divine decrees? Does it not clearly follow,

* 1 Sam. xiii. 13, &c.

† Rom. ix. 5.

that we must admit not only the prescience and providence of God, but the freedom and contingency of human conduct, and the conditionality of the divine appointments, however unable our narrow and limited faculties may be to reconcile these different truths, or fully to sound the depths of the nature and counsels of God, and to explain the mode in which he combines that freedom, which it is expressly declared he has communicated to his creatures, with that omniscience and that sovereignty, which as certainly belong to himself?

As in this instance, the rejection of Saul is declared not to have been arbitrary and unconditional, but the consequence of his rejecting the commandment of God, so the selection of David, and establishing the kingdom of the Messiah in his family for ever, is declared to have been determined on by God, in consequence of David's piety and zeal in "purposing to build a house unto the Lord," without any divine injunction or command, but merely impelled by gratitude to that protecting power, "which gave him rest round about from all his enemies," and by that pious humility which was shocked "at his own dwelling in a house of cedar, while the ark of God dwelt between curtains." It was on this manifestation of heartfelt, active piety, the prophet was sent to declare to him, "the Lord telleth thee, that he will make thee an house, and when thy days be fulfilled, I will set up thy seed after thee, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom for ever."*

Still, however, this great favour to the son of David, was in a certain degree to be regulated by the same rules of moral government, which in other cases are discernible in the divine measures; "I will be his father," saith the Lord, "and he shall be my son; if he commit iniquity I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the stripes of the children of men, but my mercy shall not depart from him, as I took it from Saul whom I put away before thee. And thine house and thy kingdom shall be established for ever before thee; thy throne shall be established for ever."

Should it be alleged, that to suppose our salvation in any degree conditional, so as that it may be promoted by our own

* 2 Sam. vii.

diligence, or forfeited by our own neligence, is to suppose it contingent and uncertain, and that this questions the prescience, and undermines our assurance of the special providence of God; the answer is found in both reason and Scripture, which concur in assuring us of the certainty of God's foreknowledge, and of his continual inspection and control over the entire system of things; so that the "very hairs of our head are numbered, and not a sparrow falls to the ground unseen ;"* so that " He understands our thoughts afar off; and every word in our tongue, he knoweth it altogether;"† while on the other hand, the consciousness of our inmost souls, unites with the whole tenor of scriptural warnings and exhortations, of scriptural commands and sanctions, to attest our free-will, self-direction, and moral agency. If we reject either of these great truths, we must oppose the clearest conclusions of reason, and the plainest doctrines of Scripture, and involve ourselves in endless contradictions and absurdities. It is true that to explain the mode in which divine foreknowledge and the freedom and contingency of human actions are reconciled, transcends our power. But the reason of this is obvious. For such an explanation, nothing less would be required than a perfect and intimate perception of the mode of divine knowledge, the extent of divine agency, and the laws regulating thought and volition in the human mind-topics on which the ingenuity of mankind has been employed from the first dawn of science to the present hour; but which are still found as impenetrably obscure, as at the first moment they were submitted to inquiry.

But while Scripture concurs with reason, in declaring that it must admit the foreknowledge and direction of God in all events, both also concur in declaring, that we must at the same time allow that the free agency of man concurs to their production (wherever human agency is concerned) in exactly the same manner as if they were supposed not to be foreknown. A remarkable instance in the history of David and Saul will confirm the truth of this conclusion, and illustrate the consistency of the divine prescience with the contingency of human actions, and the conditionality of the divine determinations concerning them. David had rescued the inhabitants of Keilah from their enemies,

and afterwards retired there for safety. The circumstances that in consequence took place are related thus; "and it was told Saul that David was come to Keilah, and Saul said, God hath delivered him into mine hand, for he is shut in by entering into a town that hath gates and bars; and Saul called all the people together, to go down to Keilah to besiege David and his men. And David knew that Saul secretly practised mischief against him and he said to Abiathar the priest, who was with him, bring hither the ephod. Then said David, O Lord God of Israel, thy servant hath certainly heard that Saul seeketh to come to Keilah to destroy the city, for my sake; will the men of Keilah deliver me up into his hand? Will Saul come down, as thy servant hath heard? O Lord God of Israel, I beseech thee, tell thy servant. And the Lord said, He will come down. Then said David, Will the men of Keilah deliver me and my men into the hand of Saul? And the Lord said, They will deliver thee up. Then David and his men, which were about six hundred, arose and departed out of Keilah, and went whithersoever they could go. And it was told Saul that David escaped from Keilah, and he forebore to go forth. And David abode in the wilderness in strongholds, and remained in a mountain in the wilderness of Ziph; and Saul sought him every day, but God delivered him not into his hand."

Now this narrative seems directly to prove, that though there may indeed be some ends which God absolutely decrees to bring about, (as in this case the preservation of David,) yet notwithstanding, the actions of men are free and contingent, though perfectly foreseen by God. It shows, that God does not first determine how men shall act, and then because he had so determined, foresee their conduct, which is therefore fixed and immutable; but that he knows how they would act in every possible variety of situation, and under the influence of every conceivable motive; that sometimes by placing them in new situations, and suggesting new motives, he alters their choice; or that without influencing their conduct, he renders their actions subservient to his own designs. Thus in this case, he

Sam. xxiii. 7, &c.