must ever be new truths for the finite mind to learn, so the progress of the human soul must be ever onward, yet endless.

All current opinions ever have an element of truth in them, otherwise no human mind could receive them. A naked falsehood cannot live in this world. To obtain acceptance, it must be sugared over with a coating of truth. Such is the modern theory of development; true in itself, it is yet converted to purposes of error, and made the vehicle of an atheism, wholly inconsistent with a correct appreciation of it.

There is another remark, which may not be out of place in this connection. This view of moral action shows that the moral life, the spiritual life, the divine life in humanity, are all equivalent expressions, and are all equally a life of faith; a life lived by faith. These laws of right and wrong are derived neither from perception or consciousness; they are simple conceptions of the reason derived from without, having an objective stand-point in the divine character, are adopted by faith as a portion of knowledge, and thereby become the laws by which man's moral or spiritual life is begun and carried on in its progress of inward development. This whole inward work is the work of faith; take away this faith, remove these moral judgments and beliefs, and such a life is rendered inpossible; the soul would be left to the influences and motives which act upon it on its side in contact with nature, while its spiritual life never could begin, since the soul could have no communion on this, its spiritual side, with any thing spiritual. Spiritual and moral development being dependent upon the reception into the reason of spiritual truths, and the mind being incapable of receiving these truths, except through reason and faith, the moral life can only be born of faith, and carried on to perfection through faith. We all, then, who in faith live a life of morality, live by faith, and by faith alone, and cannot live otherwise.

Another remark is here suggested, and it is this: there can be no difference between true morality and religion. True morality

is founded in the divine character, and so is all true religion. True morality is the correct appreciation of the divine governor, and the application of His laws to the heart and life; and the object of all this is gradually to shape the character of the finite man to the character of the infinite God, so far as finite is capable of becoming like the infinite. This, too, is the object of religion; hence they both seek the same moral end-the purification of a human soul from errors of belief and practice, and the rendering of it pure and holy, as its Creator intended it should be. But it is said that there are moral men who adopt neither religion or this view of morality. This, however, is an erroneous view of the matter. Can he be called moral who denies the very fact on which all morality rests? Can he be called a loyal subject who denies the competency of the government under which he lives? He may not violate its laws, he may indeed conform his life to them; because it would be neither prudent or safe to do otherwise; but would he the less be at heart a disloyal subject? A man may act in accordance with the rules of morality for various reasons. He may hold it prudent to do so; he may consider that an enlightened selfishness teaches him that such a course is best fitted to avoid pain and secure pleasure; but what of real morality is there in all this? Does he regard the lawgiver, or his laws, as the ground of his actions? or does he not rather make himself the ground and end of all he does? Can he be called a moral man who refrains from theft, and robbery, and murder, simply because he fears detection and dreads punishment? To be honest, to be moral, he must admit the correctness, the propriety, the righteousness of the law, and obey it simply because it is right, reckless of consequences. Like the dutiful child towards a kind and just parent, he must obey from love to the law, to the right, to the just, and not from any fear of penalties and punishments. A man, therefore, may act honestly without being honest, he may do moral acts without in truth being a moral man. Morality is something positive; it is

This

not a negative quality; to be honest, one must act honestly; it is not enough simply to refrain from acting. To be moral, one must live a moral life; he must take the law into his soul, adopt it by his faith, and live it out in his life; nothing less than this can constitute a moral life. It will thus be seen that morality and religion have the same object, and seek it by the same means-by incorporating into the soul, by faith, the law of God, and living out in the life this law; so that by both man may be said to live alike a life of faith. Morality must include the whole duty of man to his God, himself, and his fellow man, and religion can do no more. idea necessarily involves man's duties, growing out of his present relations to his Maker, himself, and his fellow man. A morality adapted to man in a different condition from his present, would be no morality at all, since it would have no adaptation to his present condition, and wants, and duties. Religion proposes to do no more than this; it points out a way in which this can be accomplished in accordance with the divine character and legislation. In a word, morality implies a God who governs all his creatures by laws enacted by Himself. It therefore cannot exist in that soul which denies this great truth; and in this idea of God is included also the idea of His character, and of His moral government, and of course of all His relations toward humanity. It can do only mischief, therefore, to speak of a morality independent of religion, and as something different from it; there can be no such morality, including the idea of duty; the moralist and the Christian must alike by faith believe in God, and if both believe in the same God, they must both alike possess the same code of duty growing out of this belief. Men disagree about what are the laws of morality, because they believe in different Gods, in Gods possessing different characters, and, therefore, organizing different governments, and enacting different laws for the regulation of the conduct and lives of His rational creatures. Here lies the difference between the mere moralist and the Christian; they do not believe in the

same God, and hence their codes of morality or religion must widely disagree. Let them agree in their views of the divine character and government, and they will agree in their code of duty, since the latter depends wholly upon the former. Men, disagreeing on questions of duty and religion, should begin here, at the source of all morality and religion; first agree here, because if agreement does not exist here, it cannot exist in the details of their moral or religious views. But it is unnecessary further to prosecute this inquiry, important as it may be. Enough has been said to stimulate thought, and that is all the occasion will permit.

In conclusion, under this head, we here find an ultimate fact on which a science of morality, involving the ideas of obligation and duty, may be founded, and from which all its possibilities, all its laws, may be logically deduced. On this great fact we shall essay to construct a true SCIENCE OF MORALITY AND THE STATE.

8

CHAPTER X.

OBLIGATION-ITS MEANING AND CHARACTER.

BEFORE proceeding further, it will be useful to ascertain the import of a word constantly in use, and yet used by most with no very definite meaning attached to it-the word OBLIGATION -it will reflect upon what has already been advanced as well as upon that which is yet to be discussed. What, then, is the meaning of this word, especially when applied to human actions?

The word OBLIGATION, as is well known, comes from a Latin root, which signifies, to bind together, to constrain, to compel one to do, or to abstain from doing an act. Hence there is implied the existence of something out of the individual exercising an influence or constraint over him so as to affect, in some way, his mode of action. When a person threatens to do another a personal injury, he is bound over to keep the peace toward that individual. A captain is bound to remain in harbor with his vessel because a storm is raging in the open sea. The soldier is bound to obey his superior, the pupil his teacher, the child the parent, a ball to run down hill, and water to rise to a certain height in a vacuum. The idea, in all these instances, is that of some outward constraint, brought to act in such a way as to produce a certain result.

This influence or constraint may be of two kinds—where it necessarily and directly produces the result, and where this is not the case the former kind working within the domain of nature,