INTRODUCTION. NO DISCUSSION of moral science can be prosecuted successfully without a careful analysis, to some extent at least, of man's moral nature, of its capacities and susceptibilities, and the mode or law of their development. With this necessary analysis there is connected a general view of humanity, with all its capacities and the law of their development. The discussion, indeed, involves, in some degree, a general analysis of the human mind and the mode of its development. In the following treatise, one object has been to prosecute a thorough analysis of moral phenomena as disclosed in consciousness. In carrying out this investigation, broader views have arisen in the mind, taking in the whole of our mental and moral constitution, embracing a classification of all these powers, to which I now propose to invite attention. Without undertaking to dogmatize upon so intricate a subject, I yet will suggest what at present appears to my mind the true aspect of a question so much debated. I do not propose to argue the propositions put forth, but simply and clearly to state these my present impressions, with some inferences which necessarily follow from them-impressions not hastily formed, but to which more distinctness has been given during the composition of the following work. Man seems to have a threefold nature-three distinct classes of capacities, susceptibilities or powers. The first in point of time in their development, are those which come in contact with the outward, material world. This may be termed his sensational nature, and includes all those powers which are brought into exercise, are developed by sensation. The moment life begins, these powers are brought into action, and are the very earliest indications of those manifold phenomena which we call life. These powers, this sensational nature, man has in common with all animals. I wish here simply to state a fact, to verify a fact, that man has a nature adapted to the action of matter upon it, and by means of which he is enabled to become conscious of an external world of matter. This fact, however, will hardly be disputed, since much of our modern intellectual philosophy starts in this fact, and never escapes from it. In the next place, man possesses a moral or spiritual nature. He possesses moral or spiritual susceptibilities, capacities or powers, which must also be developed before his moral or spiritual life can begin and be developed. As a fact, we know we are not conscious of the existence of these powers as early as we are conscious of the possession of our sensational nature or powers. This shows that the spiritual life is not begun, is not developed as early as our animal life. It is believed that such is the universal experience of humanity. It would seem, hence, to follow that our spiritual or moral nature is not developed through sensation, by coming in contact with the material world; nor does the material world seem to possess any fitness or adaptation for this moral development. As there is a prepared mean for the development of our sensational or animal life, so it would seem that some suitable mean should be prepared to meet this aspect of humanity, to develop these powers, to wake up in humanity its spiritual life. Upon a proper development of these moral or spiritual capacities, depends not the health of the body, but the well-being and the harmony of the spiritual in man, and hence his happiness. This part of man's nature is adapted for the reception of law, of truth, of ideas of duty. In exercise, man's moral powers are affected only by the presentation of moral truth-by the conception in the mind of a law by which man ought to act. If these powers are cultivated by the presentation of moral truth, it would seem that they could be developed by no other agency. And as a fact, we know that our moral consciousness is not developed until the child has reached an age when he can and has formed or received moral laws which he regards as obligatory as rules of action. He must have the idea that some things ought to be done by him, and that other things ought not to be done, before moral consciousness is developed, and the child can feel the power of duty, the pangs of a wounded, and the joys of an approving conscience, the emotions of moral approbation and of disapprobation. Now, there is nothing in sensation capable of originating such ideas. These ideas have no archetype in nature, in matter. They must come from some other source, and be communicated in some other mode. There are here two things involved: first, the reception in the mind of the ideas of rectitude, of the law of right and wrong, of duty and obligation; and secondly, the effect which these ideas exert upon these moral powers of humanity. These ideas may be formed by the mind itself, or they may be received from other minds, which have formed them. If the mind receiving these ideas adopts them as true, as obligatory, they become true to that mind, and will exert all the influence on the moral powers that absolute verity is designed to exert. They will develop the moral powers, and render the mind conscious of the beginning of its spiritual or moral life. It is, therefore, submitted that man's moral or spiritual nature can be developed only in this way, only in this mode: by the communication of moral truths or ideas to the mind. No one any longer recognizes the existence of innate ideas. All ideas in the mind must originate out of the mind, either by means of sensations, or in some other way. All our notions of matter come from sensation in the first place, and all our moral ideas must be transformed sensations, or they must be received by the infant mind from another mind which has already formed them. The doctrine of transformed sensations is now recognized by no respectable authority; hence these moral ideas must be derived in the manner last mentioned. And if so, then man's moral powers are developed in a mode entirely different from that in which his sensational nature is developed; and the law which prevails in the one must be wholly inconsistent with that which governs the other. The third class of powers is that of knowledge. Man is not alone capable of having his natural and spiritual powers developed, brought into action; he is also capable of studying and comprehending these powers, and the fact and mode of their development. He can study, examine, investigate his sensations and his moral ideas, and the action of them upon his spiritual life. When the mind studies a sensation, there arises an act of perception. The man not only feels-he knows. By the study of these sensations, the perceptions of an external world arise, and notions are formed concerning it in the mind, out of which sciences of matter are constructed. So, too, the faculty of knowledge enables us to study and verify ideas; these moral judgments, these laws of right and wrong, and their influence in developing our moral or spiritual powers; and out of this knowledge the mind constructs a science of mind and morals. This faculty of knowledge takes cognizance of all our sensations and ideas, of both our sensational and spiritual development; and from these two sources are derived all the materials with which the faculty of knowledge has to deal; and by a study of these, and of the relations seen between them and the · laws which govern them, does the mind obtain all its notions, ideas. and thoughts, out of which to build up systems of science, whether of matter or of mind. In the study of our notions derived through sensation, there is no morality; nor can the intellect develop any moral ideas out of the notions of perception; it can but study the |