thing; it keeps the peace; it gives leisure and safety for improvement, and a chance of progress; order begins to prevail, property to be respected, cultivation goes on, the wants of the body are provided for, and the mind, too, begins to expand, new ideas of order and law to be developed, and real progress to be made.

Where the family become the ruler.

Monarchy, too, has originated in the family. has grown into the State, the head of it has We see instances of this in the early history of humanity as disclosed in the Bible. Those people had not yet degenerated into barbarians; hence the family became the root of authority and the ground of power. The necessity for a lawgiver and a judge existed there; and the natural lawgiver and judge, the father, became the civil ruler and civil judge, and thus the head of the State, into which the family might grow. Still, we can hardly trace any undisputed instances of a government so growing out of the family into the State. The great man would even then claim his right to rule, and necessity gave it to him. Nimrod was a great hunter, and hence a strong man, and he became a king of those cities among whose rubbish Layard has been lately searching for history. And such has been the fact wherever we can catch a glimpse of the birth of States or nations. The early records and traditions of every people which has worked its way out of barbarism to civilization, indicate a similar state of things. Some mighty man, some demigod, as tradition comes to regard him, gathered the rude populations and laid the foundation of the tribe and the State.

The hereditary feature of this kind of government grew also out of necessity. The ruler being the great man, the wisest man, would be likely to educate his children to a higher degree of knowledge and culture than any other; hence they would be better qualified to rule than most others; besides, a new choice involved grave difficulties, serious disputes and conflicts in the State itself. A new selection would imply competitors, when little re

spect would be paid to vote by ballot; hence a necessity existed that the power should descend from father to son, so that there could be no opportunity for conflict and bloodshed. And in the long run the system usually did as well as a new selection could have done, and secured men of more than average capacity; beside, when the heir was really incompetent, he has always been set aside by his most dutiful friends, and the next heir selected, if he was competent. In this way there has always existed a remedy against absolute incompetency in the earlier history of this form of government, when the great man, the strong man, was still a necessity. It will thus be seen that the hereditary feature in monarchy is no work of man's invention, but a result brought about by a kind of necessity recognized and allowed through fear of doing worse.

Monarchy could exist in the simple form but a short time, if the tribe grew into the State, and the State continued to enlarge itself. The duties of the State would soon grow beyond the ability or time of one man; hence the king would be compelled to divide up his duties, and call in the aid of others. In this way there would soon grow up habits of government, rendered necessary from the relation existing between the king and his servants; there would be ways in which things would be done, and these ways would grow into customs and laws; customs and laws by which both king, and minister, and people would be bound and protected, since each would know what might be done, and how it might be done. As important affairs increased, counselors would be called in, whose advice would be consulted and followed, and whose abilities would be made use of in the administration of the government. These officials and counselors would form a sort of nobility, a sort of society with which the king would be surrounded, and out of which he would continue to select those whose services would be needed in carrying on the administration of the government in peace and in war.

The decision of disputes would early become onerous to the king; hence all ordinary controversies would be referred to men appointed for that purpose; and the king would, in organizing them into a court of justice, place at their disposal so much power as would be necessary to compel the attendance of parties and witnesses, and enable the court to carry into effect the judgments rendered by it. In this way would courts grow up out of necessity; and out of the decisions and practice of the court would grow up customs and laws regulating rights between citizen and citizen; and by which every citizen would seek to be governed and directed. Thus law would gradually come to supersede the mere will of the sovereign, and society to make decided progress in civilization.

This administration of justice would soon become a matter of deep interest to every citizen, since the title to his property, and even his life and liberty, would be dependent upon the ability, honesty and learning of these judges. They would, however, be the mere agents of the king, appointed and removable at his will, and paid by him for their time and service, since they would be engaged in performing his duties, in administering his law, and declaring his justice. The people, as they became more intelligent, would watch the workings of the courts and the conduct of judges, through fear of partiality, from bribery, or undue influence from the king. He would also watch them lest his authority might be impaired; and soon conflicts would spring up between the judges and the king, since in some cases he might desire a decision one way while the law of the land required a decision the other way. If judges refused to obey, others might be appointed, would be appointed, and in this way the fountains of justice might be corrupted, and injustice come to be administered. No people would long submit to this, unless they had lost all idea of right; and hence disputes and conflicts, until judges held their appointments for life, and received a fixed compensation for their

services; so that they might act independently, and honestly distribute justice without corruption or unnecessary delay. Here would spring up a new idea in the public mind, the necessity of an independent judiciary. It would soon be discovered by a people in whose minds the idea of law was formed, that a rigid and impartial administration of it was as important as the law itself, and that such a state of things could only be obtained by judges whose place and position were fixed by law, and whose means of living were made certain by a competent compensation also fixed by law. This was the trial through which the English judiciary passed from an absolute dependence upon the king to an independent position, superior to that of any judiciary in the world; and as the fruits of it, justice has been administered in England for near two centuries with an ability and learning and integrity never before seen in the world's history. On the continent the courts became the creatures of the king, subservient to his will; and the history, therefore, of every important lawsuit was a history of delay, corruption, and injustice, until courts and kings were swept away together as utterly unendurable. No people can endure a corrupt or partial administration of the law; every citizen would feel that his life and property were held by an uncertain tenure; that he might be deprived of both at any time by the decision of venal and corrupt judges. When intelligence and civilization had advanced to a certain extent, such wrongs would have to be righted, or the wrong itself, with the doers of it, be got rid of; where, as in England, it was got rid of by reforming the abuse, the continuity of order would remain unbroken; otherwise old things would have to pass away, and new things be put in their place.

The right or power of raising means to carry on the State would give rise to customs which would assume in the end the force of law. Equality in taxation, however it was assessed, would, from the first, become a law of it. So, too, certain objects would be

come objects of taxation as well as certain trades and employments; they would be made the occasion of the right to call and the amount to be called for; so that there would soon arise laws of revenue, to which king and people would refer as a measure of the right of the one, and the liability of the other. If these laws were departed from, if more taxes were raised, or upon other objects, a spirit of dissatisfaction would arise, and conflicts and disputes arise between government and people. If the king succeeded in retaining his power of unlimited taxation, the government would become a despotism, and the people his mere property; while, on the other hand, if the people succeeded in limiting the power to a particular amount, or as an assessment at a fixed rate on certain property, labor and industry would be free, and the government prevented from ruining the people.

The government, whattendency in society, and

History thus shows that the tendency of this form of government is from will to law. Laws spring up in society of necessity the very moment progress makes its appearance. There must be some rule for every thing, or no one can know whether he is safe, or whether his property, or life, is his own. ever its form, must sympathize with this learn also to subject its action to fixed and known rules and laws. Unless the rulers do thus conform to the spirit and intelligence of their age, there must arise a conflict between it and the power of this spirit and intelligence. But the condition of its peaceful existence depends upon this harmony of action between itself and public sentiment; a whole people cannot endure the daily and constant exhibition of injustice and oppression in a government; the fact could only create bad feelings, antipathy, indignation in the public mind, until it would burst forth in popular rising and ultimate revolution. The results of such outbreaks are seen in magna charta, compacts between people and king, bills of rights and written constitutions, and limited monarchies, and free populations. In these conflicts with arbitrary power, the nobles have generally