Reformed doctrines of personal and eternal election, and reprobation or preterition follow. It is only necessary to present the language of our Confession, and point to its scriptural proofs on these subjects. Chap. III. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

"3. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others fore-ordained to everlasting death.

"4. These angels and men, thus predestinated and fore-ordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished.

"5. Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith or good works or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions, or causes moving him thereunto; and all to the praise of his glorious grace.

"6. As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, fore-ordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ; are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season; are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power, through faith, unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only.

"7. The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.

"8. The doctrine of this high mystery of predestination is to be handled with special prudence and care, that men attending the will of God revealed in his word, and yielding obedience thereunto, may, from the certainty of their effectual vocation, be assured of their eternal election. So shall this doctrine afford matter of praise, reverence, and admiration of God; and of humility, diligence, and abundant consolation to all that sincerely obey the Gospel."

PSYCHOLOGICAL, ETHICAL, AND METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES RELATED TO THEOLOGY.

Before proceeding to the contested points in anthropology and soterology, it will facilitate our progress to define certain

controverted terms, as also our attitude in regard to certain psychological and metaphysical principles inseparable from such discussions. We begin with the latter:

1. As to the will. All are agreed that it is free, and that, its acts or choices involve moral quality or accountability. The only question agitated is: What does this freedom imply or involve? It involves the power of self-determination, in the sense of choosing any object or its opposite, in accordance with our preponderating desires. But we deny any power of self-determination or contrary choice beyond this, i. e. any power of determining or choosing at any given moment of choice, not only as we do choose, or as we please, but the contrary of what we desire or are pleased to choose. So far from being requisite to freedom, moral agency, and responsibility, such a power would subvert them. It would destroy the very nature of freedom, which has its being in acting as we please, or not at all. It would make it a thing of indifference, of blind haphazard, irresponsible contingency. It would leave the universe under the dominion of almighty chance, and subvert the sovereignty and universality of divine Providence. Our most intimate consciousness denies any other liberty than that already set forth, or that we can be accountable for any fortuitous acts that spring up in defiance of our own pleasure or inclination.

The other chief psychological and metaphysical questions respect the morality of desires, feelings, and dispositions. Many contend that these are all void of moral quality in their own nature, or, at all events, beyond the point at which the will has had part in producing them. In regard to this, we hold 1. That the acts and traits of the human soul having moral quality, have it in virtue of their own nature; not in virtue of any originating cause back of themselves. Love to God and man is right, malice and envy are wrong, in themselves, irrespective of their origin. 2. The moral character of volitions depends on the feelings, desires, or intentions which prompt them, but not vice versa. If a man

determines to pull the trigger of a gun, the moral character of the volition depends entirely on the feeling and purpose with which it is done. Desires, then, do not receive from, they give to, volitions their moral character. 3. The ancient scholastic division of the mental faculties, which appears in such authors as Reid and Edwards, was into understanding and will, including under will all the non-cognitive powers. In this sense of the word "will," it is of course true that no desires or feelings which are not the effect of will, have moral character. But this is by no means admitting that no desires or feelings are moral which are not the fruits of will as a mere faculty of choice. It rather implies the opposite doctrine, maintained by us, denied by our opponents.

The question whether the spontaneous feelings and desires have moral quality is to be determined, not by any a priori judgments or theories, but by the simple testimony of the unperverted consciousness of mankind, and of the sacred oracles. Now the feelings, and the desires, which are all dependent and consequent on the feelings, since we desire what, and only what, awakens agreeable or complacent feelings, are divisible into two great classes- the animal and rational. The animal are those which arise blindly, without any intervention of reason or intelligence, as hunger and thirst. These have no moral character in themselves. The undue inflamation or indulgence of them, voluntarily and knowingly, is culpable. In contrast to the animal are the rational feelings and desires, which are those evoked by objects apprehended by the intelligence as pleasure in and desire for knowledge, heaven, righteousness, the service and glory of God. Now these are divisible into three classes, according as they respect objects morally good, bad, or indifferent. Feelings and desires relative to things indifferent are themselves indifferent, as in regard to colors and shapes. Feelings and desires in regard to things morally good or evil are themselves morally good or evil. This is clearly settled: 1. By the consciences of men, which condemn feelings of envy, malice, of delight in wickedness, and

of pain in view of whatsoever is pure and lovely and of good report. It condemns not only such feelings, but the corresponding desires and affections. When the chief priests and captains were "glad" at Judas's purposed betrayal of Christ, were they not so far forth culpable? And is not the testimony of the Bible explicit as to the moral quality of feelings and desires regarding moral objects? Do they not signify, not only that they who do things worthy of death are wicked, but also those who "have pleasure in them that do them" (Rom. i. 32)? And where do they rank the "desires of the flesh and the mind" (Eph. ii. 3)? "the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life " (1 John ii. 16)? But the explicit command of God is conclusive on this point: "Thou shalt not covet." That this is decisive of the present question clearly appears from the experimental exegesis of the apostle (Rom. vii. 7): "I had not known sin but by the law, for I had not known lust, except the law had said, thou shalt not covet."

This incidentally settles the question so much controverted, whether concupiscence is of the nature of sin. So far as mere blind animal cravings, or cravings for things indifferent are concerned, it is doubtless void of moral quality. But so far as it consists in lawless cravings for what is morally wrong, it is in every degree of it sinful.

A deeper question still, respects the morality of dispositions, or permanent habits of the soul which involve a tendency and facility to any given class of exercises. The only dispositions here in question are moral dispositions; that is, to good or bad moral exercises. On this point we have no doubt what is the judgment of the unperverted human conscience. Holy, benevolent, magnanimous dispositions men judge morally excellent and praiseworthy. And they no less certainly judge wicked, perverse, and malevolent dispositions criminal. They attach blame and illdesert to a disposition to lie, steal, slander, blaspheme, and this whether such disposition be natural or acquired. No ingenuity of metaphysics or metaphysical torture can en

tirely wrench such convictions out of the human soul. The collective dispositions of a man constitute his character. If they have no moral quality, his character has no moral quality. The scriptures clearly indicate the reality, and the good or ill desert of moral dispositions, when they tell us of the "good treasure of the heart" and "the evil treasure of the heart;" of the "good tree" and the "bad tree;" of the "old man" and the "new man;" the σáp, the opóvnua τῆς σαρκὸς, and the φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος (Rom. viii. 6, 7). However any may criticise one or more of these instances as inconclusive to our purpose, it cannot be questioned that, as a whole, they, with other like phrases, import an inward state which disposes to act, and is, in its own nature, either morally good or evil, praise or blame worthy. Nor does this, as some contend, imply that the substance or essence of the soul is polluted. The substance or essence of anything does not consist of changing or separable states, which may be present or absent, that substance still remaining in its entirety. Such are all habits, all moral dispositions, all treasures of education and culture, all continued yet changeable states of the soul, whether innate, acquired, or infused. Take the soul of the habitual drunkard or libertine, as it is between his acts of debasing indulgence. Is its state precisely as pure as it would be without such polluting practices? But does the very essence and substance of his soul therefore consist of corruption? Take that "governing purpose " into which some resolve the predominant character of man, be it holy or sinful. Whatever be its origin, it is none the less a state involving tendency or facility for a given kind of acts. It has moral character. But it is not the substance of the soul.

Nor does our psychology put the intellect, in some of its operations, wholly without the sphere of moral responsibility. It is so implicated in the moral states and exercises of the soul, that its judgments connected with them cannot be wholly void of moral quality. To this the unperverted human conscience and scripture alike testify. If we find