CHAP. VI. and a vast expanse of fine fertile country was become a temporary waste. The havoc committed by those wholesale plunderers was dreadful, and 1803. the consequent misery of the wretched and starving inhabitants who had been driven from their homes, was extreme. When we contemplate the peaceful security enjoyed at the present day by the harmless population of those provinces under the paternal rule of the East India Company, and compare it with the frightful state of anarchy, bloodshed, and rapine which marked the period of 1803, and times anterior to that, it must surely be admitted that the extension of the Company's power and dominion has been eminently favourable to the establishment of tranquillity and happiness, in regions which for ages had been suffering under misrule, violence, and never-ceasing strife. CHAPTER VII. JUNCTION OF THE BRITISH CORPS. POONAH.- ARRIVAL OF THE POLICY OF SCINDIAH AND WELLESLEY INVESTED WITH THE RAJAH OF BERAR.GENERAL CHAP. 1803. ON the 14th of April, General Wellesley was encamped at Sarhatty upon the Neera, where he expected to have been joined by Colonel Stevenson; but in consequence of the baggage of the latter having taken a wrong route on the previous day, the junction was not effected till the 15th near Akloos, about eight miles from the Neera, and 70 S. E. from Poonah. The great heat had by this time taken effect on the wheels of the gun and other carriages, which, with the badness of the roads, traversing the rocky beds of rivers, and rough banks of nullahs or water-courses, had caused many to become seriously damaged. They were, however, patched up, and by unremitting attention on the part of the general, no delay arose in the movements of his troops; but in order that his artillery might be placed in a thoroughly efficient state at Poonah, he wrote to request that the governor of Bombay would have forty new wheels prepared. When the junction of the two corps was thus effected, Holkar was known to have marched on Chandore, and Futty Sing and Meer Khan, after falling back as the British advanced, having united their VII. 1803. forces and retired towards Poonah, there remained CHAP. no longer any obstacle to the march of General Wellesley upon that city. Strong rumours had long prevailed of a confederacy likely to be formed amongst the Mahratta chieftains; and he was desirous that the questions of such confederacy, and whether the British would have to contend with it, should be brought to a speedy decision, chiefly for the following reasons: 1st, Because if there was Gurwood. Despatches, to be a war, he could carry it on with advantage &c. Apr.15. during the rainy season, on account of the facility with which his army would be able to cross the rivers, owing to the provision of boats already made. 2dly, The British force was better prepared to commence operations than were the Mahrattas. 3dly, It was of importance to ascertain the views and intentions of the Peshwah. To bring the question of peace or war to a test, General Wellesley was anxious that the Peshwah should desire Scindiah to recross the Nerbudda into his own territories. In the event of his compliance, and at the same time retaining the British minister in his camp, the general was of opinion that the army ought to be broken up; taking care, however, so to dispose of the troops as to have their services at command whenever they might be required. &c. Apr.16. The corps under Colonel Stevenson having been Gurwood. strengthened by the 94th regiment, termed the Despatches, Scotch Brigade, that officer was directed to ascend the Beemah river to a point near its confluence with the Moolamoota; leaving, however, the Nizam's troops within their own frontier opposite Gardoon. Repeated intimations had been received from .CHAP. .1803. Colonel Close that Amrut Rao intended to burn Poonah; and the Peshwah now sent to request the British general to detach some of his own chiefs with their troops, in order to provide for the safety of his family. Such a measure would not have attained the object, as even if the chiefs could have been prevailed upon to go to Poonah, their force was not equal to prevent Amrut Rao's design. But anxious to avert so dreadful a calamity, General Wellesley wrote a civil letter to Amrut Rao, announcing his approach, and informing him that he should take measures to ensure the safety and tranquillity of the city on his arrival there. He trusted that his letter might draw an answer, and that a vakeel would be sent by Amrut, whom he hoped to amuse with a correspondence until he should be able to put in execution a project he had formed for saving Poonah. Accordingly, on the evening of the 19th, when his camp was still about 40 miles from that city, he suddenly ordered the cavalry to mount, and, followed by a battalion, moved all night with great celerity; and had not a detention of several hours occurred in getting the cavalry guns through the Bhore ghaut, he might possibly have surprised Amrut in the place. But this chief receiving intelligence of the approach of the British, evacuated it without effecting his purpose; and General Wellesley's rapid march (no less than 60 miles in 30 hours) saved the city from the threatened destruction. Thus was the army marched to Poonah, without any step having been taken by the Mahratta princes to impede its progress, notwithstanding the threats they had held out; and General Wellesley found himself in force at a point from which nothing could VII. 1803. drive him, and where he would gain strength daily, CHAP. while they had not yet settled their own differences, nor agreed upon any measures against the British. Thus too, in the event of hostilities, would the seat of war be removed to a distance from the Company's territories, while the preparations made were such as to ensure its speedy and successful termination. General Wellesley was further of opinion that the decided step of advancing to Poonah could alone have saved the Nizam's dominions from invasion by Holkar's people; who having, like a swarm of locusts, laid the country completely bare, must have been compelled to seek the means of subsistence within the Nizam's frontier. Some repose was necessary for the troops after their long and fatiguing march; and the gun carriages having been greatly injured, artificers were set to work immediately to repair, as well as the means would admit of, the damage sustained. The cattle also having suffered very much, General Wellesley deemed it advisable to move towards the hills on the 26th, for the convenience of obtaining forage, when he received advice that Holkar had made a move towards the Nizam's frontier, and was on the 21st at a station about 16 miles from Gurwood. the Godavery river, within a short distance of his Despatches, own, of the Nizam's, and of Scindiah's territories. He subsequently crossed the Nizam's frontier near Aurungabad, and created some anxiety for the safety of that city, as well as for the fort of Dowlutabad.* Under these circumstances, General * One of the strongest forts in India, situated on the Nizam's northern frontier. &c. Apr. 26. |