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(B) COORDINATION WITH ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. Following consultations described in paragraph (1), the order issued by the President under subsection (c) imposing any sanction on a foreign person shall take effect unless the President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, that the government referred to in paragraph (1) has taken specific and effective actions, including the imposition of appropriate penalties, to terminate the involvement of the foreign person in any prohibited activity.

(C) EXTENSION OF PERIOD.-After the end of the period described in subparagraph (A), the President may delay, for up to an additional 90 days, the effective date of an order issued under subsection (b) imposing any sanction on a foreign person if the President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, that the appropriate foreign government is in the process of taking actions described in subparagraph (B).

(3) REPORT TO CONGRESS.-Before the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date on which an order is issued under subsection (c), the President shall submit to the Congress a report on

(A) the status of consultations under this subsection with the government referred to in paragraph (1); and

(B) the basis for any determination under paragraph (2) that such government has taken specific corrective actions. (f) 180 TERMINATION OF THE SANCTIONS.-Any sanction imposed on any person pursuant to an order issued under subsection (c) shall

(1) remain in effect for a period of not less than 12 months; and

(2) cease to apply after the end of such 12-month period only if the President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, that

(A) the person has ceased to engage in any prohibited activity; and

(B) the President has received reliable assurances from such person that the person will not, in the future, engage in any prohibited activity.

(g) 180 WAIVER.-The President may waive the continued application of any sanction imposed on any person pursuant to an order issued under subsection (c) if the President determines, and certifies in writing to the Congress, that the continued imposition of the sanction would have a serious adverse effect on the safety and soundness of the domestic or international financial system or on domestic or international payments systems.

(h) 180 ENFORCEMENT ACTION.-The Attorney General may bring an action in an appropriate district court of the United States for injunctive and other appropriate relief with respect to

(1) any violation of subsection (b); or

(2) any order issued pursuant to subsection (c).

(i) 180 KNOWINGLY DEFINED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.-For purposes of this section, the term "knowingly" means the state of mind of a person with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result in which

(A) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially certain to occur; or

(B) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur. (2) KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCE.—If knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist.

(j) 180 SCOPE OF APPLICATION.-This section shall apply with respect to prohibited activities which occur on or after the date this part takes effect.

SEC. 825.181 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK. * * *

SEC. 826.182 AMENDMENT TO THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT. * * SEC. 827.183 REWARD.

SEC. 828. REPORTS.

(a) 184 CONTENT OF ACDA ANNUAL REPORT.-*

(b) REPORTING ON DEMARCHES. (1) It is the sense of the Congress that the Department of State should, in the course of implementing its reporting responsibilities under section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, include a summary of demarches that the United States has issued or received from foreign governments with respect to activities which are of significance from the proliferation standpoint.

(2) For purposes of this section, the term "demarche" means any official communication by one government to another, by written or oral means, intended by the originating government to express

(A) a concern over a past, present, or possible future action or activity of the recipient government, or of a person within the jurisdiction of that government, contributing to the global spread of unsafeguarded special nuclear material or of nuclear explosive devices;

(B) a request for the recipient government to counter such action or activity; or

(C) both the concern and request described in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

SEC. 830. DEFINITIONS.

For purposes of this part

(1) the term "foreign person" means

181 Sec. 825 amended sec. 2(b)4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (12 USC. 6356/4)) 182 Sec. 825(a) added a new chapter 10 to the Arms Export Control Act, relating to nadear proliferation controls (22 U.S.C. 2799aa et seq) Sec. 826b) repealed secs. 669 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2429, 24298) Sec. 526(c, made corresponding tech nical amendments.

13 Sec. 827 amended sec. 36(a) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 196 (22 U.S.C. 2708(a))

14 Sec. 828(a) amended sec. 51(a) of the Arme Control and Disarmament A

(A) an individual who is not a citizen of the United States or an alien admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) a corporation, partnership, or other nongovernment entity which is created or organized under the laws of a foreign country or which has its principal place of business outside the United States;

(2) the term "goods or technology" means

(A) nuclear materials and equipment and sensitive nuclear technology (as such terms are defined in section 4 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978), all export items designated by the President pursuant to section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, and all technical assistance requiring authorization under section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and

(B) in the case of exports from a country other than the United States, any goods or technology that, if exported from the United States, would be goods or technology described in subparagraph (A);

(3) the term "IAEA safeguards" means the safeguards set forth in an agreement between a country and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(4) the term “nuclear explosive device" means any device, whether assembled or disassembled, that is designed to produce an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from the detonation. of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT);

(5) the term "non-nuclear-weapon state" means any country which is not a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by Article IX (3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968; (6) the term "special nuclear material" has the meaning given that term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014aa);

(7) the term “United States person" means—

(A) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or an alien admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) a corporation, partnership, or other nongovernment entity which is not a foreign person; and

(8) the term "unsafeguarded special nuclear material" means special nuclear material which is held in violation of IAEA safeguards or not subject to IAEA safeguards (excluding any quantity of material that could, if it were exported from the United States, be exported under a general license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).

SEC. 831. EFFECTIVE DATE.

The provisions of this part, and the amendments made by this part, shall take effect 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

PART C-INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 185 SEC. 841. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES.

It is the sense of the Congress that in order to maintain and enhance international confidence in the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards and in other multilateral undertakings to halt the global proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States should seek to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to-(1) build international support for the principle that nuclear supply relationships must require purchasing nations to agree to full-scope international safeguards;

(2) encourage each nuclear-weapon state within the meaning of the Treaty to undertake a comprehensive review of its own procedures for declassifying information relating to the design or production of nuclear explosive devices and to investigate any measures that would reduce the risk of such information contributing to nuclear weapons proliferation;

(3) encourage the deferral of efforts to produce weapons grade nuclear material for large-scale commercial uses until such time as safeguards are developed that can detect, on a timely and reliable basis, the diversion of significant quantities of such material for nuclear explosive purposes;

(4) pursue greater financial support for the implementation and improvement of safeguards from all IAEA member nations with significant nuclear programs, particularly from those fa tions that are currently using or planning to use weapons grade nuclear material for commercial purposes,

(5) arrange for the timely payment of annual financial cons tributions by all members of the IAEA, including the Comed States;

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(11) seek agreement among the parties to the Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and to establish new limits on the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

SEC. 842. LAEA INTERNAL REFORMS.

In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in the implementation of the safeguards responsibilities of the IAEA, the Congress urges the President to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to

(1) improve the access of the IAEA within nuclear facilities that are capable of producing, processing, or fabricating special nuclear material suitable for use in a nuclear explosive device;

(2)(A) facilitate the IAEA's efforts to meet and to maintain its own goals for detecting the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment, giving particular attention to facilities in which there are bulk quantities of plutonium; and

(B) if it is not technically feasible for the IAEA to meet those detection goals in a particular facility, require the IAEA to declare publicly that it is unable to do so;

(3) enable the IAEA to issue fines for violations of safeguards procedures, to pay rewards for information on possible safeguards violations, and to establish a "hot line" for the reporting of such violations and other illicit uses of weapons-grade nuclear material;

(4) establish safeguards at facilities engaged in the manufacture of equipment or material that is especially designated or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material or, in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, of any nuclear explosive device;

(5) establish safeguards over nuclear research and development activities and facilities;

(6) implement special inspections of undeclared nuclear facilities, as provided for under existing safeguards procedures, and seek authority for the IAEA to conduct challenge inspections on demand at suspected nuclear sites;

(7) expand the scope of safeguards to include tritium, uranium concentrates, and nuclear waste containing special fissionable material, and increase the scope of such safeguards on heavy water;

(8) revise downward the IAEA's official minimum amounts of nuclear material ("significant quantity") needed to make a nuclear explosive device and establish these amounts as national rather than facility standards;

(9) expand the use of full-time resident IAEA inspectors at sensitive fuel cycle facilities;

(10) promote the use of near real time material accountancy in the conduct of safeguards at facilities that use, produce, or store significant quantities of special fissionable material;

(11) develop with other IAEA member nations an agreement on procedures to expedite approvals of visa applications by IAEA inspectors;

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